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# FM 30-5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

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## COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DECEMBER 1956

FM 30-5 COMBAT INTELLIGENCE—1956

## COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	Paragraph	Page
Section I. General.....	1, 2	3
II. Definitions.....	3-8	3
III. Production of combat intelligence.....	9-13	6
CHAPTER 2. COLLECTION—SOURCES AND AGENCIES		
Section I. Introduction.....	14-17	9
II. Description of sources.....	18-28	13
III. Information collecting agencies—general.....	29, 30	16
IV. Availability of agencies.....	31-37	19
CHAPTER 3. PROCESSING INFORMATION		
Section I. Introduction.....	38	24
II. Recording—division.....	39-43	24
III. Evaluation—division.....	44-47	27
IV. Interpretation—division.....	48-51	30
V. Processing at higher echelons.....	52-55	31
CHAPTER 4. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE		
Section I. Introduction.....	56	33
II. Preparation of the intelligence estimate.....	57-63	33
III. Determination of enemy capabilities.....	64-66	47
CHAPTER 5. USE OF INTELLIGENCE		
Section I. Introduction.....	67, 68	56
II. Means of dissemination.....	69-72	57
III. The periodic intelligence report.....	73-76	60
IV. The tactical study of weather and terrain.....	77-85	63
CHAPTER 6. DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT		
Section I. Introduction.....	86	83
II. Essential elements of information.....	87-97	84
III. Use of EEI.....	98-106	91
IV. The collection plan.....	107-115	97
V. Orders and requests.....	116-118	101
CHAPTER 7. RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE		
Section I. Ground reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.....	119-126	105
II. Air reconnaissance.....	127-134	110
III. Army air reconnaissance.....	135-136	115
IV. Supporting services.....	137-139	116
CHAPTER 8. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS		
Section I. Maps.....	140-143	118
II. Air photos.....	144-149	120
III. Air photo interpretation.....	150-152	126
IV. Panoramic photography.....	153	129

	Paragraph	Page
CHAPTER 9. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE		
Section I. General.....	154-159	130
II. Counterintelligence procedures.....	160-163	134
III. Counterintelligence operations.....	164-169	135
CHAPTER 10. INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS		
Section I. Military intelligence personnel.....	170-172	142
II. Staff organization and functions.....	173-179	143
CHAPTER 11. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE		
Section I. Intelligence training.....	180-190	165
II. Intelligence standing operating procedure.....	191	169
CHAPTER 12. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING		
Section I. Introduction.....	192-194	171
II. Division planning.....	195-197	171
III. Intelligence planning at higher echelons.....	198-200	175
IV. Intelligence planning for special operations.....	201-203	177
APPENDIX I. REFERENCES.....		180
II. EXAMPLE OF A CLIMATIC SUMMARY.....		182
III. EXAMPLE OF A CLIMATIC STUDY.....		184
IV. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR WEATHER INFORMATION WITHIN THE FIELD ARMY.....		186
V. EXAMPLE OF TACTICAL STUDY OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN.....		193
VI. EXAMPLE OF STATEMENT OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.....		199
VII. GUIDE TO DETERMINATION OF INDICATIONS.....		202
VIII. EXAMPLE, INTELLIGENCE ANNEX.....		211
IX. FORM, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.....		221
X. EXAMPLE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, CORPS.....		223
XI. FORM, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORKSHEET.....		229
XII. EXAMPLE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORKSHEET (PARTIAL).....		230
XIII. FORM, DAILY CIC REPORT.....		232
XIV. OUTLINE FORM, INTELLIGENCE PARAGRAPH, DIVISION SOP.....		233
XV. OUTLINE FORM, DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SECTION SOP.....		235
XVI. EXAMPLE, G2 SECTION SOP, INFANTRY DIVISION.....		237
XVII. FORM, ARMY INTELLIGENCE PLAN, WITH APPENDIXES.....		247
INDEX.....		262

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### Section I. GENERAL

#### 1. Purpose and Scope

a. The purpose of this manual is to furnish guidance for the production and use of combat intelligence. This manual contains the combat intelligence doctrine applicable at division, corps, army, army group, communications zone, and theater army levels, and is the basic manual on which other combat intelligence manuals are based.

b. This manual describes the organization of intelligence staffs at division and higher echelons; the means and methods of collecting information; the production of intelligence from information; the uses of intelligence; command counterintelligence principles and operations; intelligence training; and intelligence planning. Details of procedures and techniques which are related to combat intelligence but which are described in other intelligence manuals or in basic branch manuals are not included in this manual.

#### 2. Responsibilities

a. The commander is responsible for all intelligence activities of his command (FM 100-5 and FM 101-5).

b. Planning and coordination of those functions of command which pertain to military intelligence and counterintelligence are the general staff responsibilities of the assistant chief of staff, G2 (FM 101-5).

### Section II. DEFINITIONS

#### 3. Military Intelligence

Military intelligence is knowledge of a possible or actual enemy or area of operations acquired by the collection, evaluation, and interpretation of military information, together with conclusions drawn therefrom. Military intelligence includes deductions concerning current and future enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. Military intelligence also includes counterintelligence.

#### 4. Combat Intelligence

Combat intelligence is that knowledge of the enemy, the weather, and the terrain which is used in the planning and conduct of tactical operations.



## 5. Strategic Intelligence

a. Strategic intelligence is that knowledge of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations for use of high-level military commanders charged with the planning and execution of national security measures in time of peace, and in the planning and with the conduct of military operations in time of war.

b. Commanders responsible for carrying out large-scale operations must consider strategic intelligence at their particular level commensurate with the scope of their mission and operation. Although strategic intelligence information may be collected by the lowest echelons of command, such information becomes significant at the army level and increasingly more significant in each succeeding higher echelon of command.

## 6. Comparison of Strategic and Combat Intelligence

a. *General.* The distinction between strategic intelligence and combat intelligence is essentially in scope and point of view. Both are concerned with knowledge of foreign nations and with areas of actual or possible military operations. Both are produced by application of the same fundamental techniques.

b. *Subject Matter.*

- (1) Strategic intelligence is concerned with the total war-making potential of foreign nations, and is produced continuously both in peace and in war. Commanders and staffs below field army level are ordinarily concerned with strategic intelligence only incidentally, principally as an aid to the production of combat intelligence.
- (2) Combat intelligence is concerned with a relatively local situation: the opposing enemy, and the weather and terrain of a present or probable field of battle. It is produced in the field in time of war or during other periods which require deployment of United States forces. It is used in the planning and conduct of tactical operations at all levels.

c. *Time Required.*

- (1) Strategic intelligence is seldom produced rapidly. It is ordinarily the product of the painstaking assemblage and study of masses of detailed information.
- (2) Combat intelligence normally involves rapid evaluation and interpretation of current information, and prompt dissemination of the resulting intelligence.

d. *Related Subjects.* Many of the subjects of interest to strategic intelligence and combat intelligence are closely related. They are often identical.

- (1) Information and intelligence originally produced for strategic purposes are frequently useful in the conduct of tactical oper-

ations. In this category are maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, and other terrain features; studies of transportation and communications systems; data on trafficability, cross-country movement, climate, and hydrography; political, sociological, and economic studies; and order of battle studies on foreign armies, navies, and air forces. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, field commanders may be obliged to depend almost entirely upon strategic intelligence for their initial knowledge of the enemy and the area of operations.

- (2) Much of the information collected by combat units assists in the production of strategic intelligence. Some information, such as identification of the units opposing a friendly division, or the technical characteristics of a newly encountered enemy weapon, may be used in the production of both combat and strategic intelligence. Other information collected by combat units may be useless for the production of combat intelligence, but valuable in the production of strategic intelligence; for example, information furnished by prisoners of war on political and economic conditions within the enemy homeland.

## 7. Counterintelligence

*a. Counterintelligence* is activity which pertains to all security control measures designed to insure the safeguarding of information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage. Counterintelligence includes *passive* measures, such as secrecy discipline, *active* measures, such as the use of smoke against enemy observation posts, and certain *deceptive* measures, such as the dissemination of false information. Counterintelligence also includes the detection of treason, sedition, and disaffection among military and civilian personnel of the Army.

*b. Intelligence security* is counterintelligence within the intelligence service. Its objective is the preservation of secrecy regarding the nature, type, extent, and success of our intelligence services and activities. This objective is achieved principally by careful selection of intelligence personnel; by maintenance of secrecy regarding sources, methods, requirements, and results; and by compliance with appropriate provisions of AR 380-5. Intelligence security is an individual responsibility of all persons, military or civilian, who now perform or who have ever performed intelligence duties. It is a responsibility which does not cease with transfer to other duties, discharge, or retirement.

## 8. Other Categories

Although all military intelligence may be classified broadly as strategic or combat, there are other terms which refer, generally, to the type of

information from which the resulting intelligence is derived. The more important of these are—

*a. Order of Battle Intelligence.* Order of battle intelligence is intelligence concerning the strength, identification, dispositions, organization, equipment, tactics, combat efficiency, and history of enemy units, and personal data concerning enemy commanders. Order of battle intelligence is used in the production of both combat and strategic intelligence (FM 30-19).

*b. Technical Intelligence.* Technical intelligence is intelligence concerning foreign technological developments which have advanced to the point of having a practical application for war purposes. It includes all steps in development which follow the initial application of a scientific principle or theory for the purpose of waging war. More specifically, it is intelligence pertaining to the principles of design and operation, nomenclature, physical characteristics, performance, operational capabilities, and limitations of foreign materiel and facilities used by or for the support of foreign armed forces. It also comprises the manufacture, storage, installation, maintenance, and operating aspects of foreign materiel and facilities, including the effects of weather, terrain, other environmental factors, and military action thereon. It also includes the order of battle of foreign agencies having functions analogous to those of the technical services in the U. S. Army. Technical intelligence is used in the production of both strategic and combat intelligence (FM 30-16).

*c. Communications Intelligence.* Communications intelligence is intelligence derived from the study of enemy signal communications. Communications intelligence is used in the production of both combat and strategic intelligence.

### **Section III. PRODUCTION OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE**

#### **9. Steps in Production**

*a.* The production of combat intelligence occurs in a cycle of four steps—

- (1) Collection of information.
- (2) Processing of the collected information.
- (3) Use of the resulting intelligence.
- (4) Direction of the collection effort.

*b.* At the same time that new information is being collected in response to direction, other information is being processed and intelligence is being used. For simplicity in organization, however, this manual treats the collection of information as the first of four *successive* steps (fig. 1).

#### **10. Collection**

*a.* Collection is the systematic exploitation of sources of information and the reporting of the information thus obtained to the proper intelligence agencies. Collection is discussed in chapter 2.

## THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE




Figure 1. The intelligence cycle.

b. Battlefield surveillance is the collection of combat intelligence information by any means of observation. Surveillance means include air photos, visual observation, radar, and infrared, seismic, and acoustic devices.

### 11. Processing

a. Processing is the step whereby information becomes intelligence. It comprises the operations of *recording*, *evaluating*, and *interpreting*.

- (1) Recording involves not only reducing information to writing or to other graphical forms of presentation, but also the grouping together of related items of information to facilitate evaluation and interpretation.
- (2) Evaluation is the examination of information to determine its pertinence, the reliability of the originating source and of the

reporting agency, and the probability that the information is true (accuracy).

- (3) Interpretation is the analysis of evaluated information, and its integration with what is already known, to determine its significance.

*b.* Proper recording, evaluation and interpretation of information produce intelligence that is concise, free from irrelevant matter, and ready for immediate use. Such intelligence will convey not only facts, but also the significance of those facts, together with all deductions drawn from their study in the light of other available intelligence.

*c.* The intelligence officer is assisted in processing by personnel organic to the intelligence section, attached intelligence specialists, and by other members of the staff. Processing is discussed in chapter 3.

## **12. Use**

Combat intelligence is used primarily by the commander to make decisions, prepare plans, conduct operations, and avoid surprise. It is a necessary initial consideration in preparing an estimate of the situation. Combat intelligence is also used by G2 and other members of the staff in their own continuing estimates, and by higher, lower and adjacent headquarters. Use of combat intelligence is discussed in chapter 5.

## **13. Direction**

*a.* Direction of the collection effort involves—

- (1) Determination of intelligence requirements.
- (2) Preparation of a collection plan.
- (3) Issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies.
- (4) Continuous check on the productivity of collection agencies.

*b.* Direction of the collection effort is discussed in chapter 6.

## CHAPTER 2

### COLLECTION—SOURCES AND AGENCIES

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#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

#### 14. General

a. Intelligence can be neither better nor more complete than the information from which it is derived; however, the collection of information is the most difficult step in the intelligence cycle. The enemy's interests demand that he make every practicable effort to foil our attempts to gain information. Accordingly, he attempts to conceal his strength, dispositions, and movements; he enforces censorship and communications security measures; he often disseminates false information and adopts tactical measures designed to deceive us.

b. In order to penetrate the enemy's countermeasures against our intelligence effort, the intelligence officer must exploit continually every conceivable source of pertinent information.

#### 15. Sources and Agencies

a. Sources of information are the actual *origin* from which the information is obtained. Collecting agencies are the *means* employed to obtain the information. Agencies are under our guidance and control; sources as a rule are not.

b. A *source* is the person, thing, or activity from which information is obtained. Enemy activity is the source of most information of combat intelligence value.

c. An *agency* is any individual or organization which collects or processes information. Some agencies only collect; some only process; some do both.

#### 16. Information Sought by Division

a. The purpose of combat intelligence is to provide the commander with that knowledge of the enemy, the weather, and the terrain which will enable him to employ his forces in the manner best suited to the accomplishment of his mission.

b. The information sought as a basis for combat intelligence therefore includes—

(1) Information of the enemy; for example—

(a) Enemy unit identifications.

(b) Boundary locations and other details of the enemy's dispositions, especially the locations of automatic weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, and atomic delivery means.



- (c) Locations of observation posts and command posts.
- (d) Movement of enemy troops, and routes used for movement and supply.
- (e) Locations of logistical installations.
- (f) Daily routines of enemy units.
- (2) Information of the weather; for example—
  - (a) Precipitation, height and amount of cloud cover, temperature, and visibility conditions.
  - (b) Wind speed and direction.
  - (c) Light data.
- (3) Information of the terrain; for example—
  - (a) Effect of weather on terrain and visibility.
  - (b) Locations of areas from which observation and fields of fire are available.
  - (c) Locations of areas which afford concealment or cover.
  - (d) Locations and status of roads, railroads, rivers, and bridges.
  - (e) Trafficability.

## 17. Information Sought by Higher Echelons

### a. Corps.

- (1) The information sought by corps for the production of combat intelligence is essentially the same as the information sought by divisions. However, corps G2 is concerned with the collection efforts of the units directly in contact and with the efforts of the collecting agencies which can penetrate more deeply into the enemy area beyond the zone of division interest. Moreover, corps G2 seeks information as a basis for intelligence to support the current and projected corps operations. Corps intelligence planning requires a greater lead time than is required for division operations.
- (2) From its subordinate divisions, corps receives processed intelligence. Corps G2's principal concern is the reevaluation and reinterpretation of information in broader perspective, supplemented by additional information furnished by collection agencies directly under corps control.

### b. Army.

- (1) Like corps, army receives from its subordinate units processed intelligence. Also like corps, army reevaluates and reinterprets information and intelligence, supplemented and in broader perspective. Like corps, army is concerned with the collection of information by means of tactical air reconnaissance and communications reconnaissance. Unlike corps, Army is concerned with the use of clandestine agents. Lead time for intelligence planning and collection is considerably greater at army level than at subordinate echelons. Much of the field

army G2's effort is concerned with projected army operations two weeks to three months in advance of current operations.

- (2) Army's territorial and administrative responsibilities dictate a greater interest in counterintelligence than occurs at lower echelons; hence, the army emphasizes collection of information leading to the detection of espionage, sabotage, and subversion.
- (3) To a limited extent, the field army is concerned also with the collection of strategic information and the production of strategic intelligence.
- (4) Army civil affairs/military government agencies require information and intelligence on population; political structures; local resources of food, clothing, and shelter; and similar matters. Special staff planning agencies require information and intelligence of road and rail nets, local resources, labor forces, and similar economic political and sociological information. Although Army G2 is responsible for coordinating the overall collection effort, evaluation of the capacity, condition, and desirability of locations for technical service installations; condition and capacities of existing transportation facilities; estimation of the skill and size of the indigenous labor forces, and similar specialized uses, are functions of the technical service and civil affairs/military government staff sections concerned, and not of the G2.

*c. Army Group.*

- (1) The principal functions of army group are planning and coordination rather than the detailed supervision and direction of tactical operations which occur at division, corps, and army. Accordingly, the emphasis on combat intelligence is lessened at army group with increased emphasis on the strategic intelligence required for long-range planning.
- (2) The intelligence and information required by army group are supplied by theater army, navy, and air forces; by the subordinate field armies and task forces; and by coordinate echelons. Like the G2 of corps and army, the army group G2 reevaluates and reinterprets the available combat intelligence with cognizance of strategic plans and intelligence.

*d. Communications Zone.*

- (1) The communications zone intelligence division assembles and produces intelligence in four general categories:
  - (a) Enemy capabilities which could produce major dislocations within the communications zone, for example, significant atomic and/or chemical, biological, and radiological attacks against the communications zone; major air and airborne threats; or ground offensive which, if implemented, would

result in rearward adjustment of the combat zone rear boundary.

- (b) Installations, communications, and other facilities under enemy control which are of probable future use to communications zone.
  - (c) The individual capabilities and vulnerabilities of by-passed pockets of resistance, and guerilla bands.
  - (d) Counterintelligence.
- (2) Intelligence of the categories enumerated in (1)(a) and (b) above is produced by high-level tactical and strategic echelons: theater; theater army, navy, and air force; and army group. Intelligence of the category described in (1)(b) above is produced also by technical service intelligence personnel. Although the communications zone intelligence division assembles and correlates the intelligence reports of various agencies, and coordinates requests for information and intelligence, it performs detailed evaluation and interpretation in these two categories as required by the commander.
- (3) Accordingly, the collection effort of communications zone G2—so far as combat intelligence is concerned—emphasizes counter-intelligence and determination of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of bypassed pockets of resistance and guerilla bands. Information sought as a basis for decisions resulting in tactical action against bypassed groups and guerillas is approximately the same as the information of the enemy sought by divisions (par. 16b).

*e. Theater Army.*

- (1) Like army group, but to an even greater degree, theater army headquarters is concerned with long-range planning and the issuance of general instructions and policy guidance. Accordingly, theater army does not ordinarily collect information for the purpose of producing combat intelligence, although certain theater army agencies employed in the collection of strategic intelligence, or for other purposes, may incidentally acquire information of tactical value.
- (2) The agencies with which theater army deals directly on intelligence matters are, normally, themselves producers of strategic intelligence. Hence, a tremendous volume of intelligence flows into the theater army intelligence division. Insofar as combat intelligence is concerned, the theater army problem is not one of collection, but of processing—particularly of the reduction of masses of information and intelligence to comprehensible dimensions, and of reevaluation, reanalysis, and reinterpretation in theaterwide perspective.

## Section II. DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES

### 18. Enemy Activity

a. The volume and types of information available from sensory, photographic, and electronic surveillance of enemy activity are restricted principally by limitations of the means of surveillance. Some limitations are inherent; for example, the inability of listening posts to hear beyond a certain distance. Other limitations are imposed by enemy counter-measures; for example, enemy use of smoke and camouflage, and of artillery firing to cover the sound of vehicular movement.

b. Enemy activity is sometimes simulated; for example, construction of dummy positions and the use of sound and flash devices. Enemy activity is sometimes intentionally deceptive, for example, movement of troops to an apparent assembly area during daylight hours, followed by their movement to another location at night.

c. Information that the enemy has *not* engaged in certain activities is frequently of greater value than information of what the enemy has done or is doing. For example, information that the enemy has not moved his reserve to extend an open flank may provide assurance of the success of our projected attack.

### 19. Enemy Military Personnel

a. *General.* Enemy military personnel, including prisoners of war, deserters, wounded, and dead, are among the most lucrative sources of military information.

b. *Prisoners of War.*

- (1) Prisoners of war divulge information, advertently or inadvertently, through interrogation. They frequently carry personal or official documents which, either alone or when compared with other known data, reveal new information or confirm information which is already known. The condition of prisoners' clothing and equipment, and their very demeanor may often be informative.
- (2) Information obtainable from prisoners of war includes, but is not limited to: unit identifications, troops dispositions, combat efficiency and training, contemplated movements, arms and equipment, morale, personal data on commanders, unit history, routes of communications, fortifications, and the effects of our psychological warfare operations.
- (3) Maximum information is obtained through skillful handling of prisoners of war from the time of capture throughout all interrogations. Techniques of segregation, search, evacuation, and interrogation are discussed in FM 30-15.

c. *Deserters.* Enemy deserters are handled as prisoners of war, but are segregated from other prisoners. Since deserters may exhibit ideas and

attitudes which are not typical of the bulk of the opposing troops, and may even include false deserters delivered into our hands for deceptive purposes, reports of interrogation of deserters are clearly marked "Information from Deserter."

d. *Wounded and Dead.* Enemy wounded and dead are searched for documents and marks of unit identification. Enemy wounded are frequently more responsive to interrogation than are unwounded prisoners of war.

## **20. Friendly Personnel**

a. Military and civilian personnel of our own and allied forces who have been within enemy territory and who have evaded capture or escaped normally owe their return to their having successfully avoided contact with the enemy. They may, nevertheless, be able to furnish limited information concerning roads, railways, bridges, enemy troop concentrations, and similar matters, but usually are unable to supply data as to exact location and times of observation.

b. Liberated civilians, refugees, displaced persons, and cooperative enemy nationals ordinarily are not trained military observers. Nevertheless they may have information useful in the production of strategic intelligence, and at times are able to furnish information of combat intelligence value. Personnel of these categories are screened carefully in order to detect and apprehend line-crossing or stay-behind enemy agents.

## **21. Captured Documents**

a. *Definition.* A captured document is any piece of recorded information which has been in the hands of the enemy.

b. *Exploitation.* Captured documents, when classified and examined by qualified persons, furnish information which is ordinarily more reliable than information obtained from prisoners of war. This information may include order of battle, plans, status of supply, technical methods, codes, ciphers, and similar items. Exploitation of captured documents is discussed in detail in FM 30-15.

c. *Evacuation.* Documents taken from a prisoner of war are evacuated with the prisoner, in custody of a guard, so that the prisoner can be interrogated as to the content of the documents. Documents from other sources are transmitted through intelligence channels. Below division, documents are delayed for a minimum of time for processing and quick inspection for information of immediate tactical value to the unit then in possession (see FM 30-15).

## **22. Enemy Materiel**

a. Captured materiel is rarely of direct and immediate combat intelligence value (par. 33c(2)). Examination of captured materiel by technically qualified personnel ultimately serves any of four principal purposes:

- (1) Development of effective counterweapons and countertactics.
- (2) Exploitation of new ideas for our own benefit.
- (3) Deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war.
- (4) Use by our forces of enemy materiel, to include the publication of literature and other aids to assist in troop training.

b. FM 30-16 discusses the responsibilities of individuals and agencies with respect to captured materiel. Technical service intelligence detachments (TSID) collect and study enemy materiel appropriate to their respective technical services and prepare reports evaluating components, use, effectiveness, and—when applicable—instructions to US troops in its use, maintenance, storage, and evacuation.

### **23. Enemy Signal Communications**

Intercepted enemy signal communications furnish information of plans and orders, unit identifications, locations of transmitters, and similar data.

### **24. Duds, Shell Fragments, Craters, and Chemically, Biologically or Radiologically Contaminated Areas**

Duds and shell fragments are a source of information as to the type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons. Analysis of shell craters by qualified personnel may lead to the locations of supporting weapons. Examination of areas contaminated by chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) agents may lead to identification of agents employed. Submission of reports of shelling is a responsibility of the affected units. Submission of reports of enemy of CBR agents is a responsibility of all commands having knowledge thereof.

### **25. Photographs**

Photographs, both aerial and ground, are lucrative sources of detailed information on both terrain and enemy activity, particularly fortifications installations, lines of communications, weapons positions, the organization of tactical localities, and the location and extent of assembly areas. Intelligence utilization of photographs is discussed in chapter 8, Maps and Photographs.

### **26. Maps and Terrain Models**

a. Maps are the principal source of information used by the intelligence officer in making tactical terrain studies. The intelligence officer prepares and maintains defense and enemy situation maps. (Defense maps are maps overprinted with detailed information on enemy fixed defensive installations. Enemy situation maps show the current dispositions of enemy forces and other data (par. 44)).

b. A terrain model is a 3-dimensional graphic representation of an area, showing the conformation of the ground, modeled to scale, and



usually colored to emphasize certain physical features. The vertical scale is usually exaggerated, without severe distortion, to emphasize relief. Terrain models with exaggerated scales may be used for special studies and in oral presentation of special intelligence estimates.

## **27. Weather Forecasts, Studies, and Reports**

- a. For definitions, see paragraph 78.
- b. Weather information is furnished by Air Weather Service detachments at corps and higher headquarters. Weather information is disseminated through intelligence channels, and intelligence officers are responsible for its interpretation.

## **28. Miscellaneous**

Other sources of information include strategic and tactical terrain studies prepared by various agencies; intelligence reports prepared by higher, lower, and adjacent units; and reference materials prepared by or for the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, General Staff, US Army.

# **Section III. INFORMATION COLLECTING AGENCIES—GENERAL**

## **29. General**

A collection agency is an individual or organization which acquires information by surveillance, interrogation, or other exploitation of a source, or by research. Collection agencies comprise intelligence specialists, troops, and special information services.

## **30. Collecting Agencies**

a. *Intelligence Specialists.* Intelligence specialists are personnel trained in the specialized aspects of intelligence. Some intelligence specialists are collection agencies; for example, prisoner of war interrogators, air photo interpreters, and military intelligence interpreters (pars. 31-37, and 173-179).

b. *Troops.* Troops which are considered as collection agencies are the assigned, attached, and supporting units of a command which acquire information, principally through contact with the enemy.

c. *Special Information Services.*

- (1) Special information services are, in general, technical or highly specialized agencies which collect information of a particular type, from particular sources, or by specialized means; for example, Technical Service Intelligence Detachments collect information of particular types; communications reconnaissance units collect information from a particular source and supporting air force reconnaissance units collect information by specialized means.

- (2) Special information services are operated by the arms and services, primarily to serve special interests of the branches concerned. They frequently do not depend upon contact with the enemy for the collection of information.
- (3) Special information services include—
  - (a) *Technical service intelligence detachments (TSID)*.
    1. Each technical service maintains intelligence detachments composed of its own personnel for purposes which include—
      - (a) Collecting and reporting information obtained from study of enemy or other foreign materiel.
      - (b) Selecting and expediting the evacuation of captured materiel for intelligence exploitation.
      - (c) Assisting in the location, evaluation, and intelligence exploitation of enemy personnel, documents, materiel, facilities, or installations affording information of great scientific, technical, or military value.
      - (d) Conducting technical service intelligence examination of information repositories and participating in the production and maintenance of information and intelligence peculiar to the needs of the technical service concerned, and the supported unit.
      - (e) Rendering other technical intelligence support as required.
    2. TSID's normally are assigned to theater army and are attached to subordinate commands down to and including corps. They function under control of the appropriate special staff officer of the command to which attached. G2 places intelligence requirements on an attached TSID through the special staff officer concerned. Ordinarily, combat intelligence requirements imposed by G2 have priority over technical intelligence requirements.
    3. TSID reports are disseminated through technical service channels. Intelligence derived from TSID reports is disseminated through intelligence channels.
  - (b) *Communications reconnaissance units*. Communications reconnaissance units at division, corps, and army furnish information obtained from study of enemy signal communications.
  - (c) *Special staff sections*.
    1. Officers of the special staff at each echelon, and the troops under their command or control, obtain or produce in the course of normal combat operations a variety of information of value in the production of intelligence. At army and higher echelons, special staff sections also produce, and make available to G2, intelligence of special interest to the technical or administrative service concerned.
    2. At corps and division, examination of captured materiel by technical service personnel sometimes provides information

of immediate value, although such information is necessarily less comprehensive and detailed than the later reports of TSID's. Hasty examination of a captured tank may, for example, disclose that the tank is of a type not previously encountered. This may result in the identification of a new unit in the enemy's order of battle, but probably will not result in an immediate and accurate estimate of the tank's capabilities and vulnerabilities. On the other hand, brief study of a new type mine or a new technique of mine-field marking may reveal information of immediate tactical value.

3. Information and specialized intelligence obtained from higher echelons through technical service channels is made available to G2 by the special staff. The special staff may also make for G2 pertinent extracts of reports, studies, and other documents obtained from higher headquarters, or supplement such studies and reports with information obtained locally.
4. Information normally available from or through the special staff includes, but is not limited to—
  - (a) *Artillery.* Locations of hostile mortars and artillery, determined by infantry counterfire platoons, divisional light artillery countermortar radar, corps field artillery observation battalions, air photo interpretation, and by analysis of shelling reports and shell craters.
  - (b) *Chemical.* Information of enemy CBR troops, materiel, supply installations, and training. This information includes the kinds of agents used; location, size, and duration of concentrations or contamination; and the effects of agents used. Information furnished may also include: enemy CBR tactics, capabilities, presence and identification of captured CBR munitions, and the appearance of new or unusual enemy CBR equipment.
  - (c) *Engineer.* Information and intelligence on terrain, enemy fortifications, engineer troops, tactics, materiel, and capabilities. Terrain information supplied by engineers includes stream data (width, depth, condition of banks and bottom, rate of flow) landing beach data, trafficability studies, and certain port, railroad, road, and bridge data. Special engineer units prepare topographic maps, terrain models, and map supplements. When conditions warrant, special engineer flood warning service is provided.
  - (d) *Medical.* Information on medical and public health aspects of the enemy and the area of operations and on enemy medical materiel. Medical personnel may also

obtain information and documents from wounded enemy troops.

- (e) *Military Police.* Information of both intelligence and counterintelligence value obtained incidental to the operation of straggler lines; patrolling friendly forward and rear areas, controlling refugees and other civilian personnel; guarding, evacuating, and processing prisoners of war; apprehending enemy agents, line crossers, deserters, saboteurs; and by engaging enemy raiding parties, guerrillas, bypassed units, and parachute troops.
- (f) *Ordnance.* Data as to the capabilities and limitations of enemy ordnance materiel; identification as such of new items of enemy ordnance materiel; information as to the presence and use of special items of ordnance equipment; location and composition of enemy ammunition stocks.
- (g) *Quartermaster.* Information on the location and size of enemy petroleum stocks; recognition data on enemy uniforms and insignia; data as to the capabilities and limitations of enemy quartermaster materiel; identification as such of new items of enemy quartermaster materiel; estimates of enemy logistical capabilities, to include air supply.
- (h) *Signal.* Data as to the capabilities and limitations of enemy signal equipment and personnel; identification of new items of enemy signal equipment; information as to the presence and use of special items of signal equipment, to include radar and infrared.
- (i) *Transportation.* Operational characteristics, capacities, adequacy, and military use of transportation routes, structures, and equipment in the area of operations, with particular reference to railroads, highways, waterways, ports, and beaches.
- (d) *Air Force reconnaissance agencies.* Information collection facilities of the tactical air force supporting the field army are available through the field army G2 air division. (Procedures for requesting reconnaissance missions and for obtaining the resulting information and air photos are described in chapter 7.)

#### Section IV. AVAILABILITY OF AGENCIES

##### 31. General

Intelligence sections, from battalion up, produce intelligence from information collected by agencies directly or indirectly under the control of




Figure 2. Intelligence agencies, infantry division.

the unit, and disseminate this intelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent commands. Accordingly, the subordinate major commands, and some intelligence specialists, are at each echelon both collectors of information and producers of intelligence. No distinction is made between those agencies which collect information and report direct to G2, and those agencies which produce intelligence; all are regarded as "agencies."

### **32. Division**

The agencies normally available to G2 of an infantry division are shown in figure 2. Agencies available to the G2 of an armored or airborne division may differ slightly.

### **33. Corps**

a. Assigned and attached military intelligence specialists are under the operational control of corps G2.

b. Agencies assigned, attached, or under the operational control of the *type* corps are—

- (1) Three infantry divisions and one armored division.
- (2) Corps artillery, particularly the observation battalion.
- (3) One armored cavalry regiment.
- (4) One armor group.
- (5) Engineer troop units, particularly the topographic company.
- (6) Army aviation units or sections.
- (7) The special staff.
- (8) Technical service intelligence detachments.
- (9) Communications reconnaissance support battalion.
- (10) Corps service units.

c. Agencies assigned, attached to, or supporting the field army to which the corps is attached—

- (1) Tactical air force, including the Air Weather Service.
- (2) Army field operations intelligence units.
- (3) Army service units operating in the corps area.

### **34. Army**

a. Agencies normally assigned or attached to the type field army and directly under control of the army G2 are—

- (1) Military intelligence specialists.
- (2) Personnel of the air-ground operations system (ch. 7).

b. Agencies assigned, attached to, under the operational control of, or supporting the type field army, and from which G2 normally obtains information and intelligence are—

- (1) Three corps.
- (2) Army artillery.
- (3) Armored cavalry regiment.
- (4) Army engineer troop units, particularly—
  - (a) The topographic battalion, which prepares and reproduces maps, charts, survey data, and related material.



- (b) The camouflage battalion, which plans and supervises camouflage work, discipline, and training.
- (5) Technical service intelligence detachments.
- (6) Communications reconnaissance group.
- (7) Army aviation units or sections.
- (8) Military government group, which provides information connected with civil populace and aids, as required, in counterintelligence activities.
- (9) Tactical air force.
- (10) Military police units.
- (11) Naval units (particularly in amphibious warfare).
- (12) Communications zone.
- (13) Weather squadron.
- c. Agencies of higher echelons which normally furnish pertinent information direct to the field army G2 are—
  - (1) Theater escape and evasion unit, which initially instructs army units in escape and evasion procedures, and later aids G2 in interrogating and processing escapers and evaders.
  - (2) Theater clandestine units.

### **35. Army Group**

Agencies available to the army group include coordinate commands (adjacent army groups, tactical air commands, possible naval operating forces, theater task forces, and communications zone); subordinate armies, task forces, and independent corps; and theater army, theater navy, and theater air forces.

### **36. Communications Zone**

- a. Intelligence-producing agencies normally available to a communications zone intelligence division as shown in figure 3.
- b. The G2 sections of the advance, intermediate, and base sections of the communications zone are the agencies principally employed for the collection of combat intelligence and counterintelligence. Advance sections furnish combat intelligence which they themselves produce, as well as intelligence obtained by direct contact and liaison with the field armies. Advance sections ordinarily control communications zone tactical operations against guerrillas and bypassed units within their areas, and are thus the principal source of combat intelligence obtained by communications zone for its own use.
- c. Counterintelligence is discussed in chapter 9.

### **37. Theater Army**

The agencies available to theater army headquarters for the collection of combat intelligence information cannot be precisely defined, since their identity is largely dependent upon the organization of the theater. In general, however, they may be expected to comprise: subordinate army

groups, armies, and task forces; coordinate air, naval, and allied forces; army security agency units; clandestine units; Counter Intelligence Corps detachments; and agencies organized principally for the production of strategic intelligence but which may incidentally develop information of combat intelligence value; for example, interrogation, documents, and materiel centers.




Figure 3. Agencies available to communications zone intelligence division.

## CHAPTER 3

### PROCESSING INFORMATION

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#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

#### 38. Sequence of Operations

*a.* Processing is the step in the intelligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence. It consists of three operations: recording, evaluation, and interpretation.

*b.* The sequence in which these operations is performed varies with the nature and urgency of the information, and somewhat with the echelon.

(1) Usually, recording is first, since it involves not only the reduction of information to writing or other graphical form of presentation, but also results in the grouping together of related items to facilitate study and comparison.

(2) At division, and to a lesser extent at corps, evaluation and interpretation may be instantaneous, may precede recording, and may be followed by immediate dissemination. For example, an incoming report from a reliable source, believed to be true, may indicate that the enemy is about to launch a major attack. This report—that an immediate attack is probable—is disseminated at once, with priority to those most seriously affected. Recording proceeds, to the extent that it does not interfere with dissemination of high priority intelligence, but is of secondary importance in this case.

*c.* Information is sometimes relayed to a higher echelon prior to the performance of any processing operations. For example, to expedite production of intelligence related to targets selected for possible attack by atomic weapons, the commander who controls atomic delivery means may order that all *information* concerning specified enemy units, areas, or activities be reported to his intelligence section immediately, without delays for recording, evaluation, or interpretation at any lower headquarters.

#### Section II. RECORDING—DIVISION

#### 39. General

*a.* There are four general aids by means of which the mechanics of recording combat intelligence may be accomplished—

(1) G2 journal.

(2) Enemy situation map.

(3) G2 worksheet.

(4) Intelligence files.

b. The G2 journal contains a brief record of all incoming information. The enemy situation map displays the locations of enemy units, installations, fortifications, and other data. The G2 worksheet is a simple device for cataloging information by subject or type of activity, to facilitate comparative study and the preparation of estimates and reports. Intelligence files consist, as a minimum, of a journal file, an information or reference file, and various order of battle files. The forms and uses of these records are described in the paragraphs which follow.

#### **40. G2 Journal**

The G2 journal is the permanent, official, chronological record of messages and events affecting the intelligence section (FM 101-5).

#### **41. Enemy Situation Map**

The enemy situation map is a temporary record which graphically portrays current enemy dispositions and other data. Its principal use is as an aid to intelligence evaluation and interpretation. The area covered by the enemy situation map includes the terrain in our possession as well as that held by the enemy. Location of the friendly command posts of higher or lower adjacent units, reconnaissance units, friendly boundaries, and the trace of our front lines usually comprise the friendly information which is shown on the map. Enemy situation maps at division show the location of enemy units down to and including battalions. The data is usually posted by writing or drawing on acetate or tracing paper to conserve maps and to facilitate removal of outdated entries. Different categories of data may be shown on separate overlays. For example, one overlay may show only fortifications and another may show only hostile artillery and mortar locations. The situation map is kept up to date continually and entries made on the map are removed when they cease to be of current or future value. It is posted at the earliest practicable time after the receipt of information since delay may lead to omission, consequent inaccuracy in the evaluation and interpretation (FM 21-30 and FM 101-5).

#### **42. G2 Worksheet**

a. The G2 worksheet is an indexed pad or looseleaf notebook in which information is recorded systematically and arranged by subject for ready reference and comparison (fig. 4). The worksheet is an aid in the evaluation and interpretation of information, and in the preparation of intelligence reports; it is not disseminated.

- (1) Although there is no prescribed form for the worksheet, index tabs are customarily labeled to correspond with the headings and numbers of the paragraphs of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP) (ch. 5).

- (2) Information extracted from incoming messages and reports is entered in the worksheet under each title (tab) to which it pertains; for example, an item of information concerning the identification of a new infantry unit might properly be recorded under Tab 2b, "Order of Battle," as well as Tab 2q, "Infantry" (fig. 4).
- (3) Entries under each title of the worksheet are confined to the pertinent items. A message which furnishes information on two different subjects results in two (or more) entries, neither of which necessarily quotes the entire message. For example, a message containing information on the locations of a reserve unit and also of a committed artillery unit results in two *extract* entries in the worksheet; so much of the message as relates to reserve locations is entered under Tab 2c, "Reserves and Reinforcements"; so much as relates to the location of the active artillery unit is located under Tab 2k, "Artillery."

(Classification)		<b>G2 WORKSHEET</b>	
From:	_____	hour and date	_____
To:	_____	hour and date	_____
Headquarters:	_____		
Place:	_____		
NOTES:			
1. Numbers on tabs refer to paragraphs in periodic intelligence report.			
2. The classification will be stamped at the top and bottom of each page.			
3. A looseleaf notebook with tabbed separators may be used. As pages become obsolete they may be discarded.			
(Classification)		VS-743	

2a. Strengths and dispositions
2b. Order of battle
2c. Reserves and reinforcements
2d. New enemy tactics, weapons, and equipment
2e. Air forces
2f. Administrative units
2g. Airborne units
2h. Antiaircraft defenses
2i. Antitank units
2j. Armored units
2k. Artillery
2l. Cavalry
2m. Atomic, biological, chemical, electronic, and radiological warfare
2n. Engineers
2o. Guerrilla
2p. Guided missiles
2q. Infantry
2r. Reconnaissance
2s. Other elements
3. Other intelligence factors
4. Counterintelligence

Figure 4. Typical G2 worksheet.

(4) Each entry in the worksheet which results from an incoming message includes reference to the G2 journal serial number of that message; for example: "J2, 091200 April, from 20th Engineer Combat Battalion: Bridge at YUTAN (2146) destroyed by bombing. Estimated out of action for 30 hours." "J2" refers to the journal serial number. The date-time group refers to the time of occurrence of the event, not to the time at which the report was received.

b. The worksheet is not a permanent record. Entries are deleted when they cease to be of current value.

#### **43. Intelligence Files**

a. The *journal file* contains the original or a copy of each message or document entered in the G2 journal. It supports the journal.

b. The *information or reference file* is a suitable indexed and cross-referenced file of all information which may be of future value. During a period of stabilization or inactivity, much information is collected which is of no immediate interest, but which may become valuable when an attack is ordered. If this information is published solely in various reports as received, it may be disregarded and forgotten, and may not be available when needed. It must, therefore, be kept available for immediate check against new information. Such information may include enemy defenses; condition of roads, railways, and bridges; locations and contents of supply installations; locations of enemy reserves; and similar data.

c. Order of battle files are described in detail in FM 30-19.

### **Section III. EVALUATION—DIVISION**

#### **44. Examination for Pertinency**

a. Immediately upon receipt in the G2 section, each item of information is examined by the G2 duty officer, who determines the degree to which it is relevant, urgent, and valuable.

b. The duty officer makes the examination for pertinency by, in effect, asking himself three questions—

- (1) Is this information of the enemy or of the characteristics of the area of operations?
- (2) Is this information needed immediately, and, if so, by whom?
- (3) Is this information of possible present or future value, and if so, to whom?

c. The duty officer's answers to the foregoing questions determine the subsequent handling of the information. Information which has no pertinence—is not information of the enemy nor of the characteristics of the area of operations—is not processed. Information needed immediately by higher, lower, or adjacent units is disseminated immediately; further processing to produce intelligence is either abbreviated or proceeds concurrently with dissemination of urgent information. Information not of



immediate concern, but of possible present or future value is, ordinarily, completely processed prior to dissemination.

#### **45. Determination of Reliability**

*a.* Information found to be pertinent is next judged as to the reliability of the source of the information, and also as to the reliability of the agencies by which it was collected and reported.

*b.* The principal basis for determination of the reliability of a source is previous experience with, or knowledge of that source, or sources of the same category. For example:

(1) Experience with a particular enemy may indicate either that prisoners of war are generally reliable sources, or that they are generally unreliable. Members of some enemy units or nationalities may be more reliable sources than members of other units or nationalities. Wounded prisoners may be found to be more—or less—reliable than unwounded prisoners. Deserters may be found to be more—or less—reliable than prisoners captured during an assault.

(2) Plans, orders, and similar documents prepared by the enemy for his own use are usually reliable; however, plans may be based on false assumptions, and orders may be impossible of execution or may have been changed. Documents may also contain enemy propaganda, or may have been prepared and planted by the enemy specifically for us to capture.

*c.* The principal basis for determination of the reliability of an agency is also previous experience with, and knowledge of the agency, or agencies of the same category. For example:

(1) Knowledge of the training, personality, and past performance of a particular prisoner of war interrogator provides the basis for judging whether or not the results of his interrogation are complete and objective.

(2) Knowledge of the training and experience, and of the commanders of troop units provides a basis for estimating the reliability of those units as information collection agencies, although knowledge of their past performance is a more certain guide. The circumstances and means of collection may affect reliability; observations made under exciting circumstances may be less reliably reported than observations calmly made; observations made at night may be less reliable than observations made by day.

*d.* An additional test of the reliability of source and agency is: Under the conditions existing at the time, could this information have been obtained? Or, would this source have access to the information reported? For example: information from a source or agency which reports with seeming confidence the results of visual observations made at long range on a rainy night, is probably unreliable.

#### 46. Determination of Accuracy

a. Subsequent to, or concurrent with, estimation of the reliability of source and agency, information is judged as to its accuracy—that is, the probable truth and completeness of the information.

b. Accuracy is indicated by the answers to a series of questions:

- (1) Is the reported fact or event at all possible?
- (2) Is the report consistent within itself?
- (3) Is the report confirmed or corroborated by information from different sources or agencies?
- (4) In what respects does the report agree or disagree with other available and related information, particularly with information known to be true?
- (5) If the information does not agree with information from other sources or agencies, which is more likely to be true?

c. Since confirmation is the most reliable method of determining accuracy, G2 seeks to obtain the same information through different agencies and from as many sources as practicable (ch. 6).

#### 47. Evaluation Rating

a. The evaluation of each item of information is indicated by means of a standard system. The evaluation of *reliability* is indicated by a letter; the evaluation of *accuracy* by a numeral.

b. Evaluation of the *reliability* of source and agency is indicated as follows:

- A. . Completely reliable.
- B. . Usually reliable.
- C. . Fairly reliable.
- D. . Not usually reliable.
- E. . Unreliable.
- F. . Reliability cannot be judged.

(1) An "A" evaluation of *source* is assigned under only the most unusual circumstances; for example, when the source is an officer of long experience and extensive background. A rating of "B" indicates an informant of known integrity. Ratings of "C," "D," and "E" indicate progressively decreasing degrees of reliability. An "F" rating is assigned when there is no adequate basis for estimating the reliability of the source.

(2) *Agencies* are ordinarily rated "A," "B," or "C"; however, when the source of an item and the collecting-reporting agency are evaluated differently, only the *lower* degree of reliability is indicated.

c. Evaluation of the *accuracy* of an item of information is indicated as follows:

1. . Confirmed (by other sources or agencies).
2. . Probably true.

3. . Possibly true.
4. . Doubtfully true.
5. . Improbable (probably untrue).
6. . Truth cannot be judged.

d. Although both letter and figure are used to indicate the evaluation placed on an item of information, the letter and figure are independent of each other. A completely reliable source may report information which is, on the basis of other information, judged to be improbable; the evaluation of the information is, therefore, "A-5." Conversely, a source known to be unreliable may report information which is confirmed by other sources and is of undoubted accuracy; such a report is evaluated, "E-1."

e. In reporting to higher, lower, and adjacent units, the evaluation follows each item. For example, "Enemy 11th Rifle Division has been ordered to withdraw to LAMBALLE (G-2) . . . ."

## **Section IV. INTERPRETATION—DIVISION**

### **48. Definition**

Interpretation is the process of determining the significance of the information with respect to information and intelligence already at hand and the drawing of conclusions as to the probable *meaning* of evaluated information; that is, of estimating the significance of new information in the light of what was previously known. It is the result of reflective thought, involving *analysis* (taking apart), *integration* (putting together), and deduction (forming conclusions).

### **49. Analysis, Integration, and Deduction**

a. *Analysis* is the examination of information with selective emphasis, in the light of what was previously known. It is a marking off of the important from the trivial, and of sifting and sorting.

b. *Integration* is the combination of selected data to form inclusive patterns or hypotheses which explain the existence of the selected data and which provide a basis for further analysis and testing.

c. *Deduction* is the formulation of conclusions or inferences drawn from the evaluated information as it applies to the current situation.

### **50. Illustrative Example**

a. *Situation.* The US 20th Infantry Division is in contact with all three regiments of the Aggressor 11th Rifle Division. All elements of the 11th Rifle Division have been identified in the area. Road Junction 123 is in enemy territory, approximately 6 miles behind the line of contact. WALDEN Woods, covering approximately 40 square miles, is located between the line of contact and Road Junction 123.

b. *Information.* Men carrying rifles and other weapons, walking in single file on each side of the road, passed Road Junction 123 at about

0800 and entered WALDEN Woods. The column took about half an hour to pass the road junction. The men did not leave the woods (B-1).

*c. Analysis.* The men marched in a manner characteristic of infantry and were carrying rifles and other weapons. Time length of the column was about 30 minutes.

*d. Integration (with other known data).* Time length of an Aggressor rifle regiment in column of twos, by day, on roads, is 27 minutes. All major units of the 11th Rifle Division are still in contact along our front. The troops remained in WALDEN Woods, which is of sufficient size to serve as an assembly area for approximately a rifle division. In concentrating for the attack, Aggressor assault divisions normally stage into assembly areas 5 to 7 miles behind the line of contact, moving up 2 or 3 days before D-day.

*e. Interpretation.* The column was probably a rifle regiment moving into an assembly area. The regiment could be alone, or could be part of a larger force. The regiment could have moved in to relieve a regiment of the 11th Rifle Division, or it could be part of a force assembling for an attack. Without additional information, no choice between these alternatives is possible.

*f. Conclusions.* The enemy is preparing either to reinforce the 11th Rifle Division, or to relieve at least one of its regiments.

## **51. Bearing on Current Intelligence Estimate**

As each new item of information is processed, the interpretation placed upon it, affects in some way the current intelligence estimate. The conclusions already drawn are altered or confirmed; new capabilities are determined, old ones are discarded; the relative probability of adoption of the enemy's courses of action become clearer. The estimate is continuously revised and kept up to date in the light of new intelligence.

## **Section V. PROCESSING AT HIGHER ECHELONS**

### **52. General**

There is no essential difference in principle between processing at division and processing at higher echelons; however, differences in emphasis and in the scope of operations result in some variations in the application of principles.

### **53. Recording**

*a.* At echelons above division, recording is of increased importance because of the larger number of individuals within the G2 section who need to be informed, the larger size of the area of interest, and—especially at army—the larger number of separate items of information and intelligence received.

b. At echelons above corps, separate journals may be kept in each of the several branches of the G2 section. Similarly, separate, specialized worksheets are usually maintained by each branch. These and the information files may be supplemented by electrical and mechanical recording devices such as punchcards and electromagnetic sorting machines. Although a central enemy situation map is normally used, postings thereon are ordinarily restricted to major units and items of exceptional significance; details are posted on separate order of battle situation maps, counterintelligence situation maps, air situation maps, and similar documents maintained in and by the several branches of the G2 section.

#### 54. Evaluation

a. Determination of pertinence assumes particular importance at echelons above division. The problem is, however, not so much one of determining *whether* or not information is pertinent, as it is a problem of determining *to whom* (i. e., to what other unit or headquarters, to what staff section/or to which branch or branches) information is pertinent. Although the various branches of the G2 section are specialized, information is frequently of approximately equal interest and urgency to two or more branches; hence, precautions are necessary to insure that incoming information is made available to all who are concerned. The initial routing of messages within the G2 section is normally determined by a duty officer or noncommissioned officer, who is guided by detailed standing operating procedure. Nevertheless, it is an obligation of each branch receiving a message to ascertain that distribution has also been made to all other branches which may have an interest.

b. The agency closest to a source of information is ordinarily the best judge of the reliability of that source; consequently, higher headquarters normally accepts the *reliability* rating assigned by lower echelons, tempered, when circumstances warrant, by judgment of the reliability of the reporting echelon itself.

c. Marked differences in the estimation of the *accuracy* of information may occur between division and higher echelons. With broader perspective and more varied sources of information and intelligence, the army G2, particularly, has greater opportunity to confirm, corroborate, or refute. Hence, regardless of the source, the accuracy of incoming information and intelligence is always reevaluated at each echelon.

#### 55. Interpretation

Analysis and integration become detailed research operations at higher echelons, increasing in difficulty as the volume of information increases. Elaborate cross-indexing of files is essential, and electrical and mechanical sorting devices may be employed to extract important data from numerous reports, and to combine related items. Conversely, interpretation may become easier, based on greater wealth of knowledge of the enemy situation, in width and depth, than is possible at lower echelons.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

##### 56. General

*a. Definition.* An *intelligence estimate* is a study in which G2 describes, discusses, and interprets the enemy situation in order to estimate the enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. An intelligence estimate also includes consideration of the effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on the operations of both combatants.

*b. Purpose.* The intelligence estimate is a means of presenting and interpreting evaluated information about the area of operations and the enemy. Its immediate purposes are to determine the effects of the area of operations on the courses of action open to both combatants, and the enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. Its ultimate purpose is to assist the commander in arriving at sound and timely decisions.

*c. Form.*

- (1) An outline form for a combat intelligence estimate is shown in FM 101-5. With certain omissions and minor modifications, this form is used at all echelons from division to theater army, whether the estimate be presented orally or in writing.
- (2) At division level, the intelligence estimate rarely is prepared in writing; normally it is presented to the commander and staff at oral briefings. In oral presentation, much of the detail of a written estimate is omitted. An oral estimate may consist merely of the announcement of changes to a previous oral or written estimate.
- (3) The following paragraphs describe the preparation of a complete, written intelligence estimate. An example of a division estimate appears in FM 101-5.

*d. Timeliness.* The intelligence estimate presents and interprets evaluated information available at the time of presentation. Hence, preparation and revision of the intelligence estimate is a continuing process. G2 is always ready to furnish his commander an estimate in which he includes all pertinent information, to include that most recently received.

#### Section II. PREPARATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

##### 57. Heading

*a.* If the estimate is written for circulation only within the headquarters where it is prepared, the heading names the office of origin; for

example, "G2 Section, 20th Infantry Division." However, if the estimate is published for dissemination outside the headquarters, reference to the G2 section is omitted, and the first line of the heading becomes the official designation of the issuing command; for example, "20th Infantry Division." A code name may be used.

b. The place of issue is the physical location of the G2 section, or headquarters, at the time of preparation of the estimate. Map coordinates are included. A code designation of location may be used.

c. The date-time group is shown by a group of six digits, followed by the month and year; for example, 081600 April 1955. The date and time shown are the date and time at which the estimate is signed. The date-time group is also an indication of the timeliness of the estimate: G2's signature is, in effect, a certification that the estimate includes consideration of all pertinent evaluated information available to him at the time shown in the heading.

d. Intelligence estimates are numbered successively in each calendar year. If two or more estimates are written on the same day, they bear consecutive numbers.

e. Maps and charts required for proper understanding of the estimate are listed by title (country or geographical area, scale, sheet name or number, and edition if necessary).

## **58. Mission**

Since the principal purpose of the intelligence estimate is to assist the commander in arriving at a decision as how best to accomplish his mission, paragraph 1 of the estimate is a statement of that mission. If the mission involves the accomplishment of several tasks, all are stated. If priorities have been assigned, they are indicated. The reason, or reasons, for assignment of the mission to the command is also indicated, if known.

## **59. Characteristics of the Area of Operations**

a. The characteristics of the area of operations, as described in paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate, always include weather and terrain. They may also include hydrographic, political, sociological, economic, or other characteristics, either of the area or of its populace, which may affect materially the courses of action open to opposing forces. (The technique used in preparing an analysis of the characteristics of an area is similar to that used in the preparation of the tactical study of weather and terrain described in pars. 77-85.)

b. The consideration of each significant characteristic is arranged as follows:

- (1) A description of the situation as it is expected to exist during the conduct of the operations required by the mission.
- (2) A discussion of the effects of the characteristic on possible enemy operations.

- (3) A discussion of the effects of the characteristic on the operations required by the mission of the command.
  - (4) If appropriate, a consideration of the effects of the characteristic on the employment of atomic weapons and of CBR agents.
- c. Weather, light, and terrain:
- (1) With respect to the weather, the "existing situation" is a weather forecast. Where operations over a long period or at a distant time are involved, the weather forecast may be replaced by climatic information.
  - (2) With respect to light data, the "existing situation" is a light data table.
  - (3) With respect to the terrain, the "existing situation" is a description of the military characteristics of the area: observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, critical terrain features, and avenues of approach. The enemy's avenues of approach into our position are enumerated, regardless of the assigned mission and the enemy situation. Our avenues of approach into the enemy position are always listed when the assigned mission is offensive and may be listed when the assigned mission is defensive, since friendly forces may undertake limited offensive action during the conduct of the defense.

d. The discussion of the effects of each characteristic of the area of operations on possible enemy operations normally includes consideration of effects on the enemy's ability to attack and on his ability to defend. The discussion may also include consideration of effects on other possible enemy operations (e. g., delay), and on the enemy's possible employment of particular weapons, methods, techniques, or forces; for example, on his use of smoke, conduct of night operations, or employment of airborne troops.

e. The extent of the discussion of the effects each characteristic may have on our mission is limited by the nature of that mission. Thus, when the mission is offensive, the discussion does not include effects on defensive operations, except insofar as security of the command may be involved.

f. The effects of each characteristic on atomic weapons and CBR agents are discussed when either combatant has the capability of employing them. The treatment includes consideration of both weapons effects, and effects on delivery means. (For a brief discussion of the effects of weather and terrain on atomic weapons effects, see par. 85*d*; for a detailed discussion (FM 100-31).)

g. Lengthy discussion, either oral or written, is avoided. Maximum use is made of two and three dimensional maps and other graphic or pictorial presentations.

## 60. Enemy Situation

a. *General.* Paragraph 3 of the intelligence estimate is a description of the existing enemy situation. Subparagraphs cover enemy dispositions,



composition, strength, significant activities and peculiarities and weaknesses.

*b. Dispositions.* The enemy dispositions (par. 3a) may be described verbally, but are normally—and best—shown graphically by an enemy situation map or overlay.

*c. Composition.*

(1) The composition subparagraph (par. 3b) is a summary of the order of battle of the opposing force. It includes identification, if known, of the forces in contact, and enumeration (including identification, if known) of other enemy forces which may conceivably affect the accomplishment of our mission. Hence, the enumeration includes units in contact, available reinforcements, and supporting units.

(2) Enemy units which are believed to be under control of the opposing, comparable command, but which are committed outside our zone, are also enumerated in the composition subparagraph.

(a) Thus, a division G2 enumerates units of the opposing division(s) which are believed to be committed outside the zone or sector of his division. A corps G2 mentions units of the opposing corps which are believed to be committed outside the zone or sector of his corps.

(b) This enumeration of committed units serves to support later determination of the strength which the enemy may employ against us. Battalions of the opposing division which are in contact with us, or which are in reserve, can be employed against us; battalions which are committed outside our sector or zone ordinarily cannot be employed against us without being redeployed.

(3) The composition subparagraph also includes, if known, *identification* of the air force units and ground atomic delivery units available to support the forces opposing us.

*d. Strength.*

(1) *General.* The strength subparagraph (par. 3c) contains three main subparagraphs, 3c(1), which is titled "Locally available"; 3c(2), which is titled "Reinforcements," and 3c(3), which is titled "Air and Atomic." The enemy forces locally available are those combat units which can be employed against us without significant delay, as distinguished from those units which must be moved from their present locations in order to be employed against us. The latter are reinforcements.

(2) *Local strength.*

(a) Paragraph 3c(1) of the estimate is a statement of the number of infantry, armored, and mechanized units which the opposing enemy is believed to have locally available, together with

a statement of the number of artillery and similar units which are believed to be in position to support the locally available forces by fire.

1. At division and at army, the strength of enemy forces locally available is measured in terms of units two echelons down; thus, a division G2 measures locally available strength in terms of battalions; an army G2 measures locally available strength in terms of divisions. Practice varies slightly at corps, and at echelons above the field army.
  2. At corps the strength of enemy forces locally available may be measured in terms of regiments or divisions. In reports and estimates prepared for use within his own headquarters or for dissemination to divisions of the corps, the corps G2 expresses locally available strength in terms of regiments. In reports prepared for the army, he usually expresses enemy strength in divisions.
  3. At echelons above field army, the enemy division remains the basic unit of measure of enemy strength, since the composition of enemy corps and armies may vary widely. Nevertheless, reports and estimates normally include also a statement of the number of corps and/or armies the enemy has committed; for example: "This army group is opposed by 2 rifle corps (6 rifle divisions and 2 mechanized divisions) . . . ."
- (b) G2 considers to be locally available those enemy units which are in contact and any reserves available at their next higher echelon. For example: a division G2 considers as locally available the enemy battalions which are committed against his division, and also the reserves of the regiments to which those battalions belong; a corps G2 counts as locally available the enemy regiments committed against his corps, and also the reserves of the divisions to which those regiments belong; an army G2 counts as locally available the enemy divisions committed against his army, and also the reserves of the corps to which those divisions belong.
1. Enemy units committed outside a friendly zone or sector are normally not considered to be either locally available to reinforcements. They may be mentioned in the "composition" subparagraph of the intelligence estimate, under the conditions described in c(2) above, but they are not considered further.
  2. Illustrative example:
    - (a) Situation: The 20th Infantry Division is planning an envelopment of the north flank of the opposing 11th Rifle Division. The 1st Battalion of the 45th Rifle Regiment, 11th Rifle Division, is committed outside the

zone of the 20th Infantry Division, on the south flank. The 2d Battalion of the 45th Rifle Regiment is committed against the 20th Infantry Division. The 2d Battalion is in regimental reserve.

- (b) Solution: In the "composition" subparagraph of his intelligence estimate, the 20th Infantry Division G2 properly notes that the 1st Battalion, 45th Rifle Regiment, is committed outside the division zone, thus implying that the battalion is not available for employment against the 20th Infantry Division. Thereafter, G2 makes no further reference to the 1st Battalion, 45th Rifle Division. It is not counted as locally available, nor as a reinforcement. (Both the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 45th Rifle Regiment are, in this situation, counted as being locally available.)

(3) *Reinforcements.*

- (a) Paragraph 3c(a) of the estimate is a list of known reinforcements available to the enemy. So far as possible, units are identified as to both designation and location; for example: "21st Rifle Regiment at GOUJON." Circumstances may, however, result in such entries as: "Unidentified and unlocated elements equivalent to one rifle division."

1. All known enemy forces which are neither committed against us nor committed outside our zone or sector, but which can reasonably be considered capable of closing with us in time to affect the accomplishment of our mission, are *reinforcements*.

2. Thus a division G2 considers the reserves of the opposing division and higher commands to be reinforcements, *if* it reasonably may be supposed that those reserves may be committed against his division in time to affect the accomplishment of its mission. (Reserves under control of opposing *regimental* commanders are considered, at division, to be locally available.)

3. Similarly, a corps G2 considers the reserves of the opposing corps and higher commands to be reinforcements, *if* it reasonably may be supposed that those reserves may be committed against his corps in time to affect the accomplishment of its mission.

- (b) As discussed in (2)(a) above, *locally available* strength is customarily expressed at each echelon in terms of units of a particular size. However, this practice is not followed with respect to enemy *reinforcements*. Here, the most convenient and meaningful term of reference is used. For example, if the opposing division is holding a rifle regiment in reserve,

G2 refers to this available reinforcement as a "rifle regiment," rather than as "three rifle battalions."

(4) *Equivalent units.*

- (a) In combat, the strength of units may be considerably less than the strength authorized by tables of organization. When it is known that there is wide discrepancy between the authorized and the existing strength of enemy units, enemy strength is best expressed in terms of "equivalent" units. For example, if the enemy has locally available eight battalions known to be at 50 percent strength, division G2 properly refers to these as "four equivalent battalions." Similarly, if the field army is opposed by nine divisions known to be operating at approximately two-thirds authorized strength in personnel and equipment, the Army G2 may properly refer to these as "six equivalent divisions."
- (b) The translation of enemy strength into terms of equivalent units may be done with respect to either forces locally available, or reinforcements. However, the translation must be made with caution: two divisions, each at half strength, are likely to be more formidable than a single division at full strength, because of the added flexibility of employment and the additional combat support which is likely to be available. (A field artillery battalion at half strength is more than half as effective as a battalion at full strength.)
- (5) *Aircraft.* Paragraph 3c(3) of the Intelligence Estimate is a statement of the number of enemy aircraft, by type within operational radius, and the number of ground atomic delivery means, by type, in position to support the forces opposing us. If available, an estimate of the number of atomic weapons available to the enemy, by type and yield, is also included.

e. *Recent and Present Significant Activities.*

- (1) Paragraph 3d of the estimate summarizes those activities in which the enemy has engaged recently, or is engaged now, which may provide clues as to what he is likely to do in the future.
- (2) Also noted in this subparagraph is any enemy failure to take action which, under the existing circumstances, might be expected of him. For example, if the enemy is apparently defending behind a river obstacle, but has failed to destroy certain bridges, the omission is noted as a "significant activity."
- (3) Additionally, this subparagraph includes a reference to any existing basis for belief that the enemy has specific knowledge of the friendly situation or intentions. Such basis may include, for example, capture by the enemy of a friendly situation map or operation order, or compromise of portions of the current signal operation instructions.

*f. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.*

- (1) Paragraph 3e of the estimate comprises a list and discussion of enemy peculiarities and weaknesses which may, upon analysis or integration, disclose specific enemy vulnerabilities. This paragraph also describes any other peculiarities of the enemy or of the enemy situation which are not properly presented elsewhere in the Intelligence Estimate and which may influence the commander's choice of a course of action. Normally, six numbered subparagraphs are included: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil affairs, and personalities.
- (2) Peculiarities and weaknesses which may be mentioned, in appropriate circumstances, include but are not limited to the following:
  - (a) Personnel:
    - Replacement situation (shortages or overages).
    - Morale less than excellent, or exceptionally high.
    - Disproportionate number of very young or very old men.
    - High sickness rate.
    - Vulnerability to existing climatic conditions.
    - Percentage of authorized strength if less than 80 percent.
  - (b) Intelligence:
    - Susceptibility to deception or neutralization of certain enemy information collecting agencies.
    - Susceptibility to electronic countermeasures.
    - Known successes of information collection agencies.
    - Overdependence on one or more categories of information sources.
    - Ineffectiveness of enemy intelligence.
  - (c) Operations:
    - Habitual repetition of certain schemes of maneuver, or unconventional patterns of operations.
    - Faulty organization of the ground.
    - Faulty disposition of reserves.
    - Inadequate troop training, especially in defense against atomic weapons.
    - Lack of adequate mobility.
    - Inadequate air or artillery support.
    - Lack of tactical skills.
    - Notable failure to disperse and dig in.
  - (d) Logistics:
    - Shortages or inadequacies of supplies and materiel, including atomic.
    - Status of equipment, if less than 80 percent.
    - Inadequate dispersal of supply dumps.
    - Overdependence on a single means or route of communications.

Location of especially vulnerable points and bottlenecks in the logistics system or lines of communications.

Inability to resupply during action.

Failure to equip troops with gas masks or protective clothing.

(e) Civil affairs:

Inadequacies of food, hospital facilities, or of medical or other supplies needed by the civil populace.

Hostile attitude toward the civil populace, or of the civil populace toward the enemy.

Inadequacies in the control of civil communications, to include movement.

(f) Personalities:

Peculiarities or weaknesses of the enemy commander, major subordinate commanders, or principal staff officers, as disclosed by or deduced from their past performance, education, politics, experience, or other basis.

(3) Except as indicated below, any of the six subparagraphs may be omitted, if no enemy peculiarities or weaknesses in that category have been discovered.

(a) The subparagraph on *personnel* invariably includes an estimate of the status of enemy morale, if less than excellent and an estimate of the percentage of authorized strength at which enemy units are operating, if less than 80 percent. Units having a personnel strength of 80 percent or more are normally considered at full strength.

(b) The subparagraph on *operations* invariably includes an estimate of enemy combat effectiveness, if less than excellent.

(c) The subparagraph on *logistics* is always included, and contains an estimate of the enemy's ability to support his forces logistically, even though there may be neither peculiarity nor weakness indicated thereby. The paragraph may consist of an estimated percentage of equipment in the hands of the enemy or a simple statement such as "Enemy logistical support is apparently adequate for either offensive or defensive operations." On the other hand—and particularly at echelons above division—the subparagraph may include a detailed analysis of the enemy logistical situation, in which both strengths and weaknesses are examined. As with any other paragraph of the estimate, reference may be made to an appendix in which voluminous details are contained. Normally units having a status of equipment of 80 percent or above are considered to be fully equipped.

(4) Since the purpose of the peculiarities and weaknesses paragraph is to present the specific enemy vulnerabilities which will be summarized in G2's conclusions (par. 5 of the estimate), the

subparagraphs of paragraph 3e do not consist merely of lists of peculiarities and weaknesses. Each subparagraph also contains a discussion of the extent to which the enumerated peculiarities and weaknesses may result in advantages to us.

- (a) For example, if the enemy has an open flank, G2 states this fact in the "operations" subparagraph of his estimate. He then discusses briefly the extent to which the open flank constitutes a vulnerability which we may be able to exploit. If enemy reserves are small, not motorized, and are poorly positioned to extend the flank, the vulnerability may be great. If, on the other hand, enemy reserves are large, motorized, and positioned so as either to extend the flank or to counter-attack us if we attempt an envelopment, the vulnerability is probably insignificant.
- (b) Hence, paragraph 3e(3) of the intelligence estimate might be stated thus: "The enemy north flank is open. Available reserves, not motorized, are adequate to extend this flank a distance of only about 3,000 yards. Positions to extend the flank have not been prepared."
- (c) Conversely, the subparagraph might read thus: "The enemy north flank is open. However, available motorized reserves are adequate either to extend this flank beyond our zone, or to counterattack an enveloping force. Positions suitably located to block an attempted envelopment have been prepared as shown on the enemy situation map."
- (d) It is evident that, in the first case discussed above, the enemy's open flank is a vulnerability which G2 should reiterate in the "conclusions" paragraph of his intelligence estimate. In the second case, the open flank apparently is not a vulnerability, and should not be listed in the "conclusions" paragraph.

## 61. Enemy Capabilities

### a. Enumeration of Enemy Capabilities.

- (1) An enemy capability is any course of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission, either favorably or unfavorably.
- (2) Paragraph 4a is a list of enemy capabilities. Each is stated in a customary form. In general, a properly stated enemy capability indicates *what* the enemy can do (e. g., "attack"), *when* he can do it (e. g., "now"), *where* he can do it (e. g., "along our front"), and *in what strength* he can do it (e. g., "with five rifle battalions supported by all available artillery and air"). ("Attack now along our front with five rifle battalions supported by all available artillery and air.")

b. *Analysis and Discussion of Enemy Capabilities.*

- (1) (a) In paragraph 4b of the estimate, G2 weighs the available evidence pointing toward adoption or rejection by the enemy of each of his capabilities. Then, G2 examines each capability *from the enemy point of view*, to determine whether adoption of the capability appears to be advantageous to the enemy; or whether or not there exist conditions or circumstances which may militate against its adoption.
- (b) Each enemy capability, or appropriate combination of enemy capabilities, is the topic of a separate subparagraph, which is developed either by listing *indications* that the capability may be adopted, or by listing indications that the capability may be rejected. In certain circumstances the listing of the indications that point toward the adoption *and* rejection of a capability may be necessary to arrive at a logical conclusion.
- (2) An *indication* is any evidence of enemy activity, either positive or negative, or any characteristic of the area of operations, which supports the adoption or rejection by the enemy of any one capability. Thus, preparations for defense are a *positive* indication that the enemy *may* defend; at the same time, those preparations *may* be a *negative* indication of attack. Unlimited ceiling and visibility are indications that the enemy may employ all available air support; low ceiling and limited visibility are indications that the enemy *may not* employ all of the aircraft available to him. A good avenue of approach into our position suggests that the enemy *may* attack along that route; a major obstacle across part of our front is an indication that attack elsewhere is more likely.
- (3) (a) After listing the indications pertaining to a given capability, G2 examines it *from the enemy point of view*, and states his conclusion as to whether or not adoption of the capability appears to be advantageous *to the enemy*. For example, a subconclusion based on appropriate considerations might be stated thus: "A limited objective attack, enveloping our north flank, may achieve initial success and will delay the launching of our attack."
- (b) The statement of subconclusions is omitted when the subconclusion is obvious: for example, it is obviously to the enemy's advantage to support his operations with all available air.
- (c) 1. The statement of subconclusions *may* be omitted when there is no indication that the enemy is likely to adopt the capability concerned, *except* when it is one which, if adopted, will render the accomplishment of our mission either doubtful or impossible. Thus, when the enemy has a capability which is particularly dangerous to the accomplishment of our mission, the threat is always emphasized.



2. For example:

- (a) The enemy can usually withdraw his forces beyond our objective. Ordinarily, such withdrawal imposes no major threat to the accomplishment of our mission. Hence, in the absence of indications that the enemy may withdraw, any statement of conclusions is properly omitted. G2's analysis and discussion of this situation may, therefore, consist only of a statement substantially as follows: "There is no indication of withdrawal."
  - (b) When the enemy is holding large forces in general reserve, he can usually employ all or part of those forces against us. Their use may threaten seriously the accomplishment of our mission. Hence, even though there may be no indication that general reserves will be employed against us, the existence of the threat must be emphasized. In appropriate circumstances, G2's conclusion might read thus: "There is no indication at this time of reinforcement by the unidentified rifle division at ROLLE; however, if all or part of this division is employed in an envelopment of our north flank, the accomplishment of our mission will be difficult, if not impossible."
- (4) (a) The final step in the analysis and discussion of each enemy capability is to point out any conditions or circumstances, other than indications previously enumerated, which may militate against the enemy's adoption of that capability. Negative statements are usually omitted, except when the capability concerned is one which, if adopted, will render the accomplishment of our mission either doubtful or impossible.
- (b) For example, with respect to the employment of general reserves G2 might conclude his analysis and discussion in either of the following two ways, dependent on circumstances:
- 1. "The enemy's employment of the unidentified rifle division at ROLLE will have no apparent adverse effect on his conduct of later phases of the current operation."
  - 2. "The enemy's employment of the unidentified rifle division at ROLLE will deprive him of the reserves necessary to continue his defense, should his present position be penetrated by either of the two friendly divisions to our south. Premature employment of this division will insure the enemy's later defeat."

## 62. Conclusions

*a. General.* Paragraph 5 contains the final statement of G2's interpretation of the evaluated information presented, analyzed, and integrated in the preceding paragraphs of the estimate.

b. *Probable Courses of Action.*

- (1) Paragraph 5a is a statement of the courses of action which the evidence indicates the enemy is most likely to adopt, listed in order of relative probability of adoption. The paragraph is, in effect, a statement of the conclusions from the preceding analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities.
- (2) Since the determination of probable enemy courses of action is based on interpretation of intelligence which indicates current and future enemy action, the determination must be fully justified by the analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities in paragraph 4b of the Intelligence Estimate. The determination is objective: it is not an attempt to *guess* what the enemy will do; it is an attempt to decide, from available evidence, what he is *most likely* to do.
- (3) Probable courses of action are stated in paragraph 5a only when available evidence justifies a determination. In some circumstances, G2 will be justified in listing two, three, or more enemy courses of action in order of their probability of adoption. In other circumstances, the enemy may appear to be equally likely to adopt any of two or more courses of action. In still other circumstances, G2 will be unable to select any course of action as being more likely to be adopted than any other. In any circumstances, the statement of conclusions is unequivocal, even though it may sometimes be: "There are insufficient indications to justify any determination of probable courses of action."
- (4) In paragraph 4a of the estimate, the various enemy capabilities are stated separately. Thus, the attack with forces locally available, supported by all available artillery, is stated as one capability; reinforcing the attack or defense with certain reserves is stated as another capability; and supporting the operations with a specified air effort is stated as a third capability. However, in the statement of relative probabilities, it is customary to combine various capabilities into more descriptive statements of the courses of action the enemy is likely to adopt. For example, G2 may list as the most probable enemy course of action: "Attack to envelop our south flank, reinforced by his division reserve and utilizing all available artillery and air support." In this case, the statement of a course of action combines elements previously listed as three separate capabilities.

c. *Enemy Vulnerabilities.*

- (1) (a) An *enemy vulnerability* is any condition or circumstance of the enemy situation or the area of operations which renders the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. An enemy concentrated to the extent that he presents a favorable atomic target is vulnerable to damage. An enemy whose intel-

ligence means are overworked and inexperienced may be vulnerable to deception. An enemy whose forces are poorly disposed is especially liable to defeat. Sudden attack, particularly by tactical air, immediately following periods of severe weather conditions, can exploit the confusion and damage caused by storms with their high winds and precipitation.

- (b) *Exploitation of an enemy vulnerability* is the conduct of operations in such a way as to reap advantage from the enemy's vulnerability. Thus, an atomic attack may exploit the enemy's vulnerability to damage by such an attack. A tactical deception plan may exploit enemy intelligence inadequacies. An attack in a well-chosen direction may exploit faulty enemy dispositions.
- (2) (a) Paragraph 5b of the intelligence estimate presents those enemy vulnerabilities which *may* be exploitable, based on comparative study of the peculiarities and weaknesses enumerated and discussed in paragraph 3e of the estimate. G2 also gives consideration to the characteristics of the area of operations, pertinent aspects of the enemy situation other than peculiarities and weaknesses, and his own background knowledge of the enemy and the enemy's tactical doctrine.
- (b) Only actual vulnerabilities are presented. Thus, an open flank which the enemy cannot, with available forces, extend or refuse, may be a vulnerability. If, however, the enemy has superior forces which can readily extend the flank to an impassable obstacle, or counterattack to pin enveloping troops against that obstacle, the open flank probably is not a vulnerability, and is not given.
- (c) G2 includes all known or deduced vulnerabilities which *may* be exploitable, either at his echelon or at some higher or lower echelon. For example: a division operating as part of a larger force against an isolated hostile army cannot alone fully exploit the enemy's inability to recover from personnel and materiel losses. Nevertheless, the division G2 properly lists "inability to recover from personnel and materiel losses" as an enemy vulnerability.
- (3) (a) In paragraph 5b of the estimate each enemy vulnerability is described by a brief statement, without elaboration; for example: "Open north flank," or "Inability to reinforce against simultaneous attacks from two directions."
- (b) In determining what enemy vulnerabilities shall be listed, G2 necessarily gives some consideration to the feasibility of exploitation by his own commander, or by a higher or lower commander. However, the recommendation to the commander of tactical courses of action to be adopted is the

responsibility of the G3. Such recommendations are made by G3 *after* careful coordination and consultation with G2.

- (c) Similarly, the listing of enemy vulnerabilities does not necessarily imply that in G2's judgment every cited advantage should be seized. Frequently, the exploitation of one vulnerability will preclude the exploitation of another. For example: an inferior enemy may have an open flank and, at the same time, be overextended; he may, in such a case, be vulnerable to either envelopment or penetration.
- (d) The order in which vulnerabilities are listed is not significant.

### 63. Ending

a. *Signature.* If the intelligence estimate is written for circulation only within the headquarters, it is signed by G2. If it is prepared for dissemination outside the headquarters, it bears the name and grade of the commander, and is authenticated by G2.

b. *Annexes.* Any portion of a written estimate, if voluminous, may be made the subject of an annex. When this is done, the appropriate annex is referenced in the body of the estimate, and is listed in the ending.

## Section III. DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

### 64. General

a. *Definition.* An enemy capability is any course of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. Thus, two requirements must be met: the enemy must be physically capable of adopting the course of action; and the course of action must affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The effect on the friendly mission may be either favorable or unfavorable; however, actions which are grossly disadvantageous to the enemy, or otherwise entirely unreasonable, are not included. For example, the enemy may be physically capable of disengaging troops committed outside our zone in order to employ them against us, but in most circumstances G2 does not consider this to be a "capability."

b. *Doctrine of Capabilities.* Commanders base their actions, dispositions, and plans upon estimates of enemy capabilities rather than upon estimates of the enemy's intentions. An estimate of enemy capabilities can be formulated objectively since it is based upon knowledge of weather, terrain, the enemy situation, tactical doctrine, and factors of time and space, and enemy order of battle. But enemy intentions can seldom be determined. The enemy commander may change his mind or higher commanders may change his orders. Furthermore, the enemy may promulgate false orders and rumors, which indicate actions different from those which he actually intends. Although the enemy may also take measures to give false impressions of his capabilities, this is far more difficult to do effectively than it is to spread false information about his intentions.

## 65. Determination

a. *General.* With certain exceptions, any statement of enemy capabilities must provide the answers to four questions:

- (1) *What* can the enemy do? (e. g., "attack").
- (2) *When* can he do it? (e. g., "at 081300 June").
- (3) *Where* can he do it? (e. g., "on our north flank").
- (4) *In what strength* can he do it? (e. g., "with two divisions").

b. *What?*

- (1) Four general operations are almost always possible: the enemy can usually attack; he can usually defend; he can usually withdraw; and he can usually reinforce the troops in contact.
- (2) These general operations are divisible, dependent on the situation, into component elements of a variety of specific courses of action. For example, an attack may be a frontal attack, a penetration, an envelopment, or a turning movement. A defense may be conducted in one position or in successive positions, and may be either a position type defense or a mobile type defense.
- (3) The specific activities of which the enemy is physically capable depend upon the means available to him, and the existence of conditions under which those means can be employed. Hence, the *what* of each of the enemy's capabilities is determined in about the same way as any commander determines the *what* of each of his own courses of action: through consideration of the weather, the terrain, the order of battle of the opposing forces and factors of time and space.
- (4) Although the friendly mission is usually known with certainty, whereas the enemy's mission can rarely be, it is evident that study of the characteristics of the area of operations, our situation, and the means available to the enemy, invariably discloses that the enemy is physically capable of certain actions, but that others are impracticable. For example, he can attack to envelop our forces only when we have an assailable flank; he can reinforce troops in contact only when he has available the means with which to reinforce; he can conduct airborne operations only when he has the necessary troops and aircraft; and he can delay in successive positions only when the terrain is suitable. Accordingly, determination of enemy capabilities is largely dependent on answers to the questions: "In what strength can he do it?" and "Where can he do it?" That is, "What means are available to him, and where can those means be employed?"

c. *When?*

- (1) The time at which the enemy can initiate any of his capabilities

is dependent upon the dispositions of his forces. Obviously, locally available forces can be employed without significant delay; the enemy can attack or defend with them *now*. However, forces which are disposed at some distance behind the line of contact cannot be employed against us immediately; they must first be moved to the place of employment.

- (2) Accordingly, the *when* of an enemy capability which involves the employment of locally available forces only is frequently expressed by the word "now." In appropriate circumstances, such capabilities may be expressed thus: "Attack now along our front with six rifle battalions supported by all available artillery and air." Or, "Attack now to envelop our north flank with two rifle divisions supported by all available artillery and air." Or, "Defend now in his present position with two rifle regiments supported by all available artillery and air."
- (3) The *when* of an enemy capability which involves the displacement of forces is necessarily some time after those forces begin to move. Reserves in an assembly area cannot reinforce an attack *now*; they must first be moved to a line of departure. Nor can they reinforce the defense *now*; they must first be moved to appropriate locations. Consequently, in order to determine *when* the enemy can employ his reserves, G2 must determine the time required for those reserves to move to a place where they can be employed against us. In order to determine *when* the enemy can initiate the defense of a position not presently occupied, G2 must determine the time required for the necessary troops to move to that position. Hence, troop movement time and space computations are required. These computations are discussed in paragraph 80.

d. *Where?*

- (1) The *where* of an enemy capability is dependent upon the weather, terrain, and disposition of his forces. Under existing and predictable conditions of weather, the terrain may afford avenues of approach into our position from the front, flanks, or rear, or conversely, may preclude the enemy's employment of armored or mechanized forces in certain areas. Cross compartments may provide the enemy with suitable defensive or delaying positions. The existence of appropriate objectives and suitable drop or landing zones suggests where airborne forces may be employed. The presence of suitable beaches suggests where enemy amphibious forces may land. The locations of adequate assembly areas and attack positions indicate where enemy reinforcements may be met in the attack. The locations of prepared defensive positions in depth clearly disclose where troops may be used to reinforce the enemy's defense.

- (2) Accordingly, G2 determines the *where* of each enemy capability through analysis and integration of the weather, terrain, and the situations of the opposing forces. "If the enemy is physically capable of launching an attack," G2 asks himself in effect: "Where can he do it? If the enemy defends, where are suitable defensive positions? If he delays in successive positions, where are the favorable delaying positions? If he reinforces the troops now in contact, to what places must the reinforcements be moved before they can be committed?"
- (3) (a) Assuming that the enemy is capable of launching an attack and that the situation and the area of operations are such that the attack may strike anywhere along our front, the partially stated enemy capability becomes: "Attack along our front . . . ." In other circumstances, enemy capabilities, stated in part, may include: "Attack to envelop our north flank . . . ." "Or attack in the direction LEAVENWORTH-ATCHISON . . . ." or, "Land (amphibious or airborne forces) in the vicinity of . . . ."
- (b) Similarly, when the enemy is capable of conducting a defense, partial statements of his defensive capability may include: "Defend in his present position . . ." or, "Defend the line of the MISSOURI River . . . ."
- (c) Capabilities to delay may be stated in part thus: "Delay in his present and successive positions to the line of the MISSOURI River . . . ." or, "Delay along the general lines WARBURG-HOFGEISMAR, WILDUNGEN-MELSUNGEN, MARBURG-ALSFELD . . . ."
- (d) Appropriate, partial statements of the enemy's capability of employing available reinforcements may include: "Reinforce an envelopment of our north flank . . ." or, "Reinforce his defense of the line . . . ."
- e. *In What Strength?*
  - (1) The strength which the enemy can employ in any particular capability is dependent primarily upon the composition, dispositions, and strength of the forces available to him. The G2 obtains the necessary data from the order of battle personnel (see FM 30-19, *Order of Battle Intelligence*).
  - (2) Forces which the enemy has committed against us (i. e., locally available forces) can obviously be employed in any capability which the enemy chooses to adopt. Hence, if he has six rifle battalions committed against our division, he can attack with six rifle battalions, supported by all available artillery and air. He can defend in his present position with the same six battalions, and the same support.
  - (3) In addition to the forces locally available, the enemy may also employ the reserves available at any echelon. Thus, if the

enemy has six battalions locally available and a regiment in reserve, he can usually reinforce either his attack or his defense with the reserve regiment. An appropriate, partial statement of his capability in these circumstances might be: "Attack now to envelop our north flank with six rifle battalions supported by all available artillery and air, reinforced by one rifle regiment at the following times and places . . . ."

- (4) As the foregoing examples suggest, the statement of the strength in any enemy capability is usually confined to units which normally close with us in combat; i. e., infantry, armored, and mechanized (including reconnaissance) battalions or larger units. Artillery, similar units, and aircraft merely support the actions of infantry, armored, and mechanized forces. However, the number of artillery and similar units available to support the enemy's operations, the number of ground atomic delivery units within range, and the number of aircraft within operational radius all are specified in the "Strength" subparagraph (par. 3c) of the intelligence estimate even though not repeated in the statement of the capability.

*f. Exceptions.*

- (1) Specific expressions as to *when* and *in what strength* are customarily omitted in the statement of certain enemy capabilities but are, nevertheless, implied. Thus, a statement of the enemy's capability of delaying in successive positions rarely specified either *when* or *in what strength*. The implication is clear that the action can be initiated immediately, or at any time in the future, and is expected to involve all of the available forces. Similarly, the statement that the enemy can withdraw rarely specifies either *when* or *in what strength*. As before, the implications are clear. However, reference is frequently made to a time of initiation. For example, the capability may be stated thus: "The enemy can withdraw beyond our objective *at any time prior to our attack*."
- (2) Reference to *when* is usually omitted from a statement of the enemy's air support capability, and may be omitted from the statement of other capabilities if the implication "at any time" is both intended and obvious.
- (3) (a) Some enemy capabilities refer specifically to the support of combat forces, rather than to the capabilities of units which, in normal employment, close with our frontline troops. These are specifically, the air capability, the atomic capability, and the capability of employing CBR agents.
- (b) The enemy air capability is determined by appropriate Air Force intelligence agencies, based upon numbers of enemy aircraft within operational radius, maintenance facilities, ex-



pected attrition, the ground tactical situation, and other factors. At army the supporting tactical air force, and at army group the supporting tactical air command, furnish intelligence as to the number of sorties, by type, which the enemy can be expected to employ within the field army or larger command area, as well as the maximum number of sorties, by type, which the enemy is capable of mounting. The estimate is not prorated at lower levels of command; that is, no attempt is made to calculate the number of sorties the enemy can or may employ against a corps or division operating as part of a field army. Corps and division G2's merely quote, in their statement of the enemy air capabilities, the estimate furnished by the supporting tactical air force. For example, a corps or division G2 might express it thus: "Thirtieth Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with as many as 150 fighter, 100 ground attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily; however, by massing all aircraft within an operational radius the enemy can mount a maximum of 1,250 fighter, 500 ground attack, and 400 bomber sorties daily."

- (c) 1. The determination of enemy atomic and CBR capabilities is based primarily on strategic intelligence estimates of numbers and types of weapons and agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground troops. For example: It is likely that the enemy main attack will receive priority of atomic and CBR support.
2. As in the case of the enemy air capability, it is rarely feasible to estimate what proportion of the available enemy atomic or CBR effort may be employed against a division or corps within a field army. Additionally, estimates as to the number of atomic weapons which the enemy is capable of employing within as short a period as one day are rarely feasible. Accordingly, a typical atomic capability may be stated as follows: "The enemy can be expected to employ within Thirtieth Army area as many as 20 atomic weapons per month, with yields of from 20 to 60 KT, and with delivery by aircraft or guided missile."

g. See appendix VI for illustrative example of the statement of enemy capabilities.

## 66. Enemy Troop Movements

a. *General.* The time required for an enemy in the field to move troops from one place to another and then commit them to action obviously depends upon a number of variables, and can be determined only by continued and painstaking analysis of enemy movements actually

made in combat. However, in instruction and training, and as a point of departure for the development of experience factors against any particular enemy in the field, the general techniques and rules described in the following paragraphs are employed.

*b. General Techniques.*

- (1) In order to determine the time at which the enemy can employ any unit not already committed—
  - (a) Determine the present location of the nearest logical enemy unit that can initiate the course of action.
  - (b) Select a logical point which the unit must reach in order to be employed against us. For battalions and regiments moving to the attack, select an appropriate attack position; for divisions and larger units, select a suitable forward assembly area. For units moving to reinforce a defense, select suitable defensive lines or counterattack positions.
  - (c) Compute the minimum time required for the unit to move from its present location to the selected point (travel time).
  - (d) Add to the travel time the time required for assembling (closing) a sufficient portion of the unit for it to be employed in coordinated action.
- (2)
  - (a) The time which the enemy may require to entruck or detruck, to issue extra ammunition, to make detailed reconnaissance, to issue orders, to deploy, or to move from an attack position to a line of departure, *is not considered* since all may be completed prior to commencing the operation or simultaneously with the movement.
  - (b) In the exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements, travel time only is considered. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not close into an assembly area or attack position.
- (3) Travel time plus closing time is the time *after starting movement* (ASM) at which a reinforcement can be effected. Except when observation of enemy units and reporting of their locations is continuous, it must be assumed that any unit could have started to move immediately after its location was last observed and reported. Hence, to determine the earliest time at which the enemy can effect a reinforcement against us, it is necessary simply to add the travel plus closing time to the time last seen. For example, if an enemy reserve unit was last seen in its assembly area at 0800 hours and can be employed to envelop our north flank 1 hour after starting movement, it must be assumed that the attack can be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus 1 hr.).
- (4)
  - (a) Since observation of enemy reserves is rarely continuous, any statement of enemy reinforcing capabilities preferably includes both the earliest time, and also the time after starting

movement (ASM time) at which the reinforcement can be effected. For example: "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Rifle Regiment at 0900 hours, or 1 hour after starting movement."

- (b) When the time elapsed since receipt of the most recent report is greater than the ASM time, it is appropriate to give only the ASM time in a statement of the enemy capability. For example: "The enemy can reinforce his frontal attack with the 45th Rifle Regiment now, or 1 hour after starting movement."
- (5) Particularly when the number of available reserves is large, or when the enemy is capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing capabilities are preferably presented in tabular form. For example: "The enemy can reinforce his attack or his defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated below—

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Motor</i>	<i>Foot</i>
45th Rifle Regt..	RJ 638	Now or 1 hr ASM...	091205 Jun or 4 hr 5 min ASM
	RJ 888	090930 Jun or 1 hr 30 min ASM	091605 Jun or 8 hr 5 min ASM
37th Rifle Regt..	RJ 638	091000 Jun or 2 hr ASM	100740 Jun or 23 hr 40 min ASM
	RJ 888	090920 Jun or 1 hr 20 min ASM	091430 Jun or 6 hr 30 min ASM "

c. *General Rules.*

- (1) Select a logical point which a unit must reach in order to be employed against us.
- (2) The starting place is the edge of the unit assembly area nearest to the place to which the unit is to be moved; that is, a logical initial point for a march.
- (3) The starting time is the time at which the unit was last observed in the area.
- (4) The march distance is the distance from (2) to (1), above.
- (5) Arrival time is starting time plus march time plus closing time. This total time is rounded off to the *nearest* 5 minutes. In case of a piecemeal action, compute the arrival time of the nearest enemy unit that can initiate the action; closing time is not computed.
- (6) Compute foot marching time for reinforcements for all distances; compute motor marching time for distances greater than 5 miles only. If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor marching time.
- (7) Consider a foot march of more than 20 miles as a forced march.

- (8) Consider a motor march of more than 175 miles as a forced march for motorized infantry units, and a march of more than 140 miles as a forced march for armored, tank, and mechanized units.
- (9) At the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from night to day. If the column is in the process of closing at BMNT, continue to close the column at the night rate of march.
- (10) At the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from day to night. If the column is in the process of closing at EENT, continue to close the column at the day rate of march.
- (11) To move an enemy infantry battalion, move and close the entire unit.
- (12) Except as noted in (13) below, to move a unit of regimental or larger size, move and close two-thirds of the *combat* elements; e. g., two battalions of an infantry regiment, two regiments of an infantry division.
- (13) To move a US-type armored division, or other unit with a similarly flexible organization, move and close two-thirds of the entire division.
- (14) Consider all units to be at full strength, regardless of known shortages.

## CHAPTER 5

### USE OF INTELLIGENCE

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#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

##### 67. General

a. Combat intelligence is used by—

- (1) The commander, in arriving at sound and timely decisions, in conducting operations, and to avoid surprise.
- (2) The staff, as a basis for their plans and estimates.
- (3) The commanders and staffs of higher, lower, and adjacent units, as a basis for their decisions, plans, and estimates.
- (4) G2 and his assistants, as a basis for evaluation and interpretation of information subsequently received.

b. Of the uses indicated above, all except use by the intelligence officer and his assistants require *dissemination* of intelligence in such form and detail as to be of greatest utility and in time to serve the intended purposes. Dissemination to the commander and staff is accomplished by means of an intelligence estimate, which may be presented either orally or in writing, and may be complete, abbreviated, or fragmentary (ch. 4). Dissemination to higher, lower, and adjacent units is accomplished by means of intelligence estimates, conferences, messages, and various intelligence documents, the more important of which are described in paragraphs 69 through 72.

##### 68. Dissemination Requirements and Criteria

a. Intelligence is disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units ("up, down, and laterally"). Normally, dissemination *down* poses the most difficult problem. Changes in the situation may occur more rapidly at lower echelons and *timeliness* becomes a critical factor, but in opposition to the requirement for timeliness is the usual requirement for greater *detail* at successively lower echelons. Regimental and lower commanders wish to know the exact location of enemy weapons, and other details of the enemy's organization of the ground; the army commander may be content to know just the general location and activities of enemy divisions.

b. To allow subordinate echelons to concentrate on the intelligence with which they are vitally concerned, higher echelons avoid downward dissemination of intelligence which is of no value to the recipients. At division and lower echelons, particularly, intelligence sections do not have

sufficient personnel to separate the relevant from the irrelevant, if the volume of incoming intelligence is too great. Hence, each echelon disseminates to its subordinate units only pertinent information and usable intelligence. Although striking a balance between too much and too little is a difficult task, the judgment with which it is accomplished affects the efficiency of operation of intelligence sections at all echelons.

c. The timeliness and importance of each item of intelligence must be weighed carefully as a basis for selecting the means of dissemination to be employed. Information and intelligence must reach its users in time to permit further evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and the initiation of appropriate action. However, habitual or unnecessary use of the fastest available communications inevitably interferes with other traffic, and may delay the transmission of urgent intelligence and information.

## **Section II. MEANS OF DISSEMINATION**

### **69. Personal Contacts**

The exchange of information between the intelligence sections of higher, lower, and adjacent units is facilitated by frequent personal contacts, including staff visits, telephone calls, and conferences between the staff officers concerned. The frequency of contact varies with the intensity of activity and with the number of reports received from subordinate units.

### **70. Messages**

a. All messages must be clear, concise, and complete. Communication security measures accorded a message must be commensurate with the classification of its content and adequate for the protection of the sources and agencies on whose reports it is based.

b. *Spot reports* contain information or intelligence which is of sufficient importance to warrant immediate dissemination. There is no prescribed form for spot reports; their content is dictated by the events and incidents which they report; however, to the extent practicable, they answer the questions: *who? what? when? where? and how?* When transmitted to higher headquarters, spot reports contain information which may or may not have been evaluated, but when transmitted to lower echelons, they contain intelligence as well as information. Ordinarily, spot reports are transmitted by the most rapid means of communication available.

### **71. Intelligence Documents**

a. *Intelligence summaries* (ISUM's) are compilations of information, intelligence, or both, disseminated during a prescribed period of time. The ISUM is discussed in detail in paragraph 72.

b. The *periodic intelligence report* (PERINTREP) contains a detailed account of information and intelligence compiled during a specified period

of time. The PERINTREP is discussed in detail in paragraphs 73 through 76.

c. The *intelligence annex* to an operation plan or order is the formal intelligence order. Paragraph 1 of the intelligence annex contains a summary of the enemy situation, or may refer to a current PERINTREP. (The intelligence annex is discussed in detail in chapter 6.)

d. *Intelligence estimates* prepared at corps and higher headquarters may be disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units. Division intelligence estimates are rarely written; hence, they are seldom used as a means of dissemination, except in oral briefings of the commander and staff (ch. 4).

e. *Maps* are an essential means of disseminating terrain information. Maps may be overprinted, or overlays may be used, for the dissemination of terrain intelligence and information (chs. 4, 5, and 8).

f. *Enemy situation maps and overlays* depict graphically the locations and dispositions of enemy forces, weapons, and installations. They are a particularly useful means of dissemination following major changes in the enemy situation.

g. *Technical intelligence bulletins and summaries* disseminate the results of examination of enemy materiel or of other studies made by technical service intelligence detachments. They may be disseminated through command channels, intelligence channels, or technical service channels.

h. *Tactical studies of weather and terrain* are used to disseminate information of the weather and terrain, and intelligence as to the effect of weather and terrain on military operations (pars. 77-85).

i. *Order of battle books* are reference works containing lists, histories, code names, and other data on identified foreign units, and biographical data on certain foreign military personalities.

j. *Order of battle handbooks* contain compilations of data concerning the political structure, military system, military organization, and tactical doctrine of foreign nations.

k. *Prisoner of war interrogation reports* summarize, or report in full, the results of interrogation of one or more prisoners of war. Information in these reports must be carefully processed and checked against information from other sources before being disseminated as intelligence.

l. *Photo interpretation reports* present and identify enemy activities and installations, and are also the most reliable source of current information of terrain. Photo interpretation reports are discussed in paragraph 152.

m. *Translation reports* contain extracts or summaries of translated enemy documents. Complete translations are sometimes disseminated.

n. *Climatic summaries* (par. 78e) may be disseminated as parts of, or as annexes to other intelligence documents, or may be disseminated separately.

o. *Climatic studies*, see paragraph 78f.

p. *Weather forecasts* (par. 78g) contain highly perishable information and are disseminated by electrical or other rapid means.

- q. *Current weather reports*, see paragraph 78h.
- r. *Weather summaries*, see paragraph 78i.
- s. *Special reports* may be used to disseminate intelligence on enemy tactics, order of battle; or any data too voluminous or detailed to be included in other reports.

## 72. The Intelligence Summary (ISUM)

a. Intelligence summaries are disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units at intervals prescribed by each headquarters for its next subordinate units. Usually ISUM's are required each 6 hours during combat operations.

b. The ISUM is the principal means employed by division and lower echelons for the dissemination of intelligence. It may be supplemented by special reports, as required, to inform all recipients of intelligence and information produced by the unit.

c. Although there is no prescribed form for an ISUM, each must include identification of the reporting unit; date and time of issue of the report; a brief description of the existing enemy situation; and an abstract of significant information received and intelligence produced during the period of the report. (Significant items of information and intelligence received or produced during the period covered by each ISUM are included even though the information and intelligence may have been disseminated in previous reports.) Additionally, each ISUM concludes with an enumeration of enemy capabilities and, when warranted, a statement of probable enemy courses of action, in priority.

d. ISUM's should also include the following if applicable:

- (1) Description of enemy operations during the period (including air activity).
- (2) Estimates of enemy personnel and materiel losses.
- (3) Locations of new barriers.
- (4) Description of administrative activities, particularly those indicating offensive action.
- (5) New unit identifications.
- (6) Reports of unit movement and of the number and type of vehicles involved.
- (7) Statement of weather and terrain conditions existing during the period of the report.

e. Example. "20th Infantry Division ISUM for period ending 030730 January . . . . Aggressor continued defense in division zone except for local attack with estimated 400 men, 5 medium-type tanks, and no repeat, no artillery support at 0515 in vicinity of X487850. Attack repulsed. Four tanks destroyed. Twelve prisoners taken; identified Aggressor 1st Battalion, 17th Rifle Regiment (B-1). Estimate purpose of attack to seize defensive terrain in vicinity of Hill 405 (B-2). Two Aggressor jet fighters bombed and strafed in vicinity of X592863 at 0600; one shot down. No identification. Patrol reports battery of 150's at X603292



(A-2). Unconfirmed prisoner of war interrogation reports state ammunition supply in frontlines running low (C-3). Snow continues. Ground frozen hard and will support all types of vehicles. Enemy is capable of (1) defending in present position; (2) making local attacks to improve his defensive position; (3) withdrawing to stronger position. Continued defense in present position is most probable."

### **Section III. THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

#### **73. Introduction**

*a.* The periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP) is the principal means employed by echelons above division for the dissemination of information and intelligence. It is not normally prepared by division or lower units. The size of intelligence sections at division and lower echelons does not permit production of this detailed report. Depending upon the situation, corps may, like division, depend upon the ISUM for dissemination of intelligence. At Army level a PERINTREP is always issued.

*b.* The PERINTREP contains a summary of the enemy situation and of all intelligence produced during a prescribed period of time, usually 24 hours. Additionally, it contains an enumeration of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, an analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities, and an enumeration in order of priority of the enemy's probable courses of action. Other intelligence documents, such as technical intelligence summaries, order of battle reports, and prisoner of war interrogation reports may be disseminated as appendixes to PERINTREP's.

*c.* Each commander prescribes the period of time to be covered by the PERINTREPs of his next subordinate units. Normally the period is 24 hours, from 1800 one day to 1800 the following day, rather than from 2400 hours to 2400 hours. The 1800 to 1800 period is preferred not only for the greater convenience it affords in preparation of the report, but also to insure timeliness in the dissemination and receipt of intelligence on enemy activities during daylight hours, and to provide a basis for planning friendly operations for the following day.

*d.* In addition to daily PERINTREP's, a field army in combat may issue a weekly intelligence summary which follows the format of a PERINTREP. The weekly summary emphasizes the intelligence highlights of the week, and frequently serves to indicate hostile trends.

#### **74. Form**

*a. General.* The PERINTREP follows the prescribed 5-paragraph form shown in FM 101-5. Paragraph 1 is a concise review of the general enemy situation and principal activities during the period of the report. Paragraph 2 describes in detail the enemy operations during the period. Paragraph 3 contains other intelligence factors such as order of battle

data and weather and terrain data. Paragraph 4 describes the counter-intelligence situation and activities. Paragraph 5 contains a list and discussion of enemy capabilities and a list of enemy vulnerabilities and probable courses of action.

b. Paragraph 1, "General Enemy Situation."

- (1) This paragraph contains a brief summary of enemy operations during the period; details are furnished in the paragraphs which follow. Its purpose is to provide a quick briefing on the highlights of the enemy situation and the significance of the enemy's major activities. Data which can conveniently be shown graphically are presented in annexed maps, sketch maps, or overlays, to which reference is made in this paragraph.
- (2) It is frequently desirable to divide paragraph 1 into four subparagraphs, titled: *forward area*, *rear area*, *defensive organization*, and *administrative installations*.
  - (a) The *forward area* subparagraph contains a summary of the enemy situation from the line of contact back to and including the artillery positions.
  - (b) The *rear area* subparagraph discusses the enemy situation behind the artillery positions. It is concerned principally with the reserves of divisions and larger units which are physically capable of affecting the friendly mission, and which can reasonably be expected to be so employed.
  - (c) The *defensive organization* subparagraph considers the enemy organization of the ground for defense, including the location of obstacles, roadblocks, minefields, observation posts, command posts, barriers, and fortifications.
  - (d) The *administrative installations* subparagraph discusses administrative installations as to type, location, scale of activity, size, time of operation, and other data as available.

c. Paragraph 2, "Enemy Operations During Period."

- (1) This paragraph contains the details of the intelligence summarized in paragraph 1. Subparagraphs contain intelligence on: strengths and dispositions of enemy units; reserves and reinforcements; new enemy tactics, weapons and equipment; other order of battle data; and the operations of component elements of the enemy force; e. g. infantry, armor, and artillery. Although the intelligence presented in this paragraph usually will have been disseminated in spot reports and/or intelligence summaries during the period covered by the PERINTREP, it is, nevertheless, repeated here so that all significant intelligence produced during the period will be available in one comprehensive document.
- (2) Much of paragraph 2 may be presented graphically by means of overprinted maps, sketch maps, or overlays annexed to the report and referenced in paragraph 2. Similarly, order of battle

reports and other intelligence documents are frequently disseminated as annexes, to which reference is made in the appropriate subparagraph of paragraph 2.

- (3) The subparagraph headings which appear in the PERINTREP in FM 101-5 are not mandatory. Subparagraphs are omitted when appropriate intelligence is lacking.

*d. Paragraph 3, "Other Intelligence Factors."* This paragraph includes subheadings on enemy losses, combat efficiency, and morale. Additional subparagraphs include identification, status, location, and type of administrative installations. Other factors, including weather and terrain, are also listed. Changes to previously published terrain intelligence and information, as well as current weather conditions and forecasts, are included under these factors. Some of the foregoing are included in annexes or appendixes because of their detail, or when only a limited distribution is required. Any data which have been covered in other parts of the report are not repeated.

*e. Paragraph 4, "Counterintelligence."* This paragraph gives a brief summary of the counterintelligence situation, followed by detailed intelligence on the operations of enemy espionage agents, saboteurs, and subversive agents, including political activity, propaganda, and rumors.

*f. Paragraph 5, "Enemy Capabilities."* This paragraph usually is divided into four subparagraphs: an enumeration of enemy capabilities, a brief discussion and analysis of the enemy capabilities, a list in priority of the probable enemy courses of action, and a list of enemy vulnerabilities. This paragraph is identical in content with paragraphs 4 and 5 of the intelligence estimate, but is usually briefer.

*g. Annexes.* Any pertinent intelligence document may be disseminated as an annex to a PERINTREP. Frequently, order of battle reports and prisoner of war interrogation reports are disseminated in this manner. Although annexes provide a means of furnishing detailed intelligence to those who require it, care is exercised to avoid unnecessary bulk.

## **75. Preparation**

*a. Brevity.* The PERINTREP must be brief, but it must also be complete. Brevity is required for commanders, staff officers, and others who need a concise summary of the enemy situation and the significance of enemy operations. Paragraph 1 meets this need. On the other hand, detail is required by many other recipients of the PERINTREP, particularly the G2's and other intelligence personnel of higher, lower, and adjacent units. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the report fill their needs.

*b. Clarity.* Clarity is achieved by careful choice of language, by reporting only established intelligence, and by acknowledging any lack of desirable information. When doubtful or unconfirmed information is reported, it is accompanied by a statement to that effect.

*c. Interest.* Insofar as possible the PERINTREP, particularly paragraph 1, is written to emphasize the news appeal of intelligence. Prefer-

ably, the report begins with items which are interesting but which are, nevertheless, of intelligence value. Also, for the purpose of maintaining interest in the PERINTREP, the use of abbreviations and unnecessary references to map coordinates is avoided. Interest is enhanced by the use of illustrations, sketches, photographs, overlays, and other forms of graphic presentation.

*d. Pertinence.* Intelligence in the periodic report must be both relevant and timely. The scope and detail of enemy activity included vary with the echelon.

## **76. Dissemination**

Distribution of the PERINTREP includes as a minimum the commander and staff sections of the preparing headquarters, the headquarters of the next two higher and subordinate echelons, and adjacent units. Further dissemination may be made as necessary. The report is sent out by any available means, preferably liaison officer or messenger.

## **Section IV. THE TACTICAL STUDY OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN**

### **77. General**

The most effective employment of military forces requires consideration of the influence of weather and terrain from the inception of a plan through its final execution. Accurate interpretation of the effects of weather and terrain serves not only as a basis for increasing the probability of success in our own operations, but serves also as a basis for determining probable enemy courses of action. Accordingly, the preparation of tactical studies of weather and terrain is a responsibility of the assistant chief of staff, G2, although other staff officers—particularly the engineer and the staff weather officer (par. 79a(5))—assist in preparation.

### **78. Definitions**

*a. A tactical study of weather and terrain* is an analysis of the characteristics of an area of probable military operations, and in interpretation of the effects of weather and terrain on the operations of opposing forces in the area. It is usually prepared prior to the planning phase of an operation.

*b. Terrain* is an area of ground considered as to its extent and natural features in relation to its use for a particular operation.

*c. Weather* refers to the condition and behavior of the atmosphere at a given place and at a specified time, as determined by observation of the meteorological elements.

*d. Climate* refers to the average and extreme conditions of the atmosphere at a specified place or a region of the earth's surface over a long period of time.

*e. A climatic summary* furnishes statistical data as to normal weather conditions, and variations from the normal, at a specified place during a specified period of time (month, season, or during a typical meteorological

situation). Climatic summaries are compiled from historical records of weather observations over long periods of time. They do not alone forecast day-to-day weather conditions, but they do provide a basis for estimates and plans. (For an example of a climatic summary, see appendix II.)

f. A *climatic study* is a statistical summary of pertinent weather data together with an analysis and interpretation of the data as to their effect on military operations. Climatic studies have been, or are being, prepared for most of the strategic areas of the world and are available to planners in the National Intelligence Surveys (NIS). Detailed climatic studies for specific areas are prepared by Air Weather Service units. (For an example of the latter, see appendix III.)

g. A *weather forecast* is a prediction of future weather at a point, along a route, or within an area, for a specified period of time.

- (1) Weather forecasts are based on simultaneous observations, made over a wide area, of the more important meteorological elements: free air temperature, barometric pressure, winds, humidity, precipitation, and visibility. Data are plotted on weather maps and are analyzed as a basis for predicting the movement and alteration of weather systems.
- (2) The accuracy of a forecast depends upon a variety of factors, particularly the duration of the forecast, the amount and reliability of weather data, the geographical location of the area, the terrain, the season of the year, the detail required, and the experience of the forecaster. When reports of observed weather phenomena are sparse and the meteorological situation is complex, a forecast of conditions 2 or 3 hours in the future may be inaccurate. However, when reports are complete and the meteorological situation is relatively simple, conditions may be forecast with reasonable accuracy for as much as 3 to 5 days in the future.
- (3) Weather forecasts are classified according to the length of the forecast period as extended-period, long-period, or short-period forecasts.
  - (a) Extended-period forecasts cover periods from 5 days to several weeks in advance, and are based largely on climatic data. They predict future weather only in general terms by giving expected departures from normal conditions, and the anticipated times of significant changes. Their degree of accuracy is such that they are normally useful only for preliminary planning.
  - (b) Long-period forecasts cover periods from 3 to 5 days in advance, and ordinarily are somewhat more accurate than extended-period forecasts. Long-period forecasts are also known as "3-day" or "5-day" forecasts. (For an example, see figure 5.)

FROM 30-11 WEA DET

OPNL PRIORITY

SECRET SEND IN CLEAR VIA LAND LINE TELETYPE AUTH: MAJ M I RAINE  
TO CG 20 INF DIV

WEATHER FORECAST AND LIGHT DATA LEAVENWORTH AND VICINITY 1 AUG SKY  
CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE DAY WITH VISIBILITY RESTRICTED TO FIVE MILES BY  
LIGHT HAZE FROM SUNRISE UNTIL 0900S WIND WEST 10 TO 12 MPH BEGINNING  
MORNING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT 0551S END EVENING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT 2040S  
MOON PHASE: FULL MOON MOONRISE 2030S MOONSET 0750S. 2 AUG CONTINUED  
FAIR WEATHER WITH CLEAR SKIES THROUGHOUT THE DAY VISIBILITY AGAIN  
REDUCED BY HAZE AT SUNRISE TO 3 TO 5 MILES LIFTING TO FIFTEEN MILES  
OR BETTER BY 0900S BEGINNING MORNING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT 0552S END  
EVENING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT 2039S. 3 AUG CONTINUED FAIR AND WARM WITH  
CLEAR SKIES VISIBILITY REDUCED TO 3 TO 5 MILES AT DAWN LIFTING TO  
FIFTEEN MILES OR BETTER BY 0900S BEGINNING MORNING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT  
0553S END EVENING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT 2028S.

CFN 30-11, 20, 1, 0900, 10, 12, 0551, 2040, 2030, 0750, 2, 3, 5, 0900, 0552, 2039, 3, 3,  
5, 0900, 0553, 2028.

301358S JUL JEDKF

*Figure 5. Typical long-period weather forecast.*

- (c) Short-period forecasts describe in detail the weather which is expected to occur in the immediate future, up to 48 hours in advance. The accuracy to be expected decreases as the length of the period increases. Short-period forecasts are also referred to by the length of period covered; for example, "12-hour," "24-hour," or "48-hour" forecasts.

*h. Reports of current weather* contain information as to the existing weather conditions at a point, along a route, or within an area. Such reports normally consist of a verbal, written, or graphic interpretation of observed weather phenomena. They are useful in connection with the operation of aircraft, in the employment of atomic weapons and CBR agents, and in the control of current operations on the ground.

*i. A weather summary* is a description of the weather which has occurred at a point, along a route, or within an area, during the past day, week, or other specified recent period. Weather summaries are useful in the analysis of the effects of weather on recent operations, as a means of estimating the effects of forecast weather on future operations. Weather summaries are essential to the preparation of engineer forecasts of stream flow, state of ground, and trafficability.

## **79. Sources of Information**

### *a. Weather.*

- (1) Weather service for Army and Air Force forces in a theater of operations is provided by the Air Weather Service (AWS), a

component of the Military Air Transport Service. (The AWS ordinarily does not provide observations of the upper atmosphere for Army ballistic purposes. These observations are made by organic Army meteorological sections.) Normally, a weather wing of the AWS is assigned to each theater. Subordinate elements of the weather wing include a variable number of weather groups, squadrons, and detachments. A weather group operates with each army group—tactical air command. A weather squadron supports each army and tactical air force. A weather detachment, operating a tactical weather station, is normally attached to each corps.

- (2) (a) Weather information of both a general and a special nature is provided by AWS units serving the field army. Four classes of weather information are available: climatic information, weather forecasts, reports of current weather, and weather summaries.
- (b) General weather information normally is distributed on a routine basis. Such general weather information includes: climatic summaries, general weather forecasts, and certain reports of current weather.
- (c) Special weather information may be disseminated on a routine basis, or in accordance with an agreed standing operating procedure, or upon request. Special weather information available from AWS units includes: aviation flight forecasts, chemical target forecasts, upper air data for radiological defense, weather warning, and precipitation forecasts for Engineer use in the preparation of stream flow and trafficability forecasts.
- (3) For specific requirements for weather information at each echelon of command from battalion to field army, see appendix IV.
- (4) In addition to the weather data available from its own facilities, the AWS in a theater of operations may require weather data from army tactical units, particularly in forward areas of the combat zone. G2 has staff responsibility for advising subordinate army units of AWS weather data requirements, and for furnishing instructions governing collection and forwarding of data. Under some circumstances, mobile AWS observing teams may be attached to tactical units at division level and below.
- (5) The senior Air Weather Service officer attached to each corps and army is designated in appropriate orders as a member of the special staff of the headquarters with which serving. The weather staff officer, under the general staff supervision of G2, is responsible for—
  - (a) Continuous review of weather service requirements of each element of the command he serves.

- (b) Initiation of action to insure timely changes in weather observing or weather information facilities to meet planned requirements of the command.
  - (c) Insuring that requirements for weather reporting operations to be conducted by air and army agencies are clearly defined and thoroughly coordinated with those agencies.
  - (d) Insuring that requirements for weather communications and other services needed to support the weather service are properly defined and made known to agencies providing those services.
  - (e) Assisting in the planning and conduct of training in the proper utilization of weather information within the command to which attached.
- (6) The corps staff weather officer, in addition to serving the corps headquarters, is available to provide technical advice or meteorological matters to division commanders and their staffs.
- b. *Terrain.*
- (1) At each echelon, the engineer, under the general staff supervision of G2, is responsible for the production and maintenance of terrain studies based on *technical* analysis, except as indicated in (2) below. Accordingly, the staff engineer will—
    - (a) Determine requirements for basic technical information.
    - (b) Collect and evaluate the necessary basic technical information.
    - (c) Perform technical interpretation of terrain information of military significance including obstacles, routes, avenues of approach, cover and concealment, landforms, hydrology, and trafficability.
    - (d) Disseminate technical terrain studies and other technically evaluated terrain information through appropriate channels.
    - (e) Provide special flood-warning services, as required.
  - (2) At field army, communications zone, and higher levels, the preparation and maintenance of intelligence studies, and contributions to studies made by G2, relating to man-made features of the area of operations are, in general, a responsibility of the special staff officer concerned with such features. For example, the transportation officer is responsible for preparation of studies relating to the operational characteristics of transportation facilities in the area of operations; however, the preparation of studies relating to the engineering characteristics of routes of communication is a responsibility of the engineer (par. 17b(4)).
  - (3) Technical reports, maps and air photos, supplemented when practicable by reports of ground and air reconnaissance, are the basic documents used in the study of terrain. Special maps or overlays emphasizing specific characteristics of military importance are frequently employed. Such maps or overlays may, for example, emphasize relief, drainage, vegetation, trafficability,



depth and duration of snow cover, or communications networks. Oblique, stereoscopic, color, and infrared photographs—both aerial and ground—are useful aids. Enlarged town and city plans are essential in the planning and conduct of operations against towns and cities. In amphibious operations or in the defense of beaches, hydrographic charts and tide and surf data are essential.

- (4) Terrain models are often prepared to assist in the detailed study of areas selected for amphibious or airborne operation, or the attack of fortified areas.
- (5) For further details see TM 5-545, *Geology and Its Military Applications*.

## **80. Form**

An outline form for a tactical study of weather and terrain, applicable with minor modifications at all echelons, is shown in FM 101-5. Paragraphs 81 through 85 describe the preparation of a complete, written tactical study of the weather and terrain. An example is shown in appendix V.

## **81. Heading**

a. If the study is written for circulation only within the headquarters where it is prepared, the heading names the office of origin; for example, "G2 Section, 20th Infantry Division." However, if the study is published for dissemination outside the headquarters, reference to the G2 section is omitted and the first line of the heading becomes the official designation of the issuing command; for example, "20th Infantry Division." A code name may be used.

b. The place of issue is the physical location of the G2 section, or headquarters, at the time of preparation of the study. Map coordinates are included. A code designation of location may be used.

c. The date-time group is shown by a group of six digits, followed by the month and year; for example, "121610 May 1955." The date and time shown are the date and time at which the study is signed. The time zone letter designation is included, if necessary.

d. Tactical studies of weather and terrain are numbered successively in each calendar year. If two or more studies are prepared on the same day, they bear consecutive numbers.

e. Maps and charts required for proper understanding of the study are listed by title (country or geographical area, scale, sheet name or number, and edition if necessary); for example, "Map: KANSAS, 1:50,000, JARBALO-WESTON."

## **82. Paragraph 1, "Purpose and Other Limiting Considerations"**

- a. The statement of purpose, which appears in paragraph 1a of a tactical

study of weather and terrain, is normally a definition of the area with which the study is concerned; for example, "Purpose. To analyze and evaluate weather and terrain in the vicinity of FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS."

b. "Limiting considerations," which appear as paragraph 1b, include a statement of the mission of the command, and other considerations which define either the limits of the area to be studied or the application of the study. These may include, for example, a time limitation such as: "during the month of August."

### **83. Paragraph 2, "General Description of the Area"**

#### *a. Climatic or Weather Conditions.*

- (1) Dependent on the length and proximity of the period of time for which the study is being prepared, paragraph 2a of the study may include a statement of climatic conditions, of forecast weather conditions, or of both. Reference may be made to other documents which contain weather forecasts or descriptions of climatic conditions. Further discussion may be omitted, or the contents of a referenced document may be recapitulated.
- (2) The weather subparagraph also includes a light table showing, as a minimum, the time of beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), sunrise, sunset, phase of the moon, moonrise, and moonset for each appropriate day.

#### *b. Terrain.*

- (1) *General.* Paragraph 2b of a tactical study of weather and terrain ordinarily includes reference to appropriate maps and overlays on which various terrain characteristics are emphasized. The graphical description of terrain may, however, be supplemented by verbal summary of the more significant aspects. Subheadings of the paragraph are usually: relief and drainage systems, vegetation, surface materials, and manmade features.
- (2) *Relief and drainage system.* Drainage lines and ridge lines are the natural bases for studying terrain. Ridge and drainage lines form two interlocking systems of branching lines which, singly or together, clearly indicate the general shape of the ground. A complete study of the relief and drainage of an area includes detailed information concerning slope and configuration and the relative elevation of ground forms, and the position, depth, width, and condition of banks and bottoms of streams and rivers. These factors can be portrayed graphically by coloring available maps.

#### *(a) Ridge and stream lines.*

1. Ridgelineing consists of using lines, usually brown, to indicate the configuration of the ridge system in an area. Streamlining in blue, using solid lines for unfordable streams and

broken lines for fordable streams, indicates at a glance the conformation of the drainage system. The more pronounced ridge and drainage lines are given special emphasis by marking them more heavily.

2. Usually, unless they are emphasized, it is quite difficult to follow the minor drainage lines on an air photograph or photomap. However, by stereoscopic examination of suitable overlapping air photos the minor drainage or ridge lines may be easily distinguished. Since main ridges usually divide the principal drainage systems, the approximate location of important ridge lines on a photograph usually can be determined, even when actual elevations are not known.
  - (b) *Layer tinting.* Layer tinting consists of coloring or shading successive elevations on a map. Colors ranging from yellow through orange, red, and brown are used to indicate successive elevations, and create a realistic three-dimensional effect. The size, slope and configuration of the ground become readily apparent.
  - (c) *Hill-topping.* Hill-topping consists of coloring, shading, or otherwise emphasizing the tops of hills and noses within the area, including a notation of the relative elevations. Although hill-topping can be accomplished easily and quickly, it is less effective than layer tinting.
  - (d) *Contour-shading.* Contour-shading consists of darkening the portions of an area which are in shadow from an assumed light source. The degree of slope is generally indicated by the density of the shade. The result gives the impression of a terrain model. It assists in readily discerning the configuration of the terrain; however, it is difficult to accomplish. Contour-shaded maps of some areas are available for issue.
- (3) *Vegetation.* A complete study of the vegetation of an area includes the position, size, and shape of all wooded areas; the type, size, and density of the trees; the location, size, and shape of natural or cultivated fields, and the type and size of vegetation growing therein. Coniferous (evergreen) forests are usually densely foliated and closely grown. They offer concealment from either ground or aerial observation in both summer and winter. They are frequently impenetrable to vehicles unless the trees are small enough to be pushed down by a vehicle. Deciduous (leaf-shedding) forests are generally grown more openly and may permit the movement of vehicles, including tanks. In winter, however, they offer only partial concealment from ground observation, and even less from aerial observation.
- (4) *Surface materials.* A study of the surface materials of an area is made to determine cross-country trafficability under existing or

forecast weather conditions, to assist in siting defense and other structures, and as an aid to stream flow forecasting. Soil maps are prepared by the agricultural services of various countries for the benefit of farmers and ranchers; the information contained in a soil map, augmented by the textual material that accompanies it, can be translated into a trafficability map. The analysis of the soil and the dissemination of trafficability maps are primarily an engineer responsibility. A trafficability map, analyzed in connection with a weather forecast, and appropriately colored to indicate the degrees of trafficability for each area of different characteristics, effectively delineates areas suitable for cross-country movement.

- (5) *Manmade features.* A study of the manmade features of an area provides detailed information concerning roads (width and type of surfacing); railroads and canals; bridges, dams, underpasses, and tunnels; towns and other builtup areas (size and routes through them); manmade defensive works (details of construction); and runways and airplane landing facilities (length and capacity). Many of these features can be portrayed on a map or overlay.

#### **84. Paragraph 3, "Military Aspects of the Area"**

*a. General.* The military aspects of an area of operations are evaluated in terms of five military factors: observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, critical terrain features, and avenues of approach.

*b. Observation and Fields of Fire.*

- (1) Paragraph 3a of a tactical study of weather and terrain contains an evaluation of the observation and fields of fire in the area of operations. Usually, the paragraph begins with a consideration of the effects of weather on observation. Then, the effects of the relief and drainage systems, vegetation, and manmade features on observation and fields of fire are considered.
- (2) Observation is that condition of weather and terrain which permits a force to see the enemy. Observation is the antithesis of concealment. The highest terrain features in the area usually offer the best observation. Conversely, observation is limited or denied by such factors as fog, precipitation, darkness, woods, brush, or other tall vegetation.
- (3) A field of fire is an area that weapons can cover effectively with fire from given positions. Although observation is essential to effective control of fire, the best observation does not always guarantee the best field of fire. An ideal field of fire for flat-trajectory weapons is an open area in which the enemy can be seen and on which he has no protection from fire of such weapons within effective range. Fields of fire for high-angle weap-

ons are limited only by masks which permit enemy occupation of defiladed positions.

*c. Concealment and Cover.*

- (1) Paragraph 3*b* of a tactical study of weather and terrain is a descriptive evaluation of the concealment and cover available in the area of operations. Usually it is convenient to discuss in successive subparagraphs the concealment and cover afforded by the relief and drainage systems, by the vegetation in the area, and by manmade features.
- (2) Concealment is protection from enemy observation. Cover is protection from enemy fire or destructive weapons. Concealment may be afforded by woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, or cultivated vegetation. Concealment also may be afforded by darkness and by such phenomena of the weather as dust, fog, ground haze, rain, or falling snow. Cover is provided by ditches, quarries, caves, river banks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills.
- (3) Concealment and cover are desirable for both the attacker and the defender. If troops can move forward under the concealment of a woods, fog, or a moonless night, the chances of achieving surprise are greater. If troops can move protected from enemy fire by ditches, embankments, or walls, fewer casualties will result. A defender, on the other hand, seeks to defend behind an area which provides neither cover nor concealment for the enemy, but which does afford cover to the defending troops, and concealment of their organization of the ground.

*d. Obstacles.*

- (1) Paragraph 3*c* of a tactical study of weather and terrain contains a list of the principal obstacles in the area of operations, and may include a brief evaluation of those which are most significant. A convenient method of enumerating the obstacles is under the subparagraph headings: drainage system, vegetation, surface materials, and manmade features.
- (2) An obstacle is any terrain feature, natural or artificial, which stops or impedes military movement. Natural obstacles include rivers, streams, lakes, swamps, cliffs, steep slopes, dense woods, jungles, deserts, mountains, and certain types of unstable soil, as well as cities, canals, and other works of man not specifically constructed to deter military movement. Artificial obstacles are works of construction and destruction executed for the specific purpose of stopping or impeding military movement. They include minefields, craters, antitank ditches, trenches, abatis, roadblocks, and deliberately flooded areas.
- (3) In general, obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by assisting him to gain time by holding the attack-

er for a longer time under the effective fires of the defense. Obstacles parallel to an axis of advance may favor the attacker by protecting his flank; however, parallel obstacles may be a disadvantage to the attacker by interfering with his lateral movement and coordination.

*e. Critical Terrain Features.*

- (1) Paragraph 3*d* of a tactical study of weather and terrain is a list of the critical terrain features in the area of operations. The critical terrain features are usually listed without comment; however, brief justification of each selection may be included.
- (2) (a) A critical terrain feature is any locality or area the seizure or retention of which will afford a marked advantage to either combatant. Accordingly, critical terrain features are selected in order to emphasize to the commander and staff those areas and localities whose seizure or retention must be considered in the development of tactical plans. The selection is based primarily on the mission of the command. Those specific terrain features are selected which in our hands will have an especially favorable effect on the accomplishment of the mission of the command, or which if seized or retained by the enemy will hinder materially the accomplishment of the mission of the command. For example, a bridge over an unfordable river may provide access to the opposite shore without the necessity of an assault crossing. A road or rail center may be of such importance that its seizure will reduce the enemy's ability to resist. A fortified zone, when captured, may breach the enemy's defenses and permit exploitation of objectives in the enemy's rear. A level clearing in rough terrain may provide the only accessible landing field for reinforcement of an airborne operation. A tunnel may provide the only rail or road communications between otherwise isolated areas.
- (b) Upon his initial study of an area, G2 may select certain features which appear to be critical regardless of the friendly dispositions or scheme of maneuver; other selected features may be critical only if particular dispositions or schemes of maneuver are adopted. After the commander has completed his estimate of the situation and has arrived at his decision, the friendly plan should be checked against the list of critical terrain features to insure that provision has been made for the seizure, retention, or denial to the enemy of each appropriate feature. At the same time, the list of critical terrain features is reevaluated; the importance of some may have been diminished by the nature of the tactical plan selected by the commander.

(3) *Offense.*

- (a) In the offense, the critical terrain features selected are usually forward of the line of contact, and are frequently assigned as objectives to be seized. If the mission is to destroy certain enemy forces, terrain is selected whose seizure will insure the required destruction. If the mission is to seize or secure an area, terrain is selected which will insure the control of the area. Terrain which affords dominant observation along a particular axis of advance is frequently selected as critical.
  - (b) Terrain within friendly territory, may also be critical when its retention is essential to the success of an offensive operation. For example, even though an offensive mission be assigned, if the enemy can attack prior to the time of our attack and seize a terrain feature which prevents or hinders the launching of our own attack, then the retention of that terrain feature affords us a marked advantage; it is critical terrain.
- (4) (a) *Defense.* In the defense, critical terrain features are usually within the assigned sector and within or behind the selected defensive position. These features are normally—
- 1. Dominating terrain which affords the best observation over avenues of approach to and into the defensive position.
  - 2. Terrain which permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire.
  - 3. Important communication centers which affect command, communications, and the employment of reserves.
- (b) Terrain features forward of the defensive position may also be critical in the defense. For example, a terrain feature forward of the line of contact, which affords the enemy dominant observation into the defensive position, is selected as critical when active measures must be taken by the defender to counter the advantage afforded the enemy. The defender may be obliged to move his position forward so as to include the feature, or he may take action to minimize its advantage to the enemy by the active use of fire, chemicals and smoke, combined with emphasis on concealment and cover.
- (5) *Retrograde.* Depth of the position occupied is less important in retrograde movements than in other defensive operations. Hence, terrain features at or immediately behind the initial and subsequent lines of resistance, which afford superior observation and fields of fire forward, are usually selected as critical.
- (6) *Adjacent areas.* The commander must consider not only those terrain features within his own area, but also those terrain features in adjacent areas which may influence his planning and conduct of operations. In defensive operations a dominant hill mass in an adjacent sector which provides observation over the position being organized, and over enemy avenues of approach to that

position, may be critical. In offensive operations terrain features in adjacent zones necessary for the continuation of the attack or the accomplishment of the mission may be critical.

- (7) *Echelons of command.* Determination of critical terrain features varies at different echelons of command. For example, to an army commander, a large city may afford marked advantages as a communications center, but to a division commander the high ground which dominates the city may be more important, and the city itself may be regarded as an obstacle.

- (8) *Obstacles.* Obstacles are rarely critical terrain features. The high ground dominating a river or an essential bridge or crossing site, rather than the river itself, is the critical terrain feature.

*f. Avenues of Approach.*

(1) *General.*

- (a) Paragraph 3e of the tactical study of weather and terrain contains a list of the avenues of approach which are available to the opposing forces in the area. Enemy avenues of approach are listed first, followed by a list of our avenues of approach into the enemy position. A list of our avenues of approach into the enemy position may be included, even when our mission is defensive, since friendly forces may undertake limited offensive action during conduct of the defense. For example, limited objective attacks may be launched into enemy forward assembly areas to interfere with enemy preparations for attack, "spoiling attacks," or attacks may be launched to extricate heavily engaged security forces.

- (b) When the opposing forces are not in contact, or when only security forces are in contact, avenues of approach to the defensive position are also considered. Thus, when a friendly force is defending and the enemy has not closed with the position, G2 lists enemy avenues of approach from the enemy location to the defensive position, as well as enemy avenues of approach into the position.

- (c) Paragraph 3e of the tactical study of weather and terrain may also include a brief evaluation of each avenue of approach, and justification for its selection.

(2) *Definition.*

- (a) An avenue of approach is an area which provides a suitable, relatively easy route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective or a critical terrain feature. To be considered an avenue of approach, a route must afford some facility of movement for a force of a sufficient size to produce a significant effect on the outcome of the operation. (Hence, division G2 considers avenues of approach which are adequate to accommodate at least a regiment; corps and higher G2's consider avenues of approach which are adequate to accommodate at least a division.)



- (b) The selection of avenues of approach is based on study of the terrain, consideration being given to the communications network, cross-country trafficability, concealment and cover, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, the direction of terrain compartments with respect to the direction of movement, and the effects of weather.
- (3) *Terrain compartments.*
- (a) A terrain compartment is an area bounded on two opposite sides by terrain features which limit ground observation and direct fire into the area. These limiting features are usually ridges or high ground, but may be woods, cities, towns, or wide bodies of water. A terrain compartment includes not only the area inclosed, but also the limiting features. A terrain compartment can take several forms: it may be a street bordered by buildings, a meadow bordered by forests, a plain with a mountain range along one side and a wide body of water opposite, a valley bordered by ridges, or a similar combination of terrain features.
- (b) Terrain compartments are classified with respect to the direction of movement of forces operating therein. They are *corridors* when the longer dimension lies generally in the direction of movement, and *cross compartments* when their longer axis is perpendicular or oblique to the direction of movement. A corridor formed by ridges may offer two avenues of approach: a valley approach and a ridge approach.
- (4) *Valley approach.*
- (a) Use of a valley approach affords the advancing force some cover from enemy direct fire and some concealment from enemy observation. However, to maintain this protection, control of the military crests on each side of the valley is essential. Hence, the term "valley approach" connotes not only the floor of the valley but also the slopes of the ridges, and control of at least the military crests of each ridge. If a valley approach is used, the best axis of advance is that which offers the best observation, cross-country trafficability, road net, fields of fire, and concealment and cover. Therefore, the best axis may be along the slopes of a ridge below the military crest, rather than along the valley floor.
- (b) A valley can be used as an avenue of approach when—
1. It is adequate in size for the using unit.
  2. The terrain affords some facility of movement.
  3. Observation and direct fire into the valley from the limiting features can be controlled while the using unit moves through the valley. In figure 6, a division is using a valley as an avenue of approach; the flank regiments are each using a ridge as an avenue of approach.




Figure 6. Division using a valley as an avenue of approach; the flank regiments using ridge avenues of approach.




Figure 7. Use of ridge avenue of approach.

(5) *Ridge approach.*

- (a) The area considered in a ridge approach depends upon the width and shape of the ridge, the size and frontage of the unit(s) involved, and the distance to and the relative elevation of adjacent ridges.
- (b) A ridge approach has the advantage of placing the axis of advance along dominant observation. However, there may be little protection from enemy fire onto the ridge. Hence, the best axis of advance in a ridge approach is often slightly below the topographical crest, but with sufficient force disposed on the crest to control it (fig. 7).
- (c) A ridge can be used as an avenue of approach when—
  - 1. It is adequate in size for the using unit.
  - 2. The terrain affords some facility of movement.
  - 3. Observation and fire which enable the enemy to interfere excessively with movement along the ridge can be removed or rendered ineffective.

## 85. Paragraph 4, "Tactical Effect of the Weather and Terrain"

a. *General.*

- (1) Paragraph 4 of the tactical study of weather and terrain is a discussion of the effects which the weather and terrain are expected to have on the enemy's operations, on our operations, and on the employment of atomic weapons and CBR agents.
- (2) The effects of weather and terrain are discussed with respect to each significant course of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. Ordinarily the discussion includes, as a minimum, effects of weather and terrain on the enemy's ability to defend and on his ability to attack. It may also include, if appropriate, consideration of the effects of weather and terrain on the enemy's ability to delay in successive positions, employ his reserves, employ amphibious or airborne forces, or conduct other special operations:
- (3) The discussion of the effects of weather and terrain on our operations is limited to a consideration of effects on the courses of action required for the accomplishment of our assigned mission.
- (4) The discussion of the effects of weather and terrain on atomic weapons and CBR agents may include consideration of effects on delivery means, as well as on weapons effects and on the behavior of CBR agents.

b. *Effects of Weather.*

- (1) *Temperature.* Extremes of temperatures or of humidity affect the efficiency of both equipment and personnel. Alternate freezing and thawing of ground may affect its trafficability. Water obstacles may be of greater, or of less, significance when par-

tially or completely frozen. Severe icing conditions render flying hazardous, and consequently may interfere with air support.

- (2) *Precipitation.* Precipitation, or the lack of it, materially affects trafficability both on and off roads, and the depth of water obstacles. Wet ground may reduce the range of field wire circuits, and the efficiency of incendiary munitions. Dry ground may produce dust, and interfere with observation, or disclose movement. Falling snow, sleet, hail, or rain will restrict visibility and—especially when accompanied by thunder—reduce the efficiency of listening posts and sound ranging equipment. Precipitation also produces radar “clutter” which may obscure target echoes. Electrical discharges, whether or not accompanied by precipitation, may interfere with wire and low frequency radio communications.
- (3) *Visibility.* Good visibility favors the combatant with superiority in artillery and/or air. When those are at approximate parity, however, good visibility normally favors the defender by allowing him to observe the approach of the attacker. Restrictions on visibility imposed by fog, smoke, dust, haze, or precipitation, provide variable degrees of concealment from ground and air observation. Except as they limit the use of his supporting weapons, conditions of poor visibility may favor the attacker by enabling him to close with the enemy unobserved.
- (4) *Wind.* Wind speed and direction affect the use of smoke and incendiaries, favoring the combatant away from whom the wind is blowing. Wind speed also affects materially the degree of cold in which human beings can survive. For example, in a dead calm a well-clothed person can be fairly comfortable at temperatures far below zero, but a 5-mile-per-hour breeze at  $-20^{\circ}$  Fahrenheit or a 20-mile-per-hour wind at  $15^{\circ}$  Fahrenheit can freeze human flesh (FM 31-71). Wind also affects the rapidity with which wet ground will dry and improve in trafficability. Turbulent winds restrict air support and may reduce the accuracy of artillery and missile fire. High winds may preclude airborne operations or may preclude amphibious operations by producing rough seas. High winds may also reduce the efficiency of listening posts and sound ranging equipment.
- (5) *Cloud cover.* Extensive cloud cover limits air operations and, therefore, is usually a disadvantage to the combatant having air superiority. Dense clouds above the camera level may reduce light intensity to the point that aerial photography becomes difficult or impossible. On the other hand, a high thin layer of clouds may improve aerial photography by eliminating ground shadows. At night, cloudiness reduces the amount of light

available from the moon, but may favor the employment of searchlights for "artificial moonlight."

- (6) *Light data.* The time of beginning of morning nautical twilight often determines the time of launching of an early morning attack. The time of the ending of evening nautical twilight may establish the time for launching a night attack or commencing a retrograde operation under cover of darkness. The phase of the moon, together with its time of rising and setting, may affect significantly the conduct of night operations.

c. *Effects of Terrain.*

- (1) The summary of the effects of terrain on the operations of both combatants, as contained in paragraph 4 of a tactical study of weather and terrain, includes, as appropriate, references to the best avenue or avenues of approach available to each combatant; the best defensive position or positions available; the best delaying positions; the best landing or drop zones; the best routes for movement of reserves; as well as reference to any restrictions which the terrain may impose on the operations of either side.
- (2) Inasmuch as the selection of avenues of approach is based entirely on terrain considerations, the best *avenue of approach* may not be the best *direction of attack*. In deciding upon his direction of attack the commander gives due attention to the avenues of approach which G2 recommends. Nevertheless, enemy dispositions, the dispositions of friendly troops, the time available for preparation of the attack, and other factors may, in various circumstances, receive greater emphasis. At times, in order to achieve surprise, an attack may be launched along an axis of advance which is not a good avenue of approach, as the term has been defined.
- (3) A good defensive position provides the defender with good observation, protected in depth, and long-range fields of fire covering the avenues of approach to and into his position. An effective obstacle to the front of the position is highly desirable. Concealment within the position, sufficient at least to hide the defender's organization of the ground, and cover and concealment for supporting weapons, reserves, and command and administrative installations are sought. Adequate covered routes for supply, evacuation, and the movement of reserves are also desirable.
- (4) A good delaying position has essentially the same characteristics as a good defensive position, except that the depth of position which is required for defense is unnecessary in delaying action. Delaying forces expect to withdraw before becoming heavily engaged with the enemy, whereas troops defending a position expect to recoil within that position, then counterattack with

the advantage of the observation in depth which the position provides. However, routes of withdrawal are of greater importance in delaying action than in the defense of a position.

*d. Effect on Atomic Weapons.*

- (1) (a) Visibility and precipitation are the weather conditions which have the greatest effect on atomic weapons. The conditions which reduce visibility also reduce the thermal intensity received at any given distance from an atomic detonation. Precipitation also reduces thermal intensities and may also reduce target vulnerability. Uniforms, buildings, tentage, and other target elements which are wet with rain or snow require much higher thermal intensities for ignition. On the other hand rain or snow falling through an atomic cloud may become radioactive.
- (b) Wind speed and direction have no significant effect on blast, nor on thermal and initial nuclear radiation. However, the location and extent of the contaminated area resulting from a surface or subsurface burst are dependent primarily on wind direction and velocity. The structure of the atmosphere and the direction of winds aloft affect radioactive fall-out.
- (c) The thermal effect of an atomic burst above a cloud layer is reduced materially. Clouds above an atomic burst may reflect some thermal radiation downward. Clouds have no effect on blast, nor on nuclear radiation.
- (2) (a) Hills, valleys, and field fortifications afford some protection from all atomic effects; however, the force of blast may be canalized, and thereby increased, in a valley.
- (b) Buildings and trees may be blown down by an atomic blast, and thereby create obstacles; they may be ignited by thermal radiation; or they may be hurled into personnel and materiel.
- (c) Surface materials have little direct effect on air-burst atomic weapons; however, the range and intensity of the shock wave from a surface or subsurface burst are largely dependent on soil composition.
- (3) For additional discussion of the effects of weather and terrain on atomic effects, see FM 100-31.

*e. Effect on CBR Agents.*

- (1) (a) Chemical and biological agents, and to a lesser extent, radiological agents are influenced by wind speed and direction, and are dissipated rapidly by high winds.
- (b) Toxic chemical agents employed for persistent effect vaporize more rapidly at high temperatures than at low temperatures.
- (c) Since air is most stable at night and on cloudy days, most effective employment of chemical and biological agents in vapor form usually is accomplished at these times.

- (d) Rain and snow normally reduce the effectiveness of chemical and biological agents. Rain washes CBR agents away, and may neutralize them. Snow may blanket agents, and tends to neutralize them; however, snow increases the persistency of toxic chemical agents.
- (2) Toxic gases tend to fall away from heights and settle on low ground. However, biological and radiological agents are comparatively unaffected by terrain conditions, although vegetation may interfere with dissemination.
- (3) For detailed information on the effects of weather and terrain on CBR agents, see FM 3-5 and TM 3-240.

## CHAPTER 6

### DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

##### 86. General

a. Collection of the information from which intelligence is produced is the most difficult operation in the intelligence cycle. It is obviously to the enemy's advantage to conceal from us his capabilities, his vulnerabilities, and his probable courses of action. The thwarting of his efforts in this regard demands the continuous effort of available collection agencies, careful thorough planning and dynamic direction of that collection effort by the assistant chief of staff, G2. The planning of intelligence operations to collect and produce timely, accurate intelligence is the most difficult of G2's tasks. The G2 must constantly anticipate the intelligence requirements of his commander and the subordinate units. To reduce to a minimum the uncertainties regarding the enemy situation, the weather and the terrain when he makes his decision, the commander must have the results of his G2's operations.

b. G2's first problem in the collection of information is to determine what intelligence will be required as a basis for future tactical decisions and plans. Thereafter, G2 must determine what specific information is needed in order to produce the required intelligence; he must then publish orders and requests to those who have or may obtain the necessary information; he must maintain continuous check on the progress of the collection agencies; and he must produce the required intelligence in time to be of use.

c. Accordingly, *direction* of the collection effort comprises five successive steps—

- (1) Determination of the essential elements of information (EEI).
- (2) Analysis of the EEI to determine *indications* which point toward answers to the EEI.
- (3) Translation of indications into orders and requests for information pertaining to specific activities, localities, characteristics, or conditions.
- (4) Selection of collection agencies to be employed, and issuance of the necessary orders and requests for information.
- (5) Followup.



## Section II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

### 87. General

*a. Definition and Purpose.* The essential elements of information (EEI) in any operation are the specific information of the enemy, the weather, and the terrain which the commander needs in order to accomplish his mission. Hence, the announced EEI indicate the commander's highest priority intelligence requirements and, in effect, prescribe the intelligence missions of the command. EEI at each echelon may also include certain intelligence requirements of higher, lower, or adjacent echelons. EEI focus the attention and activities of all collecting agencies and intelligence personnel on specific information which is required at a particular time. While the primary mission of all collecting agencies is to satisfy the requirements arising from the EEI, these agencies must also transmit all additional information that comes to their attention. This primarily concerns the basic order of battle, terrain, and other data which are necessary for the understanding and appreciation of information which comes in answer to EEI. Also, much information about the enemy must be collected for the primary purpose of aiding the collection effort itself. For instance, information about the enemy's vehicle numbering system must be collected and processed into intelligence which is then sent forward to the collecting agencies so that they may collect current order of battle information, based on specific application of the developed numbering system.

*b. Designation.*

- (1) Since intelligence is a command responsibility, EEI are stated by the commander, usually based upon recommendations of the assistant chief of staff, G2.
- (2) Within an intelligence section, the determination of appropriate EEI for recommendation to the commander is generally a responsibility of the combat intelligence branch. (In a communications zone intelligence division, responsibility may vary. Although the principal responsibility is ordinarily placed on the intelligence branch, the counterintelligence branch may be held responsible for the determination of EEI pertaining to counterintelligence.)

### 88. Form and Content

EEI are stated in clear, concise, simple language and are preferably phrased as questions. In general they are concerned with—

- a.* Enemy capabilities, including time, place, strength, or other details.
- b.* Enemy vulnerabilities, including nature, extent, permanence, or other details.
- c.* Enemy order of battle factors.
- d.* Terrain, including natural and artificial obstacles.
- e.* Weather.
- f.* Information desired by higher, lower, or adjacent headquarters.

## 89. EEI Pertaining to Enemy Capabilities

a. Enemy capabilities already recognized are the first consideration in determining EEI, because of the commander's vital concern with intelligence which confirms, alters, or refutes the existing estimate of enemy capabilities and probable courses of action (ch. 7).

b. Each enemy capability—as enumerated in the current intelligence estimate, periodic intelligence report, or intelligence summary—is usually the basis for an EEI which asks whether or not the enemy will adopt that capability. For example, if it has been deduced that the enemy is capable of launching an attack, one EEI properly asks: "Will the enemy attack? If so, when, where, and in what strength?" Thereby, the intelligence agencies of the command are enjoined to seek information which will confirm, alter, or refute the enemy capability to attack previously deduced.

c. (1) Since the enemy usually has the four general capabilities of attack, defend, withdraw, and reinforce, it follows that there are usually EEI which ask, in turn: Will the enemy attack? defend? withdraw? or reinforce? Ordinarily, however, a proper EEI is more specific than the example cited in *b* above. Moreover, seldom are EEI related to each enemy capability.

(2) (a) An EEI relative to an enemy attack frequently directs specific attention to certain avenues of approach, and often indicates a *time* of attack. The latter is particularly true when our mission is offensive; the EEI in such case is properly stated, in part: "Will the enemy attack prior to our attack?" Or, if the time of our attack has been announced: "Will the enemy attack prior to 170500 June?"

(b) Attention is customarily directed to specific forces or areas in the statement of an EEI by the use of the phrase: "Special attention to . . . ." For example, in appropriate circumstances an EEI might be stated: "Will the enemy attack prior to 170500 June? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axis LAGO-MONTAL."

(c) 1. Even though the enemy may have the capability of attacking in several ways, a division G2 ordinarily recommends only one EEI concerning attack. Differences in the various capabilities are readily covered in the EEI by the use of the phrase: "Special attention to . . . ." For example: If the enemy can—

(a) Attack now with nine rifle battalions, supported by all available artillery and air, in the direction WILSHIRE-NEWTON; and

(b) Attack now with nine rifle battalions, supported by all available artillery and air, in the direction LYNCHBURG-WESTON. The EEI concerning enemy attack is properly stated: "Will the enemy attack? If so, when,

where, and in what strength? *Special attention to the axes WILSHIRE-NEWTON and LYNCHBURG-WESTON.*"

2. At echelons above division, and particularly when operating on broad frontages, separate EEI may be designated with respect to the enemy's capability of attacking in diverse directions.
- (3) EEI relative to enemy defense are specific as to the line or area of interest. For example: "Will the enemy continue to defend *in his present position*? If so, how will he organize the ground; with what troops? Special attention to locations and activities of reserves." Or: "Will the enemy defend *the line LEAVENWORTH-EASTON*? If so, with what troops and with what organization of the ground? Special attention to forces now located at BASEHOR."
- (4) EEI relative to an enemy withdrawal usually indicate the line or area beyond which the enemy's withdrawal is of particular interest, and may express interest in a line to which the enemy might withdraw. For example: "Will the enemy withdraw *beyond our objective* prior to or during our attack? If so, to what position? *Special attention to the line LEAVENWORTH-EASTON.*"
- (5) EEI concerning enemy delaying actions also specify the lines or areas along which terrain study indicates delaying positions may be organized. For example: "Will the enemy delay in his present position and in successive positions to the MISSOURI River? Special attention to the lines TRENTON-QUINCY and MOBERLY-COLUMBIA."
- (6) (a) EEI concerning the enemy's capability of reinforcing his locally available forces invariably direct specific attention to known reserves. For example: "Will the enemy reinforce units now in contact? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special attention to the 45th Rifle Regiment at HEADLEY and the unidentified mechanized division at HARRISBURG."
- (b) EEI concerning reinforcement ordinarily do not distinguish between reinforcement of an attack and reinforcement of a defense; rather, they simply ask whether available reserves may be employed, and when and where. Other EEI ask whether the enemy will attack or defend.
- (7) When the enemy has a tactical atomic capability, the EEI may be: "Will the enemy employ atomic weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yield, and by what delivery means? Special attention to very heavy artillery units in the vicinity of MAGATHAN."
- (8) An enemy CBR capability may result in an EEI substantially as follows: "Will the enemy employ CBR agents against us? If so, what agents, when, where, and by what delivery means? Special attention to mortar and artillery units."

(9) The existence of other enemy capabilities may also result in the formulation of appropriate EEI. For example:

- (a) "Will the enemy employ guerilla forces in conjunction with his attack? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the heavily wooded area north of SALEM."
- (b) "Will the enemy infiltrate our lines? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the swampy area east of HAYS."
- (c) "Will the enemy employ airborne forces in our sector? If so, when, where, and in what strength? What will be the direction and altitude of approach? What drop or landing zones will be used? Special attention to the area south of MARYSVILLE."
- (d) "Will the enemy employ amphibious forces on our south flank? If so, when, where, in what strength? How many landing vehicles of what type will be employed? Special attention to beaches at CORAL CITY and FREEPORT."

d. G2 seldom recommends an EEI related to *each* enemy capability. EEI are not stated when there is no apparent possibility of the enemy's adopting a particular course of action. Statement of EEI to cover every possible enemy activity defeats the purpose of EEI. Efforts of collecting agencies must not be dissipated by irrelevant EEI. Instead all activities of intelligence collecting and producing agencies must be concentrated to produce the timely and accurate intelligence required by the commander to accomplish his mission. For example, when a delaying action is being conducted against superior forces, EEI concerning enemy defense, delay, and withdrawal are never stated.

- e. (1) Intelligence as to enemy air capabilities is disseminated periodically by the field army G2. Therefore, EEI concerning the enemy air capabilities are rarely announced at division level, and are frequently omitted at corps. The agencies available at echelons below field army do not have means to obtain the desired information; hence, no purpose is served by asking for it. Additionally, rapid dissemination of information concerning enemy air activity and warning of impending air attack are matters of established procedure in the field.
- (2) In special operations such as airborne and amphibious assaults, enemy air activity may be a controlling factor. In such a case a corps or division commander may appropriately designate an air EEI, especially during the planning phases of the operation.

## 90. EEI Concerning Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. EEI are frequently designated for the purpose of developing knowledge of enemy vulnerability to attack by atomic weapons, and of other conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation which render his forces

liable to damage, deception, or defeat. EEI of this category may be intended to develop intelligence as to the nature, extent, permanence, or other details of the conditions or circumstances which produced the vulnerability.

*b.* The details sought may be stated in the EEI, or they may be omitted if they are numerous and normal.

- (1) For example, in the evaluation of atomic targets, information is desired as to their size, shape, composition, concentration, vulnerability, recuperability, and permanence. Since these details are both numerous and normal requirements, they are properly omitted in the statement of an EEI concerning enemy vulnerability to atomic attack. The EEI may be simply, "What atomic targets exist in our zone?"
- (2) On the other hand, EEI may appropriately emphasize certain details. When enemy vulnerabilities result from faulty dispositions, logistical inadequacies, or administrative deficiencies, the commander is often concerned with the degree of permanence of the condition. Tactical plans to exploit an enemy vulnerability must be executed while the vulnerability still exists. Hence, EEI may be designed to determine both "if" and "when" the condition may be corrected. For example: "Will the enemy strengthen his north flank? If so, when and how?" or, "Will recent enemy personnel losses be replaced? If so, when and to what extent?"

## **91. EEI Pertaining to Order of Battle**

*a.* In long-range planning, or when the enemy situation is extremely vague, there may be inadequate basis for determination of enemy capabilities or vulnerabilities. Specific intelligence as to enemy dispositions, strength or other order of battle factors may be lacking. In such cases, EEI may be designated for the purpose of developing order of battle intelligence pertaining to any or all of the eight order of battle factors: identification dispositions, strength, organization, tactics, personalities, combat efficiency, and unit histories.

*b.* For example, in the early planning phase of an amphibious assault an appropriate EEI might be: "What enemy forces will oppose our landing? What will be their composition, strength, and dispositions?"

*c.* Similarly, following loss of contact, the enemy situation upon the regaining of contact may be so vague as to result in EEI substantially as follows: "What are the identification composition, strength, and dispositions of forces to our front?" and, "What forces are available to reinforce units now in contact?"

## **92. EEI Pertaining to Terrain**

*a.* In offensive operations, terrain is frequently the subject of EEI.

- (1) Additional information usually is sought about natural and

artificial obstacles which our forces may encounter. Hence, an appropriate EEI may be: "What natural or artificial obstacles or barriers exist within the division zone? What are their nature and extent?"

- (2) Dependent upon the echelon of command and the extent of available terrain information, other terrain data such as cross-country trafficability and the condition of road and rail lines, may properly become the subjects of EEI.

- b. EEI related to terrain are rare in defensive operations, since the terrain under friendly control can be reconnoitered in detail. Forecasts of severe weather conditions may require EEI relating to condition of routes, trafficability, susceptibility to flooding and effects of freezing or thawing of snow cover on the ground.

### **93. EEI Pertaining to Weather**

Since dissemination of weather information is a matter of standing operating procedure, a weather EEI is not normally announced, except in special operations or other situations wherein weather may be a controlling factor.

### **94. EEI of Other Echelons**

- a. The EEI announced by each echelon of command are properly repeated as EEI of subordinate echelons *only* when the lower unit is physically capable of obtaining the desired information and when those efforts are compatible with the unit's mission.

- b. Under some circumstances the EEI of a higher echelon may be repeated with modification by a lower unit. For example, an army EEI may ask, in part: "Where are possible crossings of the MISSOURI River in the army zone?" Special attention to the River line between KANSAS CITY and ST. JOSEPH. Subordinate corps and divisions should, in this case, repeat the army EEI, modifying it to refer only to corps and division zones, and to restrict special attention to the condition of the river line within corps and division boundaries.

- c. Specific requests for information from lower and adjacent unit may also result in EEI at any echelon.

### **95. Dissemination of EEI**

EEI are enumerated in paragraph 2 of the intelligence annex to an operation order (sec V). EEI may be repeated in the final subparagraph ("coordinating instruction of par. 3 of the operation order"). In addition, EEI may be announced orally by the commander to members of his staff, and may be disseminated in fragmentary orders, either oral or written.

### **96. Answers to EEI**

- a. Although the EEI prescribe, in effect, the intelligence missions of the command, collection agencies normally cannot act on the EEI without

further orders, nor furnish the final and complete answers to the EEI. Answering the EEI of his own commander is the task of the G2 at each echelon; information on which to base the answers is provided by available collection agencies, usually in response to specific orders or requests.

- (1) For example: An appropriate EEI may be: "Will the enemy reinforce his units now in contact? If so, when, where, and in what strength?" Although G2 ultimately may arrive at a detailed answer, he can do so only after processing information as to the strength and movement of enemy reserves, locations of assembly areas, and numerous other data which have been collected, possibly, by a number of different agencies in response to specific orders and requests.
- (2) Furthermore, in the example cited, the answer can rarely be a definite "yes" until reinforcement has actually occurred. Unless the enemy has committed himself irrevocably, any statement of what he *will* do is the result of an attempt to divine his intentions and may lead to faulty command decisions. The commander must consider all of the enemy's capabilities, and may consider also what the enemy is *most likely* to do; i. e., the enemy's most probable courses of action.

b. EEI pertaining to enemy capabilities can rarely be answered completely until the enemy has committed himself to a course of action. Nevertheless, partial answers to EEI are produced continually and result in progressive changes to the intelligence estimate. For example, intelligence efforts to determine *in what strength* the enemy may reinforce troops in contact will often produce changes in G2's estimate first of the strength of enemy troops available for employment as reinforcements, and second of the enemy's capability to reinforce. Similarly, evidence that the enemy *has* reinforced certain units necessarily produces a change in G2's estimate of the forces locally available, with consequent revision of the estimated strength in which the enemy can *attack now* and *defend now*.

c. Answers to EEI pertaining to weather and terrain are often complete. Such EEI can be answered as soon as G2 has assembled sufficient credible information.

## 97. Cancellation of EEI

An EEI may be canceled or modified by oral or written fragmentary orders, or by publication in orders of a new list of EEI. EEI which are concerned with the enemy's adoption of a course of action prior to a specified time are automatically canceled when that time arrives; for example, an EEI which asks—"Will the enemy attack prior to our attack?" is canceled automatically when our attack is launched.

### Section III. USE OF EEI

#### 98. Introduction

a. An operation order announces in paragraph 2, the tactical mission of the command, and then, in paragraph 3, prescribes the specific tasks to be performed by each subordinate unit. Similarly, EEI, in effect, announce the intelligence missions of the command; the specific tasks to be performed by collection agencies must thereafter be assigned. Without the further direction provided by paragraph 3 of an operation order, the subordinate divisions of a corps cannot be expected to accomplish the corps tactical mission. The collection agencies of the corps likewise must be given specific direction if they are to provide the information which the corps G2 needs to answer the EEI.

b. Analysis of the EEI, to determine indications, is the basis for assignment of specific information collecting missions to collection agencies.

#### 99. Indications

a. *Definition.*

- (1) An *indication* is any evidence of enemy activity, either positive or negative, or any characteristic of the area of operations, which points toward the adoption or rejection by the enemy of a particular capability, or which may influence the commander's selection of a course of action.
- (2) It is evident from the definition that indications are of two general categories: these which suggest the adoption or rejection by the enemy of a capability and those which may influence the commander's selection of a course of action to accomplish his mission.
- (3) Thus, in the first category, forward displacement of enemy artillery may indicate an enemy attack; whereas echelonment of enemy artillery laterally and in depth may be an indication of defense. Terrain on our flank which affords inadequate trafficability for armored vehicles may indicate inability of the enemy to deliver a tank attack against that flank. Low cloud cover and limited visibility are conditions which are favorable for the displacement of enemy reinforcements.
- (4) In the second category, disposition of the enemy reserves toward the south flank may influence the commander to select a course of action which envelops the enemy north flank. Concentration of enemy troops to the extent that they present a suitable atomic target may influence the commander's selection of a course of action involving the employment of atomic weapons. The existence of a favorable avenue of approach into the enemy positions is an indication which may influence the commander's selection of his direction of attack. Visibility conditions may influence the selection of a time of attack.



b. Indications include conditions and circumstances of the enemy situation which result from previous enemy action or from enemy failure to take action. For example, current enemy dispositions may indicate the adoption of a particular enemy capability or may influence the selection of a friendly course of action. Similarly, the enemy logistical situation may favor the adoption of a particular enemy capability or may influence our selection of a course of action.

c. Indications also include conditions or circumstances of the friendly or enemy situation which were created by friendly action. For example, the destruction of large enemy forces by atomic attack may favor our resumption of the offensive. Friendly destruction of river crossing means in one area may lead to the enemy's crossing elsewhere. The echelonment of our reserves toward the north may induce an enemy attack on the south.

## 100. Analysis of EEI

a. EEI concerning enemy capabilities are analyzed by determining the indications which are likely to exist when the enemy prepares to adopt or adopts any particular capability. Thus, an EEI which asks in part, "Will the enemy attack?" is analyzed by determining the indications of attack which *may* exist during the preparation or the launching of offensive action. These indications frequently include: forward movement of hostile units; forward displacement of artillery; increased patrolling; intensification of air operations; increased activity in rear areas; forward displacement of command posts and logistical installations; strengthening of counterreconnaissance screens; and others.

b. EEI concerning enemy vulnerabilities are analyzed by determining the indications which are likely to exist when any particular enemy vulnerability develops. Thus, a marked increase in enemy desertions may be an indication of lowering morale; enemy failure to exploit our vulnerabilities may be an indication of intelligence deficiencies; concentration of enemy troops in a restricted area may disclose an atomic target; a marked reduction of enemy ammunition expenditures may be an indication of logistical deficiencies or stock-piling prior to an attack; a diversion of enemy combat troops to the police of rear areas may be an indication of civilian hostility toward the enemy.

c. (1) Any accurate analysis of EEI to determine indications necessitates thorough knowledge of the enemy, the weather, and the terrain, particularly—

- (a) Detailed knowledge of the organization, equipment, tactical doctrine, and logistical methods of the enemy.
- (b) Understanding of the enemy's use of terrain, and his probable knowledge of the terrain under our control.
- (c) Information of the personalities of the opposing enemy commanders and the past performance of the opposing enemy units.

- (2) As a point of departure, a *Guide to Determination of Indications* based on U. S. tactical doctrine appears as appendix VII. Obviously, these cannot be accepted as a rigid set of indications applicable to any enemy encountered in the field. The G2 at each echelon must analyze each actual enemy operation in the field, together with the intelligence which was available prior to and during the operation, in order to compile increasingly accurate lists of indications. The lists compiled at each echelon, and continual changes thereto, are disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units in order to augment progressively the reliability and accuracy of interpretation at each echelon.

## 101. Use of Indications

### a. Concerning Capabilities.

- (1) Having determined what indications may exist when the enemy prepares to adopt or adopts a particular capability, G2 must next determine what information is needed to substantiate or refute each indication. For example: if it has been determined that forward movement of hostile artillery is an indication of attack, the information needed is, "Is the hostile artillery moving forward, or not?" The appearance of new units in the line is an obvious indication that reinforcement may have been accomplished; the information needed to substantiate this indication is, therefore, "Have new hostile units appeared in the line, or not?"
- (2) Accordingly, *indications* provide the basis for orders and requests for specific information. The specific information which collection agencies are directed or requested to supply is the information which will confirm or deny the indications. For example, having determined that the appearance of new hostile units in the line is an indication that reinforcement has been accomplished, G2 may issue in the name of his commander, orders to subordinate units to, "Report identification of new units."

b. *Concerning Vulnerabilities.* Indications concerning enemy vulnerabilities are used in a similar manner. For example: It may have been determined that enemy troop units of battalion size are suitable atomic targets. In such a case, the discovery of a unit of battalion size is an indication that an atomic target *may* exist. The specific information desired with respect to this battalion then includes its location, composition, concentration, vulnerability, and recuperability. Orders and requests to collection agencies, therefore, seek these and other specific items of information.

## 102. Orders and Requests for Information

a. In general, G2 seeks only the information by which an indication may be substantiated, or refuted and avoids placing on a collection agency

the full responsibility for establishing that any particular indication exists. For example: if echelonment of hostile artillery in depth is an indication of defense, G2 specifically does *not* ask subordinate units to, "Report whether or not hostile artillery is echeloned in depth." Instead, he asks, "Report locations of hostile artillery in your zone." On the basis of the information furnished, G2 himself determines whether or not the indication has been substantiated.

- b. (1) G2 also seeks to be specific in orders to subordinate collection agencies and requests to higher and adjacent units. Orders to "Report everything you see in your sector," are inappropriate. Instead, orders and requests relate to a specific enemy activity, location, or characteristic, or to a specific terrain or weather condition. Insofar as possible, orders and requests indicate *what* G2 is looking for, and *where* he expects to find it.
- (2) For example, forward movement of hostile troops may be an indication of reinforcement. Through analysis of the road nets, communications centers, and locations of enemy forces, integrated with knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine, G2 determines what routes of movement the enemy is almost certain to use, and concentrates the effort of available agencies on those routes. The order to collection agencies becomes: "Report volume, type, and direction of traffic on the following roads: . . ."
- (3) (a) Rather than dissipate the effort of available agencies by such orders as, "Report movement of hostile reserves," G2 concentrates the collection effort on specific locations. If, for example, reserves are believed to be assembled at WICHITA, WINFIELD, and CENTERVILLE, an appropriate order is: "Report movement and activity of infantry or armored elements in vicinity of WICHITA, WINFIELD, and CENTERVILLE."
- (b) Concentration of the collection effort on specific locations is particularly applicable in developing indications of enemy vulnerability to atomic attack. By detailed study of the terrain and application of his knowledge of enemy tactics and administrative doctrine, G2 assisted as necessary by other members of the staff selects areas which are likely to be occupied by enemy units or installations. The selected areas become "potential" targets, and collection effort is concentrated on them for the purpose of verifying or denying that the potential targets have become actual targets.
- c. Orders and requests seeking to develop information of enemy characteristics are particularly useful in determining the suitability of enemy installations or troop concentrations for attack by atomic weapons. Units and individuals which have high morale and are well trained, capably led, and indoctrinated in defense against atomic weapons may recuperate so rapidly from the shock effect of atomic attack as to preclude maximum

exploitation of those effects. Hence, orders and requests to prisoner of war interrogators may be: "Report scope and duration of atomic defense training undergone by members of the 11th Rifle Division."

d. Orders and requests are frequently designed to obtain information concerning specific weather or terrain conditions in the area of operations. For example, an EEI may ask, "What natural and artificial obstacles exist in our zone?" Streams across the axis of advance, located by map study, are indications that natural obstacles *may* exist; hence, the *extent* to which each located stream actually constitutes an obstacle becomes a subject of inquiry. Accordingly, orders and requests to appropriate collection agencies may include: "Report width, depth, velocity, and condition of banks and bottom of WHITE River between NEWTON and SALINA."

### 103. Selection of Collection Agencies

a. *General.* After he determines what specific information is required to substantiate or refute the indications derived from each EEI, G2's next problem is to select the collection agencies which will be ordered or requested to furnish the information. In making the selections, his guiding principles are *capability*, *suitability*, *multiplicity*, and *balance*.

b. *Capability.* Orders and requests for information are issued only to those collection agencies which are physically capable of providing the desired information. A tank unit in reserve is not asked for identifications of units in contact, nor is the supporting artillery asked for information which can be obtained only from prisoners of war.

c. *Suitability.*

(1) The collection missions assigned to tactical units must be consistent with their tactical missions. Additionally, only the agencies *best suited* to furnish the desired information should be employed. For example, information which is most readily obtained by dismounted patrolling should be obtained by infantry units, rather than by tank units.

(2) *Suitability* implies also that consideration be given to economy of personnel and materiel. For example, dismounted patrols into enemy lines are not used for the collection of information which can be obtained equally well by visual air observation or air photos; patrols are used only when they are the agency best suited to collect the required information.

d. *Multiplicity.* Information becomes intelligence only after it has been evaluated and interpreted, and accurate evaluation necessitates comparison with information received from other sources and agencies. Consequently, subject to considerations of capability and suitability, G2 asks more than one agency to obtain each item of required information.

e. *Balance.* Within the limits imposed by other considerations, G2 seeks also to balance the collection workload placed on the available agencies. However, *balance* is a minor consideration in comparison with the other three.

#### **104. Place and Time of Reporting**

a. Orders and requests to collection agencies specify the place to which information is to be reported and time. Usually, the place to which reports are to be made is the requesting headquarters; however, there may be exceptions. For example, reports of incoming artillery fire are made through artillery channels, rather than direct to G2.

b. Collection missions may require that information be furnished *by* a specified time, *at* a specified time or times, at specified intervals, or upon the occurrence of specific events. A one-time report, as on the condition of a river bottom, may be required *by* a specified time. Reports on certain enemy activities may be desired *at* specified times; for example, daily, at the beginning of morning nautical twilight and at the end of evening nautical twilight. Reports of other enemy activities, such as movement along particular roads, may be required periodically; for example, "every 4 hours beginning at 2400." Reports of identification of new units, enemy aerial activity, artillery bombardment, and similar items are usually required *as obtained*, with periodic negative reports.

#### **105. Followup**

a. Direction of the collection effort does not end with the issuance of orders and requests for information; followup is essential to insure that the required information is obtained in time to produce the required intelligence. Hence, G2 checks continuously on the performance of collection agencies, prodding them to greater effort when necessary, or canceling orders and requests when the required information has been obtained.

b. Information is processed as it is received. The intelligence produced frequently suggests new lines of inquiry, and thereby results in the revision of current orders and requests for information. For example, the unexpected discovery of an unidentified enemy unit of unknown size in an apparent assembly area immediately suggests that an atomic target may exist. But additional information must be obtained before the suspected target can be declared suitable for attack by atomic weapons. Hence, G2 issues orders and requests without delay to concentrate intelligence effort on learning the size of the unit, the shape of its assembly area, and its concentration within the area.

#### **106. Additional Information Requirements**

a. The EEI approved by the commander provide the basic guidance of the collection effort for current intelligence requirements. Analysis of EEI and determination of the specific information required to substantiate the resulting indications are followed by issuance of orders, and requests.

b. G2 must also insure that his knowledge of the enemy situation is complete, so as to be able to furnish the timely intelligence required as a basis for the future plans and orders of his commander. Hence, G2 may need information which is not directly connected with current EEI, and may issue orders and requests therefor.

c. Collection agencies do not restrict their efforts, nor their reporting, to items specifically mentioned in orders and reports. All information received by collection agencies is reported, regardless of whether or not it has been specifically requested.

## **Section IV. THE COLLECTION PLAN**

### **107. Introduction**

a. It is possible for an experienced intelligence officer to formulate his collection plan mentally; however, direction of the collection effort is facilitated and is less subject to error when a formal, written collection plan is used.

b. A suggested form for a collection plan and brief notes on its use, appear as figure 8. Use of the form is explained in detail in paragraphs 108 through 115. An example of a partially completed collection plan appears in figure 9.

c. A formal written collection plan, when used, is exclusively a worksheet—an aid to direction of the collection effort. It is not disseminated although all key personnel of the intelligence section have access to it for information and guidance.

### **108. Period Covered**

a. The collection plan is prepared to cover an entire operation; hence, the period covered is from the time the plan is prepared, prior to the commencement of an operation, to the accomplishment of the unit mission. Consequently, an appropriate entry may be: "From 231600 June. To seizure of FORT LEAVENWORTH."

b. Since direction of the collection effort is continuous, an *entirely* new collection plan is rarely prepared. Assigned collection missions frequently continue in effect throughout a campaign; for example, all frontline units are required to report new identifications of forces in contact.

c. A collection plan prepared prior to the beginning of an operation may be changed materially during the course of the operation. EEI which have been answered, or which cease to be applicable, are canceled. New EEI may be added or old ones may be modified as the enemy's capabilities and vulnerabilities are found to have changed. Analysis of new or modified EEI, and cancellation of answered or inapplicable EEI, result in continual changes in the orders and requests to collection agencies.

### **109. EEI**

In column 1 of the collection plan, G2 lists the EEI which have been approved by his commander.

### **110. Indications**

a. In column 2, G2 lists the indications which result from analysis of each EEI.

UNIT:

Period covered: From: \_\_\_\_\_ To: \_\_\_\_\_

(1)  <i>Essential elements of information</i>	(2)  <i>Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)</i>	(3)  <i>Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action</i>	(4)  <i>Agencies to be employed</i>	(5)  <i>Place and time at which information is to be reported</i>	(6)  <i>Remarks</i>
			<div style="display: flex; flex-direction: row-reverse; justify-content: space-between; padding: 0 5px;"> <div>List all</div> <div>agencies</div> <div>to be</div> <div>employed</div> <div>in the</div> <div>collection</div> <div>of information</div> <div>required</div> </div>		
List the EEI announced for the operation, situation, or mission, spaced sufficiently to permit entry in column (2) of all indications pertinent to the EEI.	Record opposite respective EEI in column (1) those indications which will best provide an answer to the question asked or implied by the EEI.	Record in notes or fragmentary form the specific information sought to substantiate each indication.	Place an X under each agency that has or can get the information bearing on each indication. The agency (or agencies) finally selected as recipients of specific orders or requests for information will be indicated by circling <b>(X)</b> .  <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; margin-top: 10px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;"></div> </div>	Place: Headquarters or staff section to which information is to be reported.  Time: May be a specific time, periodically, or as the information is obtained.	

Figure 8. Suggested form for collection plan.

b. In combat, G2 develops lists of indications relating to each type of enemy capability and vulnerability, based on his analysis of previous enemy operations and on data furnished by higher, lower, and adjacent units (par. 100c(2)). Modifications to the list are made as appropriate in each situation.

### **111. Basis for Specific Orders or Requests**

a. Column 3 contains an outline or brief of the specific information needed to substantiate each indication in column 2. To this extent, the entries in column 3 provide bases for specific orders or requests to collection agencies.

b. There are frequent duplications in column 3; not every entry is the basis for a *separate* order or request. The same item of specific information may be sought as a basis for substantiation or refutation of several different indications. For example: indications of attack may include, "location of artillery well forward"; indications of defense may include, "echelonment of artillery laterally and in depth." In both cases, the specific information desired from collection agencies is locations of artillery, by type and caliber.

### **112. Agencies To Be Employed**

a. Every available collection agency is listed at the top of column 4, including the military intelligence specialists and the collection agencies of subordinate units.

b. Opposite each basis for specific orders or requests, a cross (X) is entered in the column of each collection agency which is *capable* of furnishing the required information.

c. The final selection of agencies to be employed is made after all bases for specific orders or requests have been considered, and after all the appropriate "X's" have been entered in column 4. Applying the principles of *suitability, multiplicity, and balance*, G2 then draws circles around the X's of the agencies which will actually be ordered or requested to furnish each item of information.

### **113. Place and Time of Reporting**

a. Entries in column 5, the instructions as to the place and time each item of information is to be reported, are determined in close coordination with G3. Information which arrives too late is of no value; information received too soon may be inaccurate by the time it is used.

b. When obtaining the required information will necessitate the dispatch of a reconnaissance patrol, consideration must be given to the time required for issuance of orders, the time required for preparations of personnel for the mission, the time required to execute the mission, and the time required to report its results.

### **114. Remarks**

a. Miscellaneous notes on the progress of the collection effort and notes



Unit: 20th Infantry Division.  
Period covered: 011900 July to capture of Hill 101.

## COLLECTION PLAN

COLLECTION PLAN

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)									(5)	(6)	
			Agencies to be employed											
Essential elements of information	Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action	58th Inf	59th Inf	60th Inf	20th Recon Co	20th Tk Bn	Div Arty	72d Inf Div	55th Inf Div	I Corps	Auxiliary Agencies	Hour and destination of reports	Remarks
1. Will the enemy reinforce the unit now on Hill 101 before 0600 tomorrow? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to reinforced rifle regiment on Hill 102.	a. Movement of additional troops toward the forces opposing us.	(1) Report location, activity, and rate of movement of reinforced rifle regiment last observed north of Hill 102 at— (coordinates).						X			X	X	(1) Report at 2000 _____ to division command post.	
	b. Increased traffic toward our position.	(2) Report volume and type of traffic on roads approaching Hill 101 from the north or northeast.	X	X		X		X	X		X	X	(2) Report at 2000, 2400, _____, and 0500 _____ to division command post.	
		(3) Same as (2) on road approaching Hill 101 from the west.		X				X		X	X	X	(3) Same as (2).	
	c. Identification of new units.	(4) Report new identifications.	X	X		X			X	X		X	(4) Report as obtained. Negative 2400 and 0500 to division command post.	SOP
	d. Increased aggressive patrolling.	(5) Report number, size, composition, routes of enemy patrols encountered in your zone.	X	X		X							(5) Same as (4).	SOP
	e. Additional command posts, supply or evacuation installations.	(6) Report locations of command posts, supply and evacuation installations vicinity Hills 101 and 102.	X	X		X				X		X	(6) Same as (2) and as obtained.	

Figure 9. Partially completed collection plan.

for future action are recorded in column 6, "Remarks." A simple code consisting of plus and minus signs, check marks, and crosses may be used for indicating whether positive or negative reports have been received, whether information is inadequate, or whether the indication concerned has been substantiated.

b. Notes as to future cancellation of orders and requests, modification of EEI upon the occurrence of specific events, or other action to be taken as the collection effort progresses, are also appropriately entered in column 6.

### **115. Standing Operating Procedure Items**

The formal, written collection plan is essentially a device for insuring that EEI have been thoroughly analyzed and that orders and requests have been issued for all pertinent information. Consequently, entries *are* made on the form concerning information which the unit standing operating procedure (SOP) directs. For example, division and larger unit SOP's ordinarily direct subordinate units to report new identifications when made, and periodically to submit negative reports of new identifications. Nevertheless, the collection plan form is completed with respect to new unit identifications exactly as it would be if the SOP imposed no such reporting requirement, except that "SOP" may be entered in the "Remarks" column, to indicate that the issuance of an order is not necessary (fig. 9).

## **Section V. ORDERS AND REQUESTS**

### **116. Transmittal**

a. There are two methods of transmitting orders and requests to higher, lower, and adjacent units: fragmentary orders or requests, and paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex to an operation order. Since requirements for information change continually, whereas a complete operation order is ordinarily published only once for each operation, fragmentary orders and requests are the means of transmission most frequently employed.

b. Fragmentary orders and requests for information may be transmitted by personal contact, or by any appropriate and available means of signal communication. However, there must be adequate security in the transmission of orders and requests. The enemy's knowledge of our requirements for information provides him with a basis for deducing the extent of our existing knowledge of his situation.

### **117. Fragmentary Orders and Requests**

a. Fragmentary orders and requests may be oral or written. When written, they may be in the form of field messages, overlays, or marked maps. Overlays and marked maps are particularly useful means of indicating sectors of observation, areas to be reconnoitered, and routes to be followed by patrols.

b. Fragmentary orders and requests are prepared from the basis for

specific orders and requests entered in column 3 of the collection plan. However, each entry in column 3 is merely a *basis* for orders and requests; the wording of an order or request is not necessarily the same as the column 3 entry on which it was based. Frequently, several column 3 entries are combined into a single fragmentary order.

c. There is no prescribed form for fragmentary orders or requests. Each contains a clear, concise statement of the information to be obtained and of the place and time reports are to be made.

d. An example of a fragmentary, written order for the collection of information appears as figure 10.

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
<b>MESSAGE</b> (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. _____ DATE 1 Jul 19...		
To CO 58th Inf		
AS OBTAINED, NEGATIVE DAILY AT 0500 AND 2400,		
STARTING 012400 JUL 19..., REPORT NUMBER, SIZE,		
COMPOSITION, ROUTES OF ENEMY PATROLS ENCOUNTERED		
YOUR ZONE; NEW IDENTIFICATIONS.		
CG 20th Inf Div		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		2000
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		TIME SIGNED
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		/s/ Smith, Lt Col
		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

Figure 10. Typical fragmentary order for collection of information (DA Form 11-170).

## 118. The Intelligence Annex

a. *General.* An intelligence annex, in the prescribed form in FM 101-5, normally accompanies each complete operation order issued by division and higher commands. It is a means of disseminating both intelligence and intelligence instructions, to include orders and requests for the collection of information. Additional points to be considered during the preparation are explained in the following paragraphs. An example appears as appendix VIII.

b. *Reconnaissance and Observation Missions.*

- (1) Paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex is the formal implementation of G2's collection plan. It contains a complete list of all

*current* collection orders and requests to higher, lower, and adjacent units, or refers to an appendix which contains such a list. Fragmentary orders and requests previously issued are repeated in paragraph 3 (or in an app) if they are still in effect. Except for collection orders which are a part of the unit SOP, collection orders and requests previously issued which are *not* repeated in paragraph 3 (or an app) of the intelligence annex are canceled by the omission.

- (2) As with fragmentary orders, column 3 of the collection plan is the basis for the orders and requests which appear in paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex. Again, the wording is not necessarily the same.

- (3) In both subparagraphs 3*a* and 3*b*, units are listed in the same sequence as that in which they appear in the operation order.

*c. Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Materiel.*

- (1) Paragraph 4 usually contains a reference to the unit SOP, and directs any changes or additions dictated by the situation, either from SOP or from procedures prescribed in other documents (e. g., FM 19-40, 30-15, and 30-16).

- (2) Subparagraph 4*a* contains instructions for handling prisoners of war, enemy deserters, liberated civilians, evaders, escapers, refugees, displaced persons, and repatriates, in order to insure their maximum exploitation as sources of information. This subparagraph may include instructions for initial interrogation, search, segregation, special handling of personnel of particular categories (e. g., high ranking officers), special handling of suspect civilians, or special lines of inquiry to be pursued in the interrogation of personnel. Preparation of this subparagraph is coordinated with G1 the Provost Marshal, and G4. Reference may be made as appropriate to paragraph 6, "Counter-intelligence."

- (3) Subparagraph 4*b* contains instructions for handling and processing captured documents from the time of their acquisition to their receipt by designated intelligence specialists. These may include instructions to be disseminated to troops on the necessity for turning in documents, marking of documents, search for documents, and special handling of documents found on prisoners of war. They may also include instructions on the search for and processing of documents of a particular type, and may define particular documents for which special search is to be made.

- (4) Subparagraph 4*c* designates items or types of enemy materiel particularly desired for examination, and includes any essential special instructions for processing materiel. Preparation of this subparagraph is coordinated with G4 and the special staff officers concerned.

*d. Counterintelligence.* Paragraph 6 may consist only of a reference to SOP, or it may contain special instructions concerning safeguarding of military information; radio and radar silence; communications security monitoring; censorship; compromise of signs, countersigns, paroles, codes, or other classified matters; camouflage, dispersion, and light discipline; handling of deserters, evaders and escapers, and enemy and friendly civilians; and similar matters. If the information and instructions properly contained in paragraph 6 become voluminous, a counterintelligence appendix may be added to the intelligence annex (ch. 9).

*e. Appendixes.* Appendixes to the intelligence annex contain material which is of interest to a limited number of recipients of the annex, or which is detailed or voluminous. When appendixes are used, references thereto are included in appropriate paragraphs of the annex. Typical appendixes include—

- (1) Enemy situation maps, overlays, order of battle summaries, or any combination thereof.
- (2) Reconnaissance and observation missions. A reconnaissance and observation missions appendix, when used, follows the 5-paragraph format of an operation order:
  - (a) Paragraph 1, "Situation," either describes the situation in brief or, preferably, refers to the intelligence annex or an applicable PERINTREP for the enemy situation, and to the basic operation order for the friendly situation.
  - (b) Paragraph 2, "Mission," quotes the mission of the command, as stated in paragraph 2 of the basic operation order.
  - (c) Paragraph 3, "Execution," assigns, in paragraph 3a, missions to subordinate and attached units, listed in the same order as they appear in the operation order; and, in paragraph 3b, make requests of higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.
  - (d) Paragraph 4, "Administration and Logistics," refers to the applicable administrative order.
  - (e) Paragraph 5, "Command and Signal," refers to the basic operational order, or to the signal annex thereto, if any.
- (3) Tactical Air Force air reconnaissance plan, including both visual and photo mission plans and procedures for submitting requests for additional mission.
- (4) Weather and terrain studies.
- (5) Map and airphoto plans, describing the distribution to be made of maps and photos.
- (6) Time, tide, and light tables.
- (7) Counterintelligence plan (ch. 9).
- (8) Special intelligence studies.
- (9) Intelligence administrative plan, including details of administrative reports, funds, special intelligence, liaison, and other administrative matters.

## CHAPTER 7

# RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

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### Section I. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

#### 119. Definitions

a. *Reconnaissance* is directed effort in the field to gather information of the enemy or the area of operations, which is undertaken by an appropriate element of the armed forces.

b. *Combat reconnaissance* is reconnaissance of the enemy in immediate contact with one's own forces, preliminary to, or during combat. It is classified as—

- (1) *Battle reconnaissance*, which is observation made, during combat of the terrain, disposition of the enemy, etc. It is made during or immediately before battle, when in close contact with the enemy.
  - (a) *Reconnaissance in force* is an attack, by a considerable body of troops to discover and test the enemy's position and strength, or to develop other intelligence.
  - (b) *Reconnaissance by fire* is a method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or by returning the fire.
- (2) *Close reconnaissance* is reconnaissance of a region near at hand. It furnishes the commander with information on which to base tactical decisions. It may be conducted by infantry, artillery engineer, or armored units. Close reconnaissance is constant and intensive when the opposing forces are in contact.
- (3) *Distant reconnaissance* is the reconnaissance of objectives that lie outside the immediate striking range of a force, but about which detailed information is essential for military planning. It is usually performed by armored reconnaissance units, and is preferably supplemented by aerial reconnaissance.

#### 120. Responsibilities

a. Reconnaissance to gain information required for tactical operations is a responsibility of command. The commander, personally, insures that aggressive, thorough, and detailed reconnaissance is maintained continually.

b. General staff responsibility for planning and assignment of reconnaissance missions, as part of the comprehensive collection effort, lies with

G2. Orders directing the dispatch of *patrols* are prepared by G2, and are issued by G3, in the name of the commander. Orders directing the conduct of reconnaissance in force are prepared by G3, in coordination with G2, and are issued by G3, in the name of the commander.

## 121. Planning

Planning for reconnaissance missions must be completed early enough to insure that the executing units have sufficient time to make their own preparations, conduct the reconnaissance and report the results by the specified time the information is required. Plans include provisions for interrogating participating personnel after a reconnaissance is completed and reporting the results. Adjacent and supporting units must be advised of the time reconnaissance will begin, the size units to be employed, the mission, and the routes to be followed or area to be covered.

## 122. Principles

The techniques of reconnaissance employed by the combat arms are described in branch field manuals. The basic principles of reconnaissance, applicable to all arms, are as follows:

a. *Gain Contact as Soon as Possible and Maintain It Aggressively and Continuously.* Information on the identification, disposition, and strength of enemy troop units must be gained at the earliest practicable moment. The nearer the enemy, the more intensive is reconnaissance. *Once gained, contact with the enemy must never be lost.* Ground reconnaissance elements gain and maintain contact with the enemy and, by working continuously to the front, flank, and where necessary, to the rear, endeavor to ascertain the identification, dispositions, and strength of the enemy force, and the approach of enemy reinforcements. Army aircraft may be employed to supplement and complement ground reconnaissance.

b. *Maneuver Freely in Conformity With Operations.* It is impossible to maintain contact with a moving enemy by staying in one place; nor can maximum information be obtained if reconnaissance is confined to canalized routes, i. e., roads, valleys, and ridge lines. Reconnaissance units must maneuver freely about the area of operations, and keep pace with the activity of the enemy. Reconnaissance units orient on the enemy; not on other elements of their own force.

c. *Secure Information by Stealth Where Possible, but Fight When Necessary in Order To Gain Information.* Normally, reconnaissance should be by stealth and observation of the enemy, and should be conducted without his knowledge. Combat should be resorted to only when necessary to save the reconnaissance force from annihilation or capture when prisoners are desired, or when the mission requires that the enemy be forced to reveal his dispositions through combat. However, no enemy voluntarily releases valuable information; hence, reconnaissance forces must be provided with the means to accomplish their mission by close combat if necessary.

*d. Report All Items of Information, Even if Negative or Seemingly Unimportant, as Soon as Possible.* All information must be reported. Much information has significance not readily apparent at the time of its collection, nor to the individual or force collecting it. It is important to receive negative information in order to know what the enemy is *not* doing, or where he is *not*, at given time. No information should be overlooked, nor should its reporting be delayed. The most valuable information may be worthless if received too late to assist the commander in making his decision.

### **123. Agencies**

a. Reconnaissance agencies consist of personnel manning observation posts; reconnaissance patrols and parties of any size from all arms; communications reconnaissance agencies; and units especially organized or designed to execute reconnaissance missions. Among the ground units specifically organized for reconnaissance are—

- (1) Intelligence and reconnaissance platoon in infantry regiments.
  - (2) Reconnaissance platoon in each tank and armored infantry battalion.
  - (3) Reconnaissance company in infantry and airborne divisions.
  - (4) Reconnaissance battalion in armored divisions.
  - (5) Armored cavalry regiment in each type corps and field army.
- b. (1) Infantry, armor, artillery, and engineer reconnaissance elements and units perform battle and close reconnaissance, armored reconnaissance units are ideally suited for distant reconnaissance.
- (2) Communications reconnaissance units are capable of intercepting and analyzing enemy signal communications.

### **124. Missions**

In order to obtain desired information, the intelligence officer must prepare suitable missions for reconnaissance agencies. Missions are usually derived from the collection plan, and are assigned to reconnaissance agencies in the form of orders or requests. In determining missions, the following principles are observed:

a. Missions must be assigned according to the capabilities and limitations of the agency employed.

b. Mission must be specific, and leave no doubt as to the information desired. Broad generalizations such as "report strength and disposition of the enemy" are avoided. The specific *time* that the information is desired, or the latest time that the information will be of value, should be included in the order or request.

c. In assigning missions, it is quite likely that more than one mission may be assigned to any one agency at a given time. There must be a definite priority assigned to the several missions, in such cases. Priority of missions should be based on the importance of the information requested and the time it is desired. By indicating priorities, the intelligence officer insures that proper attention will be given to the most important missions.



*d.* All reconnaissance missions are coordinated by the intelligence officer. This avoids needless duplication of effort, conflicting reconnaissance, and the possibility of combat, particularly at night, between friendly units.

*e.* The majority of the reconnaissance agencies are assigned to obtain the most vital information. Instead of spreading available agencies thinly over a wide area or a series of missions, the most critical missions are selected and concentrated upon until satisfactorily completed. This does not imply that all other missions are neglected. However, reasonable concentration of a majority of agencies on the most important missions achieves better result in a shorter time, yet does not prejudice necessary coverage.

## **125. Reconnaissance in Force**

*a.* A reconnaissance in force is an attack by a considerable body of troops to discover and test the enemy's position and strength, or to develop other intelligence. An analysis of the definition reveals three significant points.

- (1) A reconnaissance in force is an offensive operation. When definite information must be obtained about an area, a reconnaissance in force may be planned and executed as an attack, with a limited objective and appropriate control measures. If the enemy situation must be developed along a front, a reconnaissance in force may be conducted as a phased advance under mission-type orders, employing strong, aggressive, probing action to determine the enemy situation at critical points.
- (2) A reconnaissance in force is conducted by a considerable body of troops. The size of the force varies in accordance with the mission, terrain, and enemy; hence, the adjective "considerable" can have no precise meaning to cover all situations. The force must be of such strength that the enemy is obliged to react strongly and definitely to the attack, and thus disclose his location, dispositions, and strength. Since a reconnaissance in force is normally utilized only in a vague situation where the character of opposition is unknown, a balanced force of infantry and armor, with artillery, air, and engineer support, is employed.
- (3) The purpose of a reconnaissance in force is to collect information. However, the commander should be alert to seize any opportunity to exploit tactical success achieved. If the reconnaissance discovers a weak spot in the enemy's dispositions, the prompt commitment of reinforcements may produce an important tactical victory at little cost.

*b.* Although a reconnaissance in force is, in many situations, a sound tactical operation, the decision to employ it is not to be made lightly. There is inevitably some risk that the executing force may be lost or

decimated; that it may disclose the commander's ultimate intentions; or that it may provoke an unwanted general engagement. Additionally, unless the troops engaged in the reconnaissance in force are properly briefed, they may question the necessity for any mission which involves the use of a sizeable force simply to gain information.

## 126. Counterreconnaissance

*a. General.* Counterreconnaissance is active effort to neutralize enemy reconnaissance. It seeks to protect a force from observation and other hostile reconnaissance measures. It is executed by establishing a defensive screen, an offensive screen, or a combination of both.

*b. Principles.* The principles of counterreconnaissance are—

- (1) *Operations are oriented on and adjusted to the friendly forces being screened.*
- (2) *Hostile reconnaissance elements are destroyed or neutralized by combat.*
- (3) *Screening forces are echeloned in depth to provide mutual support and to prevent any deep penetration by enemy reconnaissance elements into the area being screened.*

*c. Forms.* Counterreconnaissance operations may take either of two forms or a combination of both. These forms are:

- (1) *The Defensive Screen.* This type of action is protective and is intended to prevent enemy reconnaissance forces from entering certain areas or places. It is essentially passive, and is usually established behind natural obstacles which limit avenues of approach and canalize the enemy reconnaissance effort.
- (2) *The Offensive Screen.* This type of action meets the enemy's reconnaissance forces and destroys them. An offensive screen may be moving or stationary depending upon the activities of the friendly force being screened.

*d. Relationship to Reconnaissance.*

- (1) All units have both reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance responsibilities. Thus reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance complement one another and cannot be readily separated. Good reconnaissance insures a certain amount of security. Conversely, the activities of a counterreconnaissance force provide a certain amount of reconnaissance information.
- (2) In most cases the agencies executing reconnaissance missions may be employed simultaneously in counterreconnaissance; however, an agency should be given only one primary mission, performing functions under the other mission as a secondary matter. The order to the force must state explicitly which mission has precedence. In forces of sufficient size, a part of the force may be assigned each task.

*e. Responsibilities.* Responsibilities for counterreconnaissance are the same as responsibilities for reconnaissance (par. 126).

## Section II. AIR RECONNAISSANCE

### 127. Introduction

a. Air reconnaissance is the collection of military information by visual, electronic, or photographic means from aircraft, performed by reconnaissance elements of army, tactical air force, navy or marine aviation. It is an effective, and, in general, reliable intelligence agency capable of penetrating deeper into enemy territory than other overt agencies.

b. Reconnaissance aviation performs four types of aerial reconnaissance: visual, photographic, weather, and electronic. The latter two are not discussed in this manual.

c. Air reconnaissance is conducted where ground reconnaissance is impracticable; however, it is frequently executed in conjunction with ground reconnaissance of enemy forward areas. Air reconnaissance is most useful in selecting routes for ground reconnaissance agencies and in location of enemy forces which impede or endanger long-range patrols or armored reconnaissance elements.

d. Air reconnaissance is able to provide information on terrain or enemy activities in large areas faster than other means of reconnaissance. However, at times air reconnaissance may be limited by adverse weather conditions or enemy air defense measure.

### 128. Air Reconnaissance Targets

Targets for reconnaissance aviation are classified by the Air Force as *fixed*, *transient*, or *fleeting*.

a. A fixed target is any structure or object which is not subject to movement.

b. A transient target is a temporary installation or structure. Transient targets include camps, bivouacs, supply installations, ammunition dumps, and ponton bridges.

c. A fleeting target is any object which moves. Fleeting targets include troops, vehicles, watercraft, and aircraft.

### 129. Visual Reconnaissance

a. *General.*

(1) Visual air reconnaissance is capable of providing, and disseminating rapidly, current information of enemy activity. It is most effectively employed against transient and fleeting targets.

(2) Visual reconnaissance missions are flown by pilots trained in the observation of surface activity. *Reconnaissance pilots of supporting services may be accompanied by an additional aircraft to provide defensive cover. Reconnaissance aircraft do not attack targets: their armament is provided for defensive purposes. However, they may guide fighter aircraft onto located targets.*

(3) Visual reconnaissance aircraft carry limited quantities of camera equipment capable of taking either vertical or oblique photos.

- (4) Army reconnaissance pilots are accompanied by a trained air observer who is able to devote full attention to visual observation.
- (5) Although visual reconnaissance is fast, there are limitations on both the quality and quantity of information furnished. Quality and quantity are restricted by weather, enemy countermeasures, and limitations on the visual acuity of pilots. Under optimum conditions of light and visibility, a pilot flying at altitudes of from 6,000 to 8,000 feet can distinguish movement on roads at a distance of approximately 5 miles on each side of his flight path. However, weather, enemy fire, camouflage, concealment afforded by the terrain, speed of the aircraft, and the pilot's concern with operating a high performance aircraft while observing, may reduce both the amount that the observer sees, and how well he sees it. Additionally, pilots sometimes experience difficulty in keeping themselves oriented and, consequently, may be inaccurate in reporting locations.
- (6) Communications equipment is provided divisions and corps to provide visual reconnaissance pilots with the latest information on the target area and to receive significant information from the pilot or observer while in flight. Detailed results of the mission are disseminated after the post mission interrogation of the pilot or observer.

b. *Mission Types.* There are five types of visual reconnaissance missions: area search, specific search, route reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and contact reconnaissance.

- (1) *Area search* is reconnaissance conducted at intervals over a prescribed area and, usually, for a specified period of time. Areas to be searched are designated on maps and aircraft are assigned to fly over them in prescribed patterns once, twice, or several times daily. Search areas may extend up to 200 miles into enemy territory. Area search is a method of reconnaissance particularly suitable to sparsely populated areas and open terrain. Depending upon the capability of reconnaissance aircraft employed, type of terrain and information sought, search areas may vary in size up to 2,500 square miles.
- (2) *Specific search* is reconnaissance of a specific locality for evidence of specific activities. Normally, it is not flown on a regular schedule, as is area search. Specific search is preferable to area search in close terrain or densely populated areas.
- (3) *Route reconnaissance* is the visual observation of movements along enemy routes of communications. The routes reconnoitered may pass through several search areas, and may extend as far as 200 to 300 miles into enemy territory. Route reconnaissance is employed to supplement area search, and to extend visual reconnaissance deeper into the enemy rear.
- (4) *Artillery adjustment* may be performed by reconnaissance aircraft

of the army. In addition supporting services may perform adjustment on targets beyond the range of observation or organic army means.

- (5) *Contact reconnaissance* is an emergency means of reestablishing contact and communications with isolated friendly units.

### **130. Air Photo Reconnaissance**

a. Air photos are a principal source of information on enemy dispositions, installations, and certain activities. Study of air photos of the same area taken over a period of time (repetitive cover) is a particularly valuable means of analyzing enemy activity in detail. Additionally, air photos are the fastest means of obtaining detailed terrain information on large areas.

b. Air photos largely overcome the limitations on *quality* and *quantity* of information which restrict the value of visual reconnaissance. Detailed photo interpretation, including comparative study, can produce a large quantity of accurate, detailed information. The photo interpreter is less deluded by enemy camouflage than is the visual observer.

c. The principal disadvantage of photo reconnaissance, as compared to visual reconnaissance, is the time lapse between the exposure of film and the dissemination of information derived from the photos. Time is required for processing the film and interpreting the prints and reporting the information.

d. Types of air photos and their production, distribution, and use are discussed in paragraphs 144 through 149. Procurement of air photo missions is discussed in paragraph 134.

### **131. G2 Air Division**

Field army G2 Air personnel are organized as a G2 Air division which is composed of three branches:

a. The functions of the G2 Air Reconnaissance Branch are to plan and process requests to the TAF for air reconnaissance which originate with or within the field army, to keep the army advised as to availability of air reconnaissance support, and to provide the army air reconnaissance support agency with information and priorities on all air reconnaissance missions to be executed by the TAF.

b. The functions of the G2 Air Operations Branch are to disseminate to the field army pertinent information and intelligence produced by the TAF, to disseminate to the TAF pertinent information and intelligence information produced by the field army and to provide field army air reconnaissance support agency with information required by GLO's for pilot briefing.

c. The functions of the G2 Air Target Branch are to coordinate with G3 Air in the development of the field army interdiction program, to prepare intelligence target plans and folders, to recommend targets to G3 Air and to perform target damage assessment.

### 132. Air Reconnaissance Support Agency

a. The field army G2 Air is provided with the means to procure and disseminate all pertinent information and intelligence obtained or developed by air reconnaissance units of the supporting agencies and to maintain liaison between field army and air reconnaissance units.

b. Army ground liaison officers (GLO's) are provided at each supporting service air reconnaissance unit to brief pilots before takeoff on the details of army reconnaissance requirements, to interrogate pilots on landing, and to disseminate the results of visual reconnaissance missions and immediate air photo interpretation.

c. A reproduction and delivery unit is provided to reproduce and package for field army units the required quantities of air photos procured by supporting services. An air delivery element is available to deliver negatives and prints from nearby reconnaissance airfields to the reproduction facilities and air photos from the reproduction facilities to subordinate field army units. This unit maintains a negative library for reprint and basic cover purposes.

d. An air photo interpretation unit is provided to plot and interpret (immediate) air photos at air reconnaissance units of supporting services. This unit will provide mission review interpretation of all missions flown for field army headquarters and will maintain a print library of all air photo missions flown for the field army.

e. Communications are provided for transmission of briefing instruction to GLO's, and for dissemination of the results of air reconnaissance missions from air reconnaissance units to field army headquarters, and corps headquarters and to the G2 Air with the supporting service.

### 133. Air-Ground Communications System

The air-ground communications system comprises the following army communications nets:

a. The *information net* links the ARS agency with the headquarters of each corps and the field army. It is used for the transmission of information between the ARS agency, army, and corps.

b. The *air request net* links divisions and corps with the army. It is used for the transmission of requests for air support, both fighter and reconnaissance.

c. The *GLO reconnaissance net* links the GLO's at reconnaissance airfields with the headquarters of the ARS agency is used for the transmission of briefing instructions to GLO's, and for the transmission to the ARS agency of information obtained in debriefing.

### 134. Air Reconnaissance Mission Requests

a. The procedure for requesting air reconnaissance missions is dependent on whether the request is for a *preplanned* or/and *immediate* mission.

(1) A preplanned mission is one in which the target is selected suffi-

ciently in advance to allow complete planning and preparation prior to execution, usually at least a day in advance.

- (2) An immediate mission is one the need for which arises during battle, and which cannot be planned in detail in advance.

b. Mission requests, whether preplanned or immediate, contain the following information:

- (1) Originating agency.
- (2) Priority of request, as determined by the originating agency, relative to other requests.
- (3) Areas, routes, or targets to be covered.
- (4) Time the coverage is to be effected.
- (5) Type reconnaissance desired (visual or photo).
- (6) Significance of desired information (justification for request).
- (7) Specific information desired.
- (8) Time deadline (i. e., the latest time the information will be of value).
- (9) Coordinates of ground fires in the area.
- (10) Whether or not an air control team (ACT) is available to control the executing aircraft (if applicable).
- (11) In addition, for photo reconnaissance—
  - (a) Type photography desired (vertical, oblique, or other).
  - (b) Scale desired.
  - (c) Distribution desired.
  - (d) Number of prints desired.

c. From division to army aerial reconnaissance mission requests are processed through intelligence (G2 air) channels.

d. The procedure for preplanned reconnaissance is as follows:

- (1) Division G2 air consolidates all requests from subordinate elements of the division, the fire support coordination center (FSCC), and the division staff. He assigns each mission a priority, and forwards the consolidated request at corps G2 air.
- (2) Corps G2 air screens requests from the several divisions, consolidates them with request from the corps FSCC and staff, assigns priorities, and forwards the consolidated corps request to the G2 air division army.
- (3) The G2 air reconnaissance branch consolidates the several corps requests with those originating from the army staff and army troops assigns priorities, and presents the army requirements which cannot be fulfilled by organic army aviation to supporting services.
- (4) The G2 air division forwards to the ARS agency information with which to brief reconnaissance pilots, priority lists for interpretation of photos to be taken, and distribution data for photos and photo interpretation reports.
- (5) The G2 Air Reconnaissance branch advises each corps G2 air of the relative priority of approved corps requests, and the esti-

mated time over target. Each Corps G2 air is also informed of the reason for disapproval of any of his requests.

e. The procedure for immediate aerial reconnaissance is as follows:

- (1) Division G2 air receive requests from subordinate units, the FSCC; or division staff and forwards them *direct* to the G2 air division at army by the most expeditious means. When division requests are transmitted by any means other than the air request radio net, corps G2 air is informed immediately.
- (2) Corps G2 air monitors the air requests radio net and indicates approval of division requests by remaining silent.
- (3) The G2 air division at army assigns each request which is beyond army aviation capabilities and presents it to supporting services.
- (4) The army G2 air division furnishes the ARS agency information with which to brief reconnaissance pilots and, if the request is for a photo mission, instructions for interpretation, reproduction, and distribution of photos and interpretation reports.
- (5) The G2 air reconnaissance branch notifies the requesting unit of action taken and, if approved, the estimated time over target, or, if disapproved, the reason for disapproval.

### Section III. ARMY AIR RECONNAISSANCE

#### 135. General

a. Division and corps are provided army means for the conduct of air reconnaissance.

b. Army reconnaissance aircraft operate from hastily prepared air strips at forward locations in the field army area. Visual, photographic, or electronic means may be employed to maintain surveillance of the battlefield or to collect information on terrain or enemy activity at a specific location.

c. Army reconnaissance aircraft are provided radio communication which permit—

- (1) Immediate transmission of intelligence information to combat or command support units and division or corps headquarters.
- (2) Inflight diversion to higher priority reconnaissance missions.
- (3) Request for and adjustment of artillery fires.
- (4) Control of close offensive air support.
- (5) Employment as a radio relay station for ground reconnaissance elements.

d. Air reconnaissance activities are coordinated by the G2 air to integrate the activities of all reconnaissance means available to the command, eliminate duplication of effort, and to establish priorities in consonance with the commander's plan.

#### 136. Employment

a. Visual air reconnaissance missions (par. 119b) are executed by a pilot



air observer team. Preflight briefing and post mission interrogation of the team by trained intelligence personnel increases the accuracy, completeness and volume of intelligence produced on reconnaissance missions.

- (1) Army reconnaissance aircraft are normally able to maintain continuous visual surveillance during daylight hours of the battlefield to a depth of 15,000 yards.
- (2) The tactical situation may permit visual reconnaissance mission to be executed at greater distances.
- (3) The lower speeds of army aircraft permit more detailed visual observations than are possible from high performance aircraft of supporting services.
- (4) Pilots and air observers are trained in observation and reconnaissance techniques to insure optimum collection of accurate intelligence information.

b. Army photographic reconnaissance missions can usually be requested, executed and the commander provided with resultant intelligence in less time than when the photography is procured by supporting services.

- (1) Equipment provided divisions and corps can provide all types of air photos except continuous strip and color photography and at scales from 1:500 to 1:15,000.
- (2) Reconnaissance pilots are trained in the operation of mounted cameras.
- (3) Air observers are trained in the operation of hand-held cameras and the procurement of "target-of-opportunity" air photos. Air observers performing visual reconnaissance missions can be diverted to execute a higher priority air photo mission.

c. Divisions and corps are provided air photo processing equipment which is normally located in the vicinity of army air strips. The G2 air coordinates with the signal officer on priorities for film processing and air photo reproduction.

#### **Section IV. SUPPORTING SERVICES**

##### **137. Tactical Air Force**

a. Air reconnaissance support is provided each field army by the air reconnaissance wing of a numbered tactical air force (TAF). Each army group is supported by a numbered tactical air command (TAC) with one or more reconnaissance wings. The field army and army group G2 air coordinate air reconnaissance support with the combat operations sections of TAF and TAC.

b. The air reconnaissance wing supports field army from widely dispersed airfields. Logistical support is provided by the wing for field army air photo interpretation elements located with air reconnaissance squadrons. The air reconnaissance wing provides necessary air courier service for delivery of army negatives and prints except in those instances where

field army air couriers can make speedy delivery from nearby TAF reconnaissance airfields.

*c.* TAF high performance reconnaissance aircraft and fighter cover, when required, permit execution of air reconnaissance missions at great distances beyond the line of contact. The same capabilities will also provide air reconnaissance support when enemy air activity may restrict operation of army aircraft.

*d.* The air reconnaissance wing can provide continuous-strip and color photography in addition to those types procured by field army air reconnaissance agencies.

*e.* The field army air photo reproduction and delivery unit and the TAF reconnaissance technical squadron maintain film libraries of TAF photo reconnaissance missions flown for the field army and for TAF. Reprints are provided either service by the organization that has retained the processed film.

*f.* Information on significant sightings during visual reconnaissance missions are transmitted in flight over the tactical air observation net (TAF) to the Air Control Center and to interested corps and divisions.

### **138. Naval Air Reconnaissance Support**

*a.* Air reconnaissance support of all types can be provided army units engaged in amphibious operations. The amount of reconnaissance support provided is determined during the initial planning phases.

*b.* Requests for air reconnaissance support are coordinated by the G2 Air with the Supporting Arms Coordination Center (Navy). Army requests are processed to the first echelon where air reconnaissance support is available.

*c.* Because of limited aircraft carrier air photo reproduction facilities, army air photo reproduction elements may be required with naval air reconnaissance units. Air photos may be delivered to army units by navy and/or army air couriers. Army photo interpreters are normally located with navy air reconnaissance units to provide immediate photo interpretation of army requested missions.

### **139. Marine Air Reconnaissance Support**

Marine air units may be employed in conjunction with naval air or the tactical air force in (TAF) support of army units. Air reconnaissance support provided is similar to that provided by the TAF or naval air.

## CHAPTER 8

### MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

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#### Section I. MAPS

#### 140. General

a. Maps are essential sources of information about the area of operations. *They are intelligence documents*, not supply items. Procurement and distribution of military maps is accomplished through channels established exclusively for that purpose; they are neither requisitioned nor distributed through supply channels. Corps, primarily a tactical headquarters, is an integral part of the map distribution system. Divisions requisition and draw their maps from corps, and not directly from the field army, as with supply items.

b. G2 is responsible for general staff supervision of all activities concerning military topographic surveys and maps, including their acquisition, reproduction, storage, and distribution.

c. The unit engineer is charged with the procurement, storage, and distribution of military maps, under the general staff supervision of G2.

#### 141. Classification

a. *Military Maps.* The term *military maps* refers to all maps, other than aeronautical and hydrographic charts, used for military purposes. Military maps are classified according to the use for which they are best suited. The classification of a map depends to a large extent upon its scale; the scale is indicative of both the accuracy and the amount of detail shown. Certain general classifications are also used to indicate the extent of geographic information given, as well as the manner in which that information is portrayed.

b. *Military and General Classification* (FM 101-10).

#### 142. Requirements

a. *General.* Timely planning is essential to insure that sufficient quantities of suitable maps are available at the time and place needed. The basic considerations which govern map planning are—

- (1) Area of map coverage required.
- (2) Map scales required.
- (3) Map allowances.
  - (a) Initial issue.
  - (b) Replenishment issue.
  - (c) Emergency issue.

*b. Area of Map Coverage Required.* Map coverage refers to the number of sheets of the same scale required to cover the terrain being considered. The extent of the area of present and projected operations is the basis for determining the map coverage required. A combat unit requires map coverage of an area wider than that which is included within its tactical boundaries. Overlap is required for planning, tactical security, and coordination with adjacent units. The number of map sheets required at each scale is determined by the use of a map index. The outline of the area for which map coverage is required is marked on the index. The sheets included within the outline are then counted and listed by an appropriate identification symbol.

*c. Map Scales Required.* Map scale requirements are influenced by the enemy situation, the type of unit, character of the terrain, and the type of operations. Small-scale maps are used for general planning and strategic studies of higher commanders. Large-scale maps meet the technical and tactical needs of the combat arms, and other appropriate users. Maps covering the area of present and projected operations are of as large a scale as necessary to provide the detail required. Coverage outside the area of immediate interest usually is of smaller scale.

*d. Map Allowances.* Map allowances are based on predetermined tables published by theater or theater army headquarters, which prescribe kinds of maps and quantities authorized according to map scale and type of unit. These tables, when used in conjunction with inventories of available maps, provide an appropriate distribution guide for a particular type and scale map. (FM 101-10 includes tables based on experience factors compiled in World War II.)

- (1) *An initial issue* is based upon initial allowances as set forth in FM 101-10 or by theater, and is the number of copies of map sheets, by type or scale, which can be requisitioned by each organization without further approval. Initial issues are authorized for organizations and units.
- (2) *A replenishment issue* is based upon replenishment allowances which include authorized supplemental issues to cover normal losses. Replenishment requirements are calculated by applying a percentage factor to the number of copies required for initial issue. The sum of the initial requirement, plus the replenishment requirement for each sheet, is the total number of copies of each sheet which a field army must be prepared to distribute.
- (3) *An emergency issue* has as basis only emergency needs which arise in combat.

*e. Determination of Requirements.* Determination of initial map requirements is made by the intelligence officer, the operations officer, and the unit engineer. Based on operational plans, the intelligence officer and the operations officer decide on the types and scales of maps to be used. The unit engineer advises on the availability of maps, including types and

scales. In accordance with the plan of operations, unit boundaries are projected and the area for which coverage is desired is determined. This area extends forward of present lines to include the objectives of current operations. With this information obtained and the data contained in allowance tables, the unit engineer calculates actual map requirements.

#### **143. Distribution**

- a.* (1) The distribution of maps must fit the operational plan. Therefore, only the map sheets which cover the area of current interest are of use to troops. Changes in tactical plans have an immediate effect on map requirements. The distribution system must respond instantaneously to such changes if the required maps are to be provided in time. This sensitivity to the tactical situation demands close staff supervision of map supply.
  - (2) Premature issue of maps not of immediate interest is wasted effort because the maps may be lost or discarded, or may be made useless by a change in operational plans.
  - (3) In mobile situations issue to individuals and small units is difficult to accomplish. The bulk of maps needed to cover a large area makes it impracticable to supply a unit with maps for a prolonged period of mobile operations.
  - (4) Logistical limitations prevent the maintenance of large reserves of maps. Hence, map distribution must be carefully controlled and supervised to prevent waste.
- b.* Paragraph 5 of the intelligence annex to an operation order lists the maps which will be supplied for the operation and states the quantities each classification or scale to be furnished each unit, and instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution.

### **Section II. AIR PHOTOS**

#### **144. General**

- a.* Photography provides an accurate and timely source of information for the commander and his staff. It produces positive information which is often exploited to clarify, amplify, or substantiate other sources and to supplement maps.
- b.* The capability of Army agencies to produce air photos supplements the capabilities of supporting services.
- c.* Procedures for requesting photo reconnaissance are described in paragraphs 127 through 134.

#### **145. Responsibilities**

- a.* The G2 of divisions and larger units prepares plans and policies for and supervises all activities concerning air photos at this echelon. He is charged with the procurement, storage, and distribution of air photos.

b. The G2 Air assists the G2 by handling all matters pertaining to air photos.

#### 146. Types of Air Photos

The following are the principal types of air photos.

a. *Vertical Photo.* An air photo made with the optical axis of the camera approximately perpendicular to the earth's surface or with the film as nearly horizontal as practicable.

b. *Composite Photo.* Air photos made with a camera having one principal lens and two or more surrounding and oblique lenses symmetrically placed. The several resulting photos may be rectified in printing to permit assembly as verticals with the same scale.

c. *Oblique Photo.* An air photo taken with the camera axis directed between the horizontal and the vertical.

(1) *High oblique.* An oblique photo which shows the apparent horizon.

(2) *Low oblique.* An oblique photo which does not show the apparent horizon.

d. *Stereoscopic Pair.* Two photographs with sufficient overlap, and consequent duplication of detail, to permit stereoscopic examination of an object or area common to both.

#### 147. Air Photo Coverage

Air photo coverage refers to the ground area portrayed on air photos and mosaics. Air photo coverage is divided into two general classes: *intelligence photography and mapping photography.*

a. The types of intelligence photography are—

(1) *Basic cover.*

(a) Basic cover is complete seasonal, vertical photo coverage of a projected area of operations, extending from the line of contact to a depth of 200 miles or more into enemy-held territory. The photographs may be current or noncurrent but must lend themselves to stereoscopic study. Basic cover is distributed to ground and air units to furnish information of terrain, routes of communication, and enemy civilian and military activity. For greatest effectiveness, basic cover should be of a scale of 1:12,500 or larger. It provides basic information about enemy-held territory; i. e., enemy installations, defenses, cultural features, trafficability, soil, and vegetation. It is compared with later photography to discover changes subsequent to the date of earlier cover.

(b) An initial issue of basic cover is made to Army units according to their requirements, and supplementary issues are made as the campaign progresses. In general, the issue of basic cover to each unit is governed by the range of weapons or area of

interest of that unit. For a typical automatic issue of basic cover see figure 11.

- (2) *Frontline cover.* Frontline cover is current vertical stereophotography of an area extending from the line of contact to a depth of from 10 to 15 miles into enemy territory, and to the flanks as necessary for coordination. For maximum effectiveness, frontline cover should be of scale 1:10,000 or larger. The depth to which frontline cover is flown is usually determined by the maximum range of friendly artillery, or by the location of selected objectives during an offensive operation. It is flown as requested, or as weather permits. The tactical situation, terrain characteristics, and other variables affect the requirements for such coverage; in some circumstances, daily coverage of only portions of the front is required. In moving situations requirements usually are for cover of only specified areas and immediate objectives. Depending upon the rapidity of movement, areas of coverage may, of necessity, be limited to towns, roads, rivers, and terrain strips. Comparative analysis of repetitive frontline cover is used to determine current locations of enemy mobile installations, troop concentrations, and movements. Frontline cover is distributed automatically as shown in figure 11.

(3) *Special cover.*

- (a) Special cover is photography of specific targets or objectives. Special cover photographic missions are flown to obtain information to meet immediate requirements of combat units and for planning purposes. The scale is dependent upon the information desired, and is specified by the requesting unit. Types of special cover include but are not limited to those discussed in the following paragraphs.
- (b) *Night photography* is ordinarily requested to scales of from 1:5,000 to 1:12,000, both in photo strips and in mosaics requiring more than one flight line. Night photography is usually requested to detect, identify, and maintain surveillance of enemy movement and activities along routes of communications and in assembly areas, bivouacs, and supply installations. Night reconnaissance aircraft are provided electronic guidance.
- (c) *Large-scale, vertical photography*, susceptible of stereoscopic study is required in scales of from 1:2,000 to 1:6,000. The use of large-scale photography is usually restricted to selected areas, and provides information unobtainable from smaller scale photos.
- (d) *Oblique photography*, both forward and side, is normally taken in an area within 10 to 15 miles of the line of contact. Side oblique photography can be produced as either high or low

Unit or agency	Number of sets <sup>1</sup>	Depth into enemy territory <sup>2</sup>
Army G2 (joint photo library) . . . . .	1 set (army zone or sector).	Up to 200 miles
Corps G2 (PI team) . . . . .	1 set (army zone or sector divided).	Up to 100 miles
Corps arty (PI team) . . . . .	1 set (army zone or sector divided).	Up to 100 miles
Division G2 (PI team) . . . . .	1 set (corps zone or sector divided).	Up to 35 miles
Division arty (PI team) . . . . .	1 set (corps zone or sector divided).	Up to 35 miles

<sup>1</sup>Additional coverage may be obtained on request.

<sup>2</sup>Depths apply to basic cover only.

*Figure 11. Automatic distribution of basic and frontline cover.*



obliques with overlaps of from 20 percent to 60 percent and at scales of from 1:2,000 to 1:10,000 in the foreground area. Forward oblique photos can be obtained at scales of from 1:500 to 1:10,000 in the foreground area. Very large-scale forward oblique missions are exceptional missions and are flown only when the intelligence value of the desired information justifies possible battle damage or aircraft loss.

- (e) *Color photography* or camouflage detection photography can be obtained of selected targets. It is susceptible of stereoscopic study and is furnished in scales of from 1: 2,000 to 1: 10,000.
- (f) *Damage assessment* photos of guided missile and selected artillery targets are susceptible of stereoscopic study and are normally furnished at a scale of 1: 6,000. Although field army requirements for damage assessment photos can often be consolidated with other requests for photography, some selected targets require high priority photo missions.

b. *Mapping (or Charting) Cover.* Mapping (or charting) photography is taken for the purpose of preparing or revising maps and charts. It is usually taken at much smaller scales than intelligence photography (e. g., 1:35,000 to 1:60,000) and cannot be used successfully to supplant intelligence photography.

#### **148. Mosaics**

A mosaic is an assemblage of two or more overlapping air photos to present a picture of a larger area than could be recorded on one photograph. There are three types of mosaics: controlled, uncontrolled, and strip.

a. A *controlled mosaic* is a mosaic laid on surveyed ground control to provide an accurate representation of distance and directions. A controlled mosaic can be made quite accurate if adequate control data exist, but preparation is slow and tedious.

b. An *uncontrolled mosaic* is a mosaic made without use of ground control points. In comparison with a controlled mosaic, preparation is quite rapid, but an uncontrolled mosaic is much less accurate.

c. A *strip mosaic* is a mosaic consisting of one series of air photos taken on a single flight. Depending on the time and the amount of control data available, a strip mosaic may be either controlled or uncontrolled.

#### **149. Production and Distribution**

a. In order to meet army requirements for intelligence photography, photo interpretation, and quantity reproduction of prints, an air reconnaissance support agency is located near an airstrip in proximity to field army headquarters. This facility is made up of the following components:

- (1) Reproduction and delivery unit.
- (2) Photo interpretation unit.
- (3) Photo library.

b. The Army Air Reconnaissance Support Agency is under the general staff supervision of G2, and under the operational control of G2 Air.

c. The primary function of the army G2 air is to produce and disseminate information and intelligence obtained or developed from tactical air reconnaissance units operating in support of the field army, and to maintain liaison between field army and air force reconnaissance units.

d. The army G2 air is provided support which has the following general capabilities:

- (1) Providing unified control and administration of army units and personnel working in conjunction with tactical air force reconnaissance units.
- (2) Interpreting, annotating, reproducing, and delivering air photos obtained by the tactical air force in support of army intelligence requirements.
- (3) Maintaining liaison with all reconnaissance elements of the tactical air force.
- (4) Obtaining and disseminating information from visual reconnaissance by elements of the tactical air force.

e. Two sets of photos and one set of negatives are normally delivered to army photo interpreters located with the TAF reconnaissance squadron which flew the mission. One set of prints is used by the immediate interpretation platoon for plotting; the other is used for concurrent immediate interpretation. After plotting is completed, the negatives are sent to the air photo reproduction and delivery unit. Disposition of the two sets of prints, is governed by standing operating procedure and depends upon operational requirements, type of mission, priority of mission, and other factors. Reports of enemy activity which will have an immediate effect upon the situation are transmitted to army G2 Air. Immediate reports, complete or partial, are rendered within a maximum of 2 hours after receipt of the photos. When partial reports have been rendered, additional reports follow until the sortie has been completely reported upon. Complete and partial immediate interpretation reports are transmitted or dispatched to the army G2 Air, to the headquarters having primary interest in the photo coverage, and to the photo interpretation unit.

- (1) The air photo reproduction and delivery unit, in the case of frontline cover, automatically prepares five prints from each negative. These five prints are the five sets of field army frontline cover which are distributed as shown in figure 11, columns 1 and 2.
- (2) Initial distribution of basic cover is as indicated in figure 11. The reproduction of five sets of prints is automatic; however, additional prints of both basic and frontline cover may be ordered as necessary.
- (3) The procedure for special cover is essentially the same as for frontline cover except that distribution is normally limited to

- the requesting unit and the number of prints reproduced and delivered is the number requested plus one. The extra set is retained at the army print library at the joint air photo center.
- (4) The needs of the requesting unit, the ability of the requesting unit to exploit the photographs, and the capabilities of reproduction agencies are the factors governing photo reproduction and distribution. If information of the enemy or of the terrain is sought, this information may be furnished the requesting unit orally or in written reports. Prints need not accompany reports when words will convey the information. Air photos have no inherent value. The *information* must be expedited. Similarly, prints alone should not be requested when qualified personnel are not available to utilize the prints, nor should an excessive number of prints be requested of subjects of immediate concern, since mass production of prints can delay the dissemination of information.

### **Section III. AIR PHOTO INTERPRETATION**

#### **150. General**

- a. Interpretation of air photos assists in determining the identity and physical characteristics of terrain features and of ground, sea, or air activity, including information on installations, strength, dispositions, and activities of the enemy.
- b. Detailed photo interpretation is accomplished by trained photo interpreters. Photo interpreters are able to interpret "indications" and discernable features associated with activities which themselves may be hidden.
- c. Interpretation of air photos taken at daily, weekly, or monthly intervals provides current information of enemy activities and installations. This "repetitive" or "routine" comparison is the principal basis of the intelligence produced from air photo interpretation (TM 30-246).

#### **151. Air Photo Interpreters**

- a. Photo interpreters attached to divisions and higher units, and not further attached to subordinate units, work as a part of the G2 Air branch of the G2 section. They are responsible for the following:
- (1) Interpretation of all air photos requested by the unit.
  - (2) Dissemination of interpretation reports.
  - (3) Preparation of mosaics and special studies.
  - (4) Briefing of reconnaissance units and patrols and furnishing of annotated photos of areas to be reconnoitered.
  - (5) Furnishing of reports and annotated photos to unit engineers on bridge and road conditions and fording or crossing sites.

(6) Verification and evaluation of information obtained from other intelligence sources.

*b.* The photo interpreters of a division headquarters are capable of interpreting an average of approximately 400 air photos (9 by 18 in., scale 1:8,000) per day. The preparation of mosaics, special studies, briefing of reconnaissance units, and patrols and verification of information developed by other sources, can be accomplished only at the expense of the indicated average interpretation capability. Moreover, the capabilities of individual photo interpreters may vary considerably from the average capability cited, dependent upon the skill of the individual, the quality of the prints, camouflage employed by the enemy, the interpreters' familiarity with the terrain, local working conditions, and the information required by the commander.

*c.* The photo interpreters attached to headquarters of division artillery and higher artillery echelons work as part of the artillery intelligence section. Their primary interest is in the location of artillery targets. Division artillery photo interpreters are capable of interpreting an average of approximately 140 photos per day (*b* above).

*d.* There is obvious overlap in the responsibilities of photo interpreters at successive echelons: division photo interpreters interpret all photos of the division zone to include photos requested by subordinate units; these same photos may have been interpreted by corps photo interpreters, and may have been interpreted also by army photo interpreters. Although there is some duplication of effort, the duplication is desirable as means of insuring that important evidence is not overlooked.

## **152. Photo-Intelligence Reports**

The system of photo-intelligence reporting has two primary purposes: first, to insure maximum exploitation of all air photo intelligence; second, to provide all recipients with the type information they want at the time it will be most useful to them.

*a. Form.* Photo-intelligence reports are issued in a variety of forms ranging from an oral summary on the telephone, to a series of volumes detailing the entire defense, communications, and terrain characteristics of a theater of operations. Reports are issued in the forms prescribed in FM 30-245 and SR 380-305-10. In addition to formal reports, photo intelligence is also disseminated by means of notes on a photograph or mosaic, or on overlays to photographs.

*b. Types.* Photo-intelligence reports are of six basic types:

- (1) *Flash reports.* Flash reports are made at the earliest possible time after the film or prints have been processed and are usually given a high priority for electrical transmission. Flash reports have no prescribed form and are transmitted direct to units concerned. They provide information on specific items contained in the air photo request (par. 134b(7)).

- (2) *Immediate reports.* The purpose of an immediate report is the same as that of the flash report. It is a written report prepared in addition to or in lieu of a flash report when a large distribution, a permanent record, or a written verification of a flash report is required. The immediate report has no prescribed form except for certain data which must be included in the heading or in a legend.
  - (3) *Mission review reports.*
    - (a) The mission review report has a prescribed form and is prepared on each air photo mission. It contains a summary of the intelligence on various installations, activities and areas photographed for the first time, or changes which have occurred since the last photo coverage.
    - (b) Mission review report is distributed to units who will not require further photo interpretation or who do not have trained photo interpreters. Mission review reports are prepared and published by the unit requesting the photo mission within 24 hours after receipt of the air photos. It can be used in the maintenance of target folders and in requesting reprints from selected negatives for annotation or special study.
  - (4) *Summary reports.* Summary reports consolidate information from earlier photo intelligence reports by category and time period, develop trends and patterns relative to targets covered, and describe the current status of the targets.
  - (5) *Detailed reports.* Detailed reports are normally restricted to one subject. They describe all important military aspects of the area which can be determined from the study of photos, in conjunction with intelligence from other sources and may have attached annotated prints, mosaics or a plot map. Detailed reports prepared in analytical form and accompanied by appropriate graphic material, represent the most exhaustive study of the subject possible under operational conditions.
  - (6) *Special reports.* Special reports are used when other types are inadequate, have no prescribed form and are usually lengthy. They present a thorough treatment of a subject or a related group of subjects and normally require considerable time for completion and publication.
- c. *Uses.* The principal uses of photo-intelligence reports are—
- (1) Prior to operations:
    - (a) Map compilation and correction.
    - (b) Studies of beaches.
    - (c) Terrain studies.
    - (d) Communications studies.
    - (e) Detailed enemy defense studies.
    - (f) Operational planning.
    - (g) Briefing assault troops.

(2) During operations:

- (a) Map correction.
- (b) Briefing reconnaissance units.
- (c) Locating hostile artillery.
- (d) Studies of enemy positions and strong points.
- (e) Terrain studies.
- (f) POW interrogation.
- (g) Information for trafficability maps.
- (h) Studies of enemy minefields, bivouac areas, command posts, and similar installations.
- (i) Information of fords, streams, and rivers.
- (j) Information of enemy supply movement.
- (k) Information relative to the tactical employment of our own forces; e. g., lines of departure, assembly areas, avenues of approach, and defiladed areas.
- (l) Selection of CP's and logistical installations.
- (m) Target acquisition and analysis, including atomic.
- (n) Post-strike analysis, including atomic.

#### **Section IV. PANORAMIC PHOTOGRAPHY**

##### **153. General**

Panoramic photos are taken from a dominant terrain feature and usually comprise a series of overlapping photographs. They are used as supplements to maps and air photos.

*a.* Panoramic photos can be used in—

- (1) Coordinating observation plans.
- (2) Planning and briefing reconnaissance units and patrols.
- (3) Orienting commanders and staffs or personnel or relieving units.
- (4) Coordinating fires of supporting weapons.

*b.* Panoramic photos are requested through intelligence channels and procured and processed by signal photographers. Requests should contain—

- (1) Limits of the area to be photographed.
- (2) Recommended camera position.
- (3) Date and time photos are to be made.
- (4) Number of prints desired.
- (5) Deadline for delivery of prints.
- (6) Place of delivery.

## CHAPTER 9

### COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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#### Section I. GENERAL

##### 154. Introduction

a. Intelligence is no less essential to the enemy than it is to us. The enemy, too, employs all available means to gain knowledge of our capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action, as well as of weather and terrain. Counterintelligence seeks to deny the enemy this knowledge, to deceive him, and also to prevent enemy espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and also to detect possible sedition or treason in our own forces.

b. Counterintelligence is a significant aspect of both strategic and combat intelligence. It is essential to successful application of two principles of war: *security* and *surprise*. It is necessary in peace, as well as during war.

##### 155. Definition

*Counterintelligence* consists of measures designed to conceal from the enemy our intentions and activities, and to neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities, to include sabotage and subversion. The measures employed may be *passive*, *active*, or *deceptive*.

##### 156. Counterintelligence Measures

a. *Passive counterintelligence measures* are those which seek to conceal information from the enemy. They include secrecy discipline, security of classified documents and materiel, signal communications security, movement control, censorship, camouflage, and the use of concealment.

b. *Active counterintelligence measures* are those which actively *block* the enemy's attempts to gain information, or the enemy's efforts to engage in sabotage or subversion. They include counterreconnaissance, counter-espionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, and the use of smoke against enemy observation.

c. *Deceptive counterintelligence measures* are those which seek to deceive or mislead the enemy. They include feints, demonstrations, ruses, construction of dummy positions, and the dissemination of false information.

##### 157. Responsibility

a. The commander is responsible for the planning and execution of counterintelligence measures within his command. G2 is charged with

general staff responsibility for the planning and direction of all counterintelligence measures *except* deception and counterpropaganda.

b. Deception planning and operations are general staff responsibilities of G3. However, G2 participates in deception planning and in the supervision of deception operations so far as they involve passive and active counterintelligence measures, and the dissemination of false information.

c. Counterpropaganda planning and operations are also primarily a G3 responsibility, inasmuch as they are principally concerned with psychological warfare and troop information, both of which are within G3's functions. G2 is, however, charged with estimating the effectiveness of both friendly and enemy psychological warfare operations, and with assisting in the planning and execution of defensive measures against enemy propaganda.

d. G2's responsibilities also include the supervision of activities pertaining to the detection of subversion and, with certain restrictions, the identification and apprehension of subverters.

### **158. Counterintelligence Operations**

a. *Categories.* In general, five categories of counterintelligence operations are conducted within a theater of operations. They are military security; civil security; port, frontier, and travel security; censorship; and special operations.

b. *Military Security.* Military security encompasses the measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, observation, subversion, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise. It includes passive, active, and deceptive counterintelligence measures within or directly pertaining to the Armed Forces and to specific military operations. Examples are—

- (1) Secrecy discipline.
- (2) Safeguarding of classified defense information and equipment.
- (3) Signal communications security.
- (4) Security of troop movements.
- (5) Security control of accredited correspondents.
- (6) Special handling of evaders and escapers.
- (7) Base and unit censorship.
- (8) Countersubversion within the Armed Forces.
- (9) Countersabotage.
- (10) Counterespionage.
- (11) Concealment and camouflage.
- (12) Counterreconnaissance.
- (13) Counterintelligence control of prohibited areas.
- (14) Special handling of prisoners of war.
- (15) Security control of friendly secret agents.
- (16) Security control of all relations with resistance groups operating in enemy territory.
- (17) Tactical measures, as required, in combat areas.

c. *Civil Security.* Civil security encompasses active and passive counter-



intelligence measures affecting the nonmilitary nationals of belligerent and nonbelligerent states permanently or temporarily residing under military jurisdiction. Such measures include the following:

- (1) Systematic registration of civilians, including neutrals and enemy aliens.
- (2) Control of circulation.
- (3) Curfew.
- (4) Censorship, *to include* monitoring of *postal*, radio and wire communications.
- (5) Surveillance of suspect political groups.
- (6) Security screening of labor.
- (7) Issuance of passes and permits.
- (8) Security control of immigration.
- (9) Control of international commerce, especially controls over trade with neutral states.
- (10) Surveillance of neutral diplomatic and consular officials and staffs.
- (11) Security activities of special police agencies.
- (12) Counterintelligence functions of civilian defense agencies.
- (13) Control of restricted areas.
- (14) Operation of interrogation and detention centers.
- (15) Control of refugees and displaced persons.
- (16) Counterpropaganda, civil population.
- (17) Industrial countersabotage and plant protection.

*d. Port, Frontier, and Travel Security.* Port, frontier, and travel security consists of the special application of military and civil security measures to the counterintelligence control of airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, coastlines, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of a theater of operations. Examples are—

- (1) Security control of seaports.
- (2) Security control of airports.
- (3) Establishment of frontier crossing points.
- (4) Security control of merchant seamen and crews of commercial aircraft.
- (5) Coastline and land frontier patrols.
- (6) Military travel permit system.
- (7) Security screening and control of frontaliers (legal daily frontier crossers).
- (8) Control of land, shore-leave, and fishing permits.
- (9) Countersabotage in yards, docks, and port installations and equipment.

*e. Censorship.* Censorship is surveillance over communications, such as correspondence, telephones, news dispatches, motion pictures, and radio broadcasts to prevent information of military value from reaching the enemy. It is accomplished by the systematic monitoring and examination of all communications, other than official matter. Byproducts of

censorship operations include the detection of illicit hostile activities and the collection of information for other intelligence purposes.

*f. Special Operations.* Special operations include the specialized employment of active and deceptive counterintelligence techniques and procedures in the conduct of secret operations against hostile and unfriendly intelligence organizations and activities. Examples of these operations are—

- (1) Compilation and dissemination of counterintelligence target data.
- (2) Operation of special interrogation centers for processing captured enemy agents.

## **159. Counterintelligence Agencies**

- a. (1) *The individual soldier* is the most important counterintelligence agency in the Army, but his value is largely dependent upon the training he receives in security, observing, and reporting. The success of camouflage and concealment, particularly, depends upon the cooperation of all participating troops. Additionally, the disclosure of military information to unauthorized persons can be avoided only through constant individual security consciousness.
- (2) The individual soldier is a lucrative source of information concerning enemy intelligence activities, particularly of subversion.
- (3) Prisoners of war are among the most lucrative sources of combat intelligence to both us and the enemy. However, their value to the enemy can be reduced by proper training in invasion, escape, resistance to interrogation, and adherence to the code of conduct.

b. *The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)* is the Army's counterintelligence specialist branch. CIC detachments are assigned to theater army as part of the Military Intelligence Organization and are attached to subordinate commands. They operate under the general staff supervision of G2. Their missions are to contribute to the success of the command to which attached through the detection of disaffection, sedition, treason, and subversion; by detecting and preventing espionage and sabotage; and by assisting in the security training of troops.

c. Subordinate units execute most counterintelligence measures; hence, the success of counterintelligence operations is largely dependent upon subordinates' understanding and efficiency.

d. Other army agencies, including the Army Security Agency, censorship units, military police, and civil affairs/military government have some special counterintelligence functions.

e. *Other federal agencies*, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State, together with their branch and local offices, perform certain counterintelligence functions.

## Section II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES

### 160. Introduction

a. *Counterintelligence procedures*, as distinguished from operations, are the means whereby the enemy's intelligence capabilities are estimated, plans are made to neutralize or destroy them, and instructions are issued to execute counterintelligence measures. Included in these broad fields are the minor procedures of reporting and recording indications of hostile intelligence capabilities, preparing worksheets from which plans are developed, and reporting and recording counterintelligence activities of the command.

b. Planning for the counterintelligence support of any operation is concurrent with the planning and conduct of the operation. It begins with the inception of the operation plan, and continues until the operation is completed.

c. Many counterintelligence measures are prescribed by standing operating procedures initiated during training and expanded during combat. However, not all appropriate counterintelligence measures can be taken from a checklist. The specific measures adopted in any situation are based on an estimate of the enemy's existing intelligence, sabotage, and subversive capabilities.

### 161. Counterintelligence Estimate

a. The purpose of a counterintelligence estimate is to determine the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, and subversive capabilities, and the relative probability of adoption of those particular causes of action. The estimate may also include a consideration of the effects of the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, and subversive activities on the accomplishment of our mission and on our counterintelligence operations.

b. A sound counterintelligence estimate is necessarily based on knowledge of the order of battle of the enemy intelligence service, and of enemy sabotage and subversive agencies. Of specific interest are organization, training, equipment, doctrine, techniques, and deployment of these agencies.

c. With minor modifications, the intelligence estimate form described in chapter 4 is suitable for a counterintelligence estimate. Appropriate modifications include deletion of the "Enemy vulnerabilities" paragraph, since vulnerabilities should be covered adequately in the intelligence estimate; and addition of a paragraph titled "Effects of enemy intelligence, sabotage, and subversive capabilities," to point up, specifically, counterintelligence measures which should be emphasized.

d. A counterintelligence estimate form and a sample corps counterintelligence estimate appear as appendix IX and X, respectively. However, written counterintelligence estimates are rare at division and corps; they are common at army and communications zone.

## **162. Counterintelligence Worksheet**

a. A counterintelligence worksheet, similar in form to an intelligence collection plan (ch. 6), is a useful aid to planning. Column entries are concerned with specific counterintelligence measures to be adopted to neutralize the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, or subversive activities in each category of counterintelligence operations, and with assignment of agencies to execute or supervise each measure. The worksheet is a basis for the counterintelligence plan.

b. A suggested form for a counterintelligence worksheet appears as appendix XI. A sample, partially completed counterintelligence worksheet appears as appendix XII.

## **163. Counterintelligence Orders and Requests**

a. Counterintelligence orders and requests may be published as paragraph 6 ("Counterintelligence") of the intelligence annex to an operation order, or as an appendix to the intelligence annex. In the latter case, the appendix is titled, "Counterintelligence Plan." At division and corps, paragraph 6 of the intelligence annex is the medium of dissemination most frequently employed.

b. Counterintelligence measures which are prescribed by standing operating procedure are not repeated in the plan, except for emphasis.

c. A form for a counterintelligence plan appears in appendix XVII.

## **Section III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

### **164. Division**

a. Counterintelligence operations at division and lower echelons are ordinarily concerned almost entirely with military security. Consequently, except in unusual operational situations, division counterintelligence measures are reduced to standing operating procedure (SOP). A division counterintelligence plan is rarely published; paragraph 6 of the intelligence annex is used to prescribe necessary changes from SOP, and to emphasize specific SOP measures.

b. CIC personnel are not organic to division headquarters and headquarters company; however, a CIC unit is attached to each division in a theater of operations. The counterintelligence branch of a division G2 section is organized with attached personnel, and the senior attached CIC officer usually is designated as the chief of branch.

c. In static combat situations, or other circumstances which require extraordinary attention by a division to civil security or other counterintelligence operations, theater army may attach additional CIC personnel to a division (AR 381-100).

### **165. Corps**

a. *Counterintelligence Operations.*

(1) Corps counterintelligence operations are primarily concerned

- with military security, although expansion of the field of interest is more frequent than is the case at division.
- (2) The counterintelligence branch of a corps G2 section is staffed by organic personnel, plus attached CIC personnel. In some circumstances, where the establishment of early and continuous counterintelligence surveillance is desired, theater Army CIC personnel may be attached to a corps and may remain in specified areas after the corps moves forward.
  - (3)
    - (a) Of the five categories of counterintelligence operations, military security usually receives the greatest emphasis. The larger the civil population in the corps zone of action and the slower the pace of the advance, the greater is the emphasis on civil security, frontier and travel security, and censorship; but these activities are directed primarily toward providing security for tactical operations. If port security activities and special operations are performed in the corps zone, these tasks ordinarily are executed by CIC personnel of higher echelons temporarily attached to the corps and remaining in the area as the corps moves forward.
    - (b) As is the case at the higher echelons, corps may reattach some of its CIC personnel to reinforce division personnel in order to begin the early seizure of counterintelligence targets, or to effect the transfer of areas of responsibility from division to corps at an earlier date. Such corps CIC personnel are preferably placed under the operational control of the division CIC units, rather than being attached to those units.
  - (4) The following duties are appropriately supervised by the corps counterintelligence branch, and performed by its attached CIC personnel:
    - (a) Conduct security checks in cooperation with other military units which are marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from enemy-occupied territory.
    - (b) Contact local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the American cause in order to secure all possible counterintelligence information.
    - (c) Recommend measures in securing against sabotage all public and private installations whose continued operation is considered desirable by U. S. forces.
    - (d) Check upon the enforcement of all security measures and recommend remedial action, when necessary, to the G2.
    - (e) Assist in the discovery and confiscation of any hidden armaments, equipment, or contraband which were not surrendered or reported in accordance with proclamations or orders. CIC personnel will not be responsible for the custody or ultimate disposition of these items.

- (f) Seize signal communications centers and arrange for their protection against sabotage until taken over by authorized army agencies as provided in operation orders.
- (g) Seize and impound all captured mail and arrange for its protection until delivered to civil censorship personnel.
- (h) Stop publication of newspapers and other periodicals pending the arrival of military censorship teams.
- (i) Recommend and supervise measures necessary to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and materiel by our troops.
- (j) Seize and begin exploitation of counterintelligence targets and arrange for their continuing security. Foremost of such targets are—
  - 1. Known and suspected enemy agents.
  - 2. Known enemy collaborators, sympathizers, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of US forces.
  - 3. Installations formerly occupied by enemy intelligence services or enemy police organizations and any documents they contain.
  - 4. Installations of local para-military organizations, collaborators, and their records.
  - 5. Centers of communication.
  - 6. Buildings, billets, and installations known or suspected to contain documents of intelligence or counterintelligence value.
- (5) (a) The counterintelligence branch of a corps G2 section both plans and supervises. In both activities it maintains close contact with the combat intelligence branch. It furnishes the latter with information obtained in the course of counterintelligence operations, requests for counterintelligence EEI, material for ISUM's and PERINTROP's, and assistance in intelligence planning for future operations. In turn the combat intelligence branch furnishes the counterintelligence branch with information of counterintelligence value, such as answers to counterintelligence EEI, and information on such counterintelligence targets as headquarters of hostile intelligence agencies or subversive groups, and personnel known or suspected to be collaborators, saboteurs, or espionage agents.
- (b) Counterintelligence operations and investigations frequently result in gaining possession of documents which are not of counterintelligence interest, and in apprehending persons who possess information of intelligence value. Such persons and documents are delivered to the appropriate agencies for exploitation.

- (c) Operations connected with the civil population are, insofar as possible, conducted through appropriate military government agencies.
- (d) The counterintelligence branch is best located near the combat intelligence branch. The CIC unit itself is normally located away from, but reasonably near, the headquarters proper. For additional details, see AR 381-100.

*b. Counterintelligence Procedures.*

- (1) The forms for the counterintelligence estimate, the counterintelligence worksheet, and the counterintelligence plan which appear as appendixes IX, and XII are suitable for use at corps. Minor modifications are indicated by corps' lack of territorial and administrative responsibility.
- (2) Reports of counterintelligence activities by CIC units subordinate to the corps are of prime importance. Divisional reports are usually contained in paragraph 4 of their PERINTREP's, ISUM's, spot reports, or special messages. CIC reports are usually forwarded as spot reports, daily reports, weekly summaries, and such special summaries as may be required. An appropriate form for a CIC daily report appears in appendix XIII.

## **166. Army**

*a. Counterintelligence Operations.*

- (1) Counterintelligence operations of the field army are conducted in the same manner as those of lower units. Activities are broader in scope and, with army's territorial responsibility, more intensified in the categories of civil security and special operations. Army not only applies its controls for tactical purposes, but also commences the territorial control of the area with a view to later transfer of its responsibilities to the communications zone.
- (2) Theater and communications zone CIC personnel may be temporarily attached to army to assist in counterintelligence operations and to provide for continuity of control when communications zone assumes responsibility for territory formerly part of the army services area. Port, frontier, and travel security operations are normally under theater control and are carried out by theater units assisted by Navy and Air Force personnel.

*b. Counterintelligence Procedures.* The forms and reports used at division and corps are also applicable at army.

## **167. Army Group**

*a. Counterintelligence Operations.* Army group has no territorial responsibility and conducts only such counterintelligence operations as apply to army group headquarters. These operations are generally limited to military and civil security. Normally, they are performed by CIC per-

sonnel obtained from the theater CIC detachment since the counterintelligence operations of an army group ordinarily do not justify the attachment of a CIC detachment.

*b. Counterintelligence Procedures.*

- (1) The counterintelligence procedures of army group are comparable to those of corps, army group planning for, and direction of, the counterintelligence operations of its armies has the same broad aspects characteristic of other army group planning, direction and supervision.
- (2) The counterintelligence estimate and the counterintelligence plan previously described are readily adaptable for use by army group. Plans are kept general in nature and include broad policy statements so that when they are made effective the operations of the armies will not be unduly restricted. Coordination is army group's primary interest; hence in its counterintelligence plans this aspect must be stressed.
- (3) In both the estimate and the plan, the major emphasis is placed on security of military operations, and involves consideration of those enemy activities which threaten military security and the civil and military security measures to provide it. Censorship, special operations, and port, frontier, and travel security have more to do with territorial administration than with operations. As a consequence, they do not figure largely in the counterintelligence procedures of army group. Still, although army group delegates its territorial responsibility to its armies, it does not divert itself of its obligation to insure that the area is adequately controlled.

## **168. Communications Zone Counterintelligence**

*a. General.* Counterintelligence occupies a place of major importance in communications zone intelligence operations. Not only is it essential in the execution of the territorial responsibilities with which communications zone is charged, but it is also vital in protecting the stocks of supplies, the service installations, and the means of transport and communication on which the success of combat operations may depend. It covers many matters ranging from the attitude of the civilian population for or against the US or Allied forces to the breaking up of a ring of saboteurs. Its success depends on effective planning, proper use of CIC personnel, and prompt reporting of security violations and seizure of violators when necessary. Immediate recommendations are made to the commander by the intelligence officer for action in cases beyond the latter's authority. Although the scope and emphasis varies, counterintelligence operations in the communications zone are no different from those at other headquarters. The procedures are essentially the same as those at tactical headquarters.

*b. Counterintelligence Operations.* In communications zone counterintelli-



gence operations, more emphasis is placed on civil security; port, frontier, and travel security; and censorship than in the combat zone.

- (1) The production of intelligence for counterintelligence purposes is primarily a matter of ascertaining in detail the capabilities of the hostile intelligence system, including the enemy's ability to execute acts of sabotage and subversion. To determine and thwart the enemy's attempts at espionage, sabotage, and subversion, the first essential is information leading to correct assessment of his capabilities in those fields; the second essential is providing the personnel and means to neutralize or destroy these activities. The information and consequent intelligence is of the following general type:
  - (a) Identity of hostile agents, as individuals or groups.
  - (b) Hostile communication equipment or sabotage devices.
  - (c) Methods of entry of agents into area.
  - (d) Repeated incidents of sabotage indicating a planned pattern.
  - (e) Evidence of subversion or espionage.
- (2) Communications zone counterintelligence operations are relatively static. The CIC detachments normally assume control of an area, city, town, or installation and remain there as long as their services are required. They thus acquire as individuals and as a unit a thorough familiarity with the area and its inhabitants.
- (3) Considering the huge stocks of supplies and the sizable service installations of communications zone and the attendant vulnerability to sabotage, any inexplicable accidents, whether in series or not, should be considered sabotage. Strict surveillance must be maintained over the military or civil population connected with these accidents in any causative or contributory way.
- (4) Since the communications zone is charged with the security of marshalling areas for airborne and amphibious operations, special measures must be taken to insure that no part of the counterintelligence coverage of these areas falls on the combat troops involved, other than local security of the units.
- (5) In addition to its responsibility to supervise unit censorship of assigned and transient service and combat units, communications zone must normally plan, control, and supervise the operations of area censorship.
- (6) Countersubversion and the detection of sedition and treason among civilian employees of the army and the military personnel of communications zone is an important activity. This applies particularly to the military personnel who are more exposed to subversive influence since they remain for a considerable time in one place and in contact with the civil population. Suspected and potentially subversive military and civilian personnel must be closely watched, and investigated and apprehended if such

action is warranted. Military personnel believed to be disaffected are assigned to nonsensitive positions, until proof of their disaffection is obtained and they are apprehended.

*c. Counterintelligence Procedures.* The forms and reports described in section II are, with appropriate minor modifications, applicable at communications zone.

### **169. Theater Army Counterintelligence**

*a.* Theater army delegates its territorial responsibilities to the field armies and to communications zone. In so doing, theater army removes itself almost entirely from operational counterintelligence. Except for providing security for the theater army headquarters, counterintelligence activities are confined to the coordination and supervision of the operations of subordinate commands in their carrying out of plans and policies, and to administrative control of all CIC personnel assigned to the theater.

*b.* The coordination of counterintelligence operations is a matter of planning, supervising, and providing guidance and assistance. Essentially, it is assured by—

- (1) Amplifying, when necessary, the policy statements and directives of the theater.
- (2) Planning for and supervising the assumption of counterintelligence control of army rear areas by communications zone. Usually coordination is made more effective by direct contact between the armies and the advance section of communications zone on counterintelligence matters.
- (3) Supervising the activities of subordinate commands to insure complete counterintelligence coverage.
- (4) Planning for, procuring, and—when necessary—training additional CIC personnel.

## CHAPTER 10

### INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

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#### Section I. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

##### 170. General

*a.* Few military intelligence personnel are organic to tactical units. In general, centrally trained military intelligence specialists are assigned to theater army, and are attached as necessary to subordinate units.

*b.* When attached, military intelligence units and personnel remain under the command and administrative control of the superior military intelligence unit to which assigned. However, attached military intelligence personnel man various branches of the G2 section of the command to which attached and work under the direction and supervision of the G2 or designated branch chief, in much the same manner that members of the command's organic headquarters company work as members of the various staff sections, but still remain under the command and administrative control of the headquarters company commander.

*c.* Military intelligence units are activated concurrently with the military commands which they are to support and, except for linguist element are habitually attached early in the unit training phase. Linguists ordinarily join at ports of embarkation. Military intelligence units remain attached to the command with which they trained, and displace with that command.

##### 171. Theater Army Responsibilities

Under the direction of the theater army G2, the theater army military intelligence unit headquarters is responsible for:

*a.* Supervision of all military intelligence units within theater army, including those attached to subordinate commands.

*b.* Insuring procurement of qualified intelligence specialists and related personnel for the theater army.

*c.* Training and retraining of military intelligence specialists and related personnel.

*d.* Establishment of doctrinal and operational policies relating to military intelligence.

*e.* Operation and control of an adequate number of augmentation units.

*f.* Liaison with military establishments of friendly and allied nations in matters pertaining to the employment of U. S. military intelligence units serving with those forces.

*g.* Implementation of organization and logistical policies as established

by the theater army commander, for all operating military intelligence units within the theater army.

*h.* Conduct of inspections and the making of appropriate recommendations to the theater army commander, on matters pertaining to certain classified intelligence operations within the theater army.

## **172. Military Intelligence Units**

*a.* The various military intelligence units are composite organizations designed to provide intelligence support to a specific type command, or to render other specific support.

*b.* Component elements of typical military intelligence units provide G2 with specialized assistance in such fields as: order of battle, photo interpretation, counterintelligence, interrogation of prisoners of war, field operations intelligence, censorship, technical intelligence, documents translation, interpretation, and strategic intelligence research and analysis.

*c.* For detailed composition of specific units, see appropriate TOE.

## **Section II. STAFF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS**

### **173. General**

*a.* There is no prescribed organization for the intelligence section at any echelon of command. The mission of the intelligence section, the scope of activities to be performed, the qualifications and allocations of personnel, as well as the personal preferences of the G2, the chief of staff, and the commander will determine the specific organization established in each case. The following paragraphs describe recommended intelligence section organizations which are readily adaptable to individual requirements.

*b.* The general missions of an intelligence section are—

- (1) To plan and direct the collection effort, collect and process information, and disseminate information and intelligence.
- (2) To plan and direct the execution of counterintelligence measures.
- (3) To plan and supervise the intelligence training of the entire command.

*c.* The scope of activities to be performed ordinarily dictates the establishment of a *functional* organization, with specific responsibilities being charged to major subdivisions of the section.

- (1) At army group and lower echelons, major subdivisions of the intelligence section are called "branches." At theater army and communications zone, intelligence personnel may be organized as an "intelligence division," with the major subdivisions being called "branches."
- (2) Organization is also influenced by the necessity for 24-hour operation of one or more major subdivisions of the G2 section during combat. In the subdivisions affected, personnel are

organized as duty teams, and during certain periods of the day may be supplemented by personnel who ordinarily serve with other subdivisions.

- (3) It is essential that the organization be such as to release the G2 from the detailed supervision of the operation of his section. It must function during the G2's absence, and also must leave him free to analyze objectively the intelligence his section produces, and to draw sound conclusions therefrom. Consequently, the detailed operation of the section is preferably charged to the assistant G2 at division, and to the G2 executive at higher echelons.
- (4) In all intelligence sections from division up, the G2, assistant G2, or other qualified officer assigned to the G2 section, functions as an atomic target analyst, as required.

*d.* Intelligence sections (divisions) are integrated organizations comprising both organic and attached (MIO) personnel.


#### **174. Division G2 Section**

*a.* A typical division intelligence section organization is shown in figure 12.

*b.* Executive functions within the section are performed by an assistant G2 assigned to the division staff, who may serve in addition as chief of the combat intelligence branch. The chief of the counterintelligence branch is normally the senior attached CIC officer.

*c.* Duties within the G2 section are usually assigned as follows:

- (1) Assistant G2 (or G2).
  - (a) Prepare the intelligence and counterintelligence planning program schedule, or timetable for each projected operation.
  - (b) Coordinate and direct the dissemination of intelligence to the commander and all other interested staff sections and headquarters.
  - (c) Inform the section of the plans, planning progress, and activities of other staff sections and the concepts and desires of the commander.
  - (d) Coordinate formally with other staff sections.
  - (e) Assign and reassign personnel and tasks within the section.
  - (f) Supervise the training and operations of all personnel assigned or attached.
  - (g) Plan and supervise, in coordination with G3, the intelligence and counterintelligence training of all troops in the division.
- (2) Administrative branch.
  - (a) Operate the section message center.
  - (b) Maintain the section journal.
  - (c) Distribute all section reports and publications.
  - (d) Circulate appropriate documents and disseminate all information from other staff sections and other headquarters.



#### LEGEND

- Opn control.
- - - Coordination.

Figure 12. Typical organization division G2 section.

- (e) Maintain central files and records.
- (f) Prepare all section personnel reports.
- (g) Prepare duty rosters and staff visit roster.
- (h) Receive or transmit, register, handle, and file classified documents.
- (i) Supervise moving of G2 section and arrange with headquarters commandant for transportation allocation of space in new area.
- (j) Prepare and issue credentials and passes for intelligence personnel.
- (k) Supervise the G2 section's transportation.
- (l) Arrange for receiving and administering intelligence liaison personnel.

- (3) Combat intelligence branch.
  - (a) Provide for collection of information, process information received and disseminate resultant intelligence.
  - (b) Maintain enemy situation map and G2 worksheet.
  - (c) Prepare intelligence estimates, plans, annexes, and summaries. Indicate parts of these documents to be prepared by other branches and consolidate results of their work.
  - (d) Prepare tactical studies of the weather and terrain, with assistance of G2 Air and engineer.
  - (e) Maintain enemy situation maps, and other intelligence documents in the war room and conduct briefings on enemy situation and area of operations.
  - (f) Conduct research and planning for future operations.
  - (g) Arrange intelligence liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters.
  - (h) Prepare daily journal summary and furnish to administrative branch for entry as last item in journal.
  - (i) Prepare appropriate portions of command report.
  - (j) Edit, consolidate, and produce intelligence reports to be disseminated. Coordinate preparation of periodic intelligence reports.
  - (k) Coordinate dissemination of weather information.
  - (l) Direct the operations of field operations intelligence personnel.
  - (m) Order of battle analysts—
    - 1. Maintain order of battle records and files.
    - 2. Evaluate and interpret information received on enemy order of battle.
    - 3. Keep order of battle map current.
    - 4. Prepare order of battle studies and summaries as required.
  - (n) Translators: Translate documents of intelligence value.
  - (o) Prisoner of War Interrogators—
    - 1. Interrogate prisoners of war and enemy civilians.
    - 2. Prepare interrogation prisoner of war reports.
- (4) G2 Air Branch.
  - (a) Prepare reconnaissance plans for air and ground agencies organic to or supporting the division.
  - (b) Receive, screen, consolidate and establish priorities on requests for air reconnaissance.
  - (c) Prepares specific directives and requests for reconnaissance.
  - (d) Forward planned air reconnaissance requests to corps and immediate requests to the supporting service coordinating agency.
  - (e) Forward planned and immediate requests to organic air reconnaissance agencies.
  - (f) Coordinate air photo reproduction with signal photo officer.
  - (g) Supervise operations of photo interpreters.

- (h) Supervise air photo procurement and distribution within the command.
- (i) Supervise the procurement and distribution of maps and map supplements.
- (j) Arrange for the briefing and interrogation of division pilots and air observers.
- (k) Disseminate, in coordination with combat intelligence branch, information obtained from air reconnaissance.
- (l) Prepare town plans and defense overprints with assistance of the engineer.
- (m) Assist in the preparation of tactical studies of weather and terrain.
- (n) Monitor air reconnaissance broadcasts of supporting services.
- (o) Maintain air reconnaissance maps and essential records.
- (5) Counterintelligence branch.
  - (a) Recommend counterintelligence policy.
  - (b) Prepare counterintelligence estimates, plans, directives, and reports.
  - (c) Supervise measures for counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion.
  - (d) Coordinate operations with higher, lower, and adjacent counterintelligence teams.
  - (e) Check internal security of headquarters.
  - (f) Coordinate censorship operations.
  - (g) Recommend program and supervise counterintelligence training.
  - (h) Interrogate friendly and enemy civilians.
  - (i) Maintain record of enemy agents and collaborators.


d. Desirably, the G2 section is located adjacent to, or even integrated with the G3 section, in order to facilitate coordination and joint use of situation maps and of some personnel (e. g. operations assistants (draftsmen) and stenographers). A typical section arrangement is shown in figure 13. An integrated G2-G3 arrangement, utilizing command post tents, is shown in figure 14.

## **175. Corps G2 Section**

a. The corps G2 section is normally organized into five branches, each corresponding to one of the principal intelligence functions of the corps G2. These branches are combat intelligence, counterintelligence, G2 air, miscellaneous, and administrative.

b. Duties are apportioned among the several branches approximately the same as in a division G2 section, except for a shift to the miscellaneous branch of certain duties which are performed, principally, by the combat intelligence branch in a division G2 section. Specifically, the corps G2 section's miscellaneous branch is usually assigned the following duties:





Notes: Photo interpreters in separate room or tent.  
 POW interrogators located adjacent to div POW encl.  
 CIC and FOI personnel located away from div HQ area.

Figure 13. Typical arrangement, division G2 section.

- (1) Determine adequacy of military intelligence specialists and make recommendations for their employment, including allotment to subordinate units. Inspect activities as required.
- (2) Supervise operation of prisoner of war interrogators at corps prisoner of war cage, medical installations, and civil police establishments.
- (3) Establish liaison with division POW collecting point.
- (4) Conduct interrogations of prisoners of war, civilians, refugees, and internees.
- (5) Translate and process all captured documents and deliver information derived therefrom to combat intelligence branch.
- (6) Provide interpreters to commander and staff as required.
- (7) Plan and supervise evasion and escape training, in coordination with G3.
- (8) Establish liaison with technical services on employment of technical service intelligence detachments.
- (9) Assist in planning for future operations.
- (10) Determine requirements for intelligence funds and inform administrative branch.
- (11) Coordinate activities of field operations intelligence detachments.

c. The Corps G2 Air Branch performs duties listed for the division G2 air (par. 157c(4)) with the following additions:

- (1) Prepare and disseminate intelligence target plans.
- (2) Maintain intelligence target folders.
- (3) Analyze and recommend targets to G3.




Figure 14. Integrated G2-G3 section, type arrangement.

- (4) Supervise target damage assessment.
- (5) Determine weather service support requirements in conjunction with the staff weather officer and the corps artillery commander.
- (6) Plan and coordinate movement and employment of Army air reconnaissance support agencies.
- (7) Supervise unit training in air observation, photo interpretation, uses of weather information and G2 air operations.

## 176. Army G2 Section

a. An army G2 section organization differs little from the organization of a corps G2 section; however, there is marked difference in the scope of intelligence operations performed at corps and army. Army planning and operational responsibilities, which include administration and logistics, are much greater than those of a corps. Additionally, army G2 has a much greater lead-time requirement, and must produce considerably more information and intelligence.

b. Similarly, although there is marked difference in scope and complexity the functions of the executive and the various branches of the army G2 section are parallel to those of corresponding branches at corps, with the addition of the functions listed in (1) through (3) below:

- (1) *Combat intelligence branch.*
  - (a) Plan for employment and supervise activities of field operations intelligence personnel attached to or controlled by army.
  - (b) To a limited extent, collect and process strategic information and disseminate strategic intelligence.
  - (c) To a limited extent, prepare strategic intelligence studies and estimates.
- (2) *Counterintelligence branch.* Supervise army counterintelligence interrogation center, when established.
- (3) *G2 air branch.*
  - (a) Analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of the air reconnaissance support system.
  - (b) Determine requirements for reconnaissance support and battlefield surveillance.
  - (c) Coordinate air reconnaissance requirements and plans with appropriate agencies of the Army and supporting services.
  - (d) Coordinate with G3 in the preparation of the interdiction program.
  - (e) Coordinate the logistical support of Army air reconnaissance support elements with other services.
  - (f) Determine communications requirements to support reconnaissance operations.
  - (g) Prepare intelligence summaries for ground liaison officer.
  - (h) Coordinate the exchange of intelligence between the Army and supporting services.

- (i) Provide representation and supervise operations of G2 air personnel with coordination agencies of supporting services; supervises G2 air operations at lower echelons.
- (j) Provide staff supervision over operations of ARS agency.

### **177. Army Group G2 Section**

The army group G2 section parallels the corps and army sections in organization and functions; however, there are variations in personnel strengths of the branches of the G2 section. Such variations are occasioned mainly by the following:

- (1) Army group delegates territorial responsibility to the armies under its command. An immediate effect of this to the elimination of a requirement for personnel concerned with counter-intelligence control of the civil populace.
- (2) Few prisoners of war are interrogated at army group.
- (3) Army group usually delegates control of clandestine operations to the armies.

### **178. Communications Zone Intelligence Division**

*a. General.* The intelligence responsibilities of an administrative commander are essentially the same as those of a tactical commander, but there is marked difference in the emphasis on various functions. Because of the communications zone commander's territorial and administrative responsibilities, intelligence officers of the communications zone and its subordinate sections are concerned primarily with intelligence functions which pertain to control of territory and the provision of administrative support to combat units. The change in emphasis on functions is reflected in the organization of the intelligence divisions of communications zone headquarters. However, the specific functions and detailed organization of the communications zone intelligence division depend on the mission of the communications zone, the location and command structure of the theater, and the personalities of the senior commanders.

#### *b. Organization.*

- (1) A type organization for the intelligence division of communications zone headquarters is shown in figure 15.
- (2) The organization chart shows a separate censorship branch and a separate technical intelligence branch. The communications zone commander's responsibilities for censorship and the production of technical intelligence are so great as to warrant organization of separate branches to execute them.

*c. Functions.* Appropriate functions for the subdivisions of the intelligence division are as follows:

#### *(1) Intelligence officer and executive.*

- (a) Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the intelligence division and its branches.




Figure 15. Type organization, communications zone intelligence division.

- (b) Prepare an intelligence planning schedule for each phase of operations.
- (c) Direct and coordinate the dissemination of intelligence to the commander, other staff divisions, and higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters.
- (d) Coordinate formally with other staff divisions. (This does not preclude informal coordination by G2 action officers with other staff divisions.)
- (e) Assign and reassign personnel and tasks within the division.
- (f) Request procurement and direct the allocation and employment of military intelligence specialists.
- (g) In coordination with the operations officer, plan and supervise the training and operations of all intelligence personnel assigned or attached to the communications zone and its subordinate commands.
- (h) Plan and supervise, in coordination with G3, the intelligence training of all troops assigned to the communications zone.

(2) *Counterintelligence branch.*

(a) *Chief, counterintelligence branch.*

1. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the branch.
2. Recommend counterintelligence policy, based on recommendations of the sections.
3. Prepare consolidated counterintelligence estimates, plans, directives, and reports.
4. Recommend augmentation of CIC detachments when necessary.
5. Procure, distribute, and in conjunction with administrative branch maintain records of counterintelligence funds, special equipment, and supplies.
6. Provide staff supervision and control of operations of CIC detachments, including inspection of operation plans.

(b) *Military security section.*

1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports for all matters pertaining to military security.
2. Recommend military security policy.
3. Supervise and coordinate military security activities throughout communications zone.
4. Recommend program and supervise counterintelligence training of transient units, and units of the communications zone.
5. With respect to military security, recommend policies and plans for assumption of counterintelligence control of army rear areas.

(c) *Civil security section.*

1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports for all matters pertaining to civil security.
2. Recommend civil security policy.
3. Supervise and coordinate civil security activities throughout communications zone.
4. Interrogate friendly and enemy civilians.
5. Maintain records of enemy agents and collaborators.
6. With respect to civil security, recommend policies and make plans for assumption of counterintelligence control of army rear areas.
7. Establish liaison, through the administrative branch, with military government, military police, indigenous authorities, and others, for circulation control and other counterintelligence activities within communications zone.

(d) *Port, frontier, and travel security section.*

1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports on all matters pertaining to port, frontier, and travel security.
2. Recommend port, frontier, and travel security policy.

3. Supervise and coordinate port, frontier, and travel security policy.
  4. Coordinate with Navy and Air Force on security of sea frontiers, seaports, and airports.
- (e) *Special operations section.*
1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports for all matters pertaining to special counterintelligence operations.
  2. Supervise and coordinate special counterintelligence operations throughout communications zone.
  3. Determine requirements for, procure, and employ special counterintelligence units and agents.
  4. Determine requirements for, procure, and issue special counterintelligence funds, equipment, and supplies.
  5. Establish and operate special interrogation centers, if required.
  6. Plan for and supervise the execution of intelligence security throughout the communications zone.
- (3) *Censorship branch.*
- (a) *Chief, censorship branch.*
1. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the branch.
  2. Recommend censorship policy.
  3. Prepare consolidated estimates, plans, directives, and reports.
  4. Recommend procurement and employment of censorship units.
  5. Direct and supervise preparation of appropriate parts of periodic intelligence reports.
- (b) *Civil censorship section.*
1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports on all matters pertaining to civil censorship in the communications zone.
  2. Recommend civil censorship policy.
  3. Supervise and coordinate civil censorship activities in the communications zone.
  4. Determine requirements for and recommend procurement and employment of civil censorship units.
  5. Control and supervise operations of civil censorship units attached to communications zone.
  6. Maintain general and special watch lists.
- (c) *Military censorship section.*
1. Perform same functions as civil censorship section with respect to military censorship.
  2. Insure compliance with military censorship regulations by subordinate units.
  3. Coordinate with provost marshal on employment of prisoner of war censorship units.

4. Plan for and supervise censorship training of all communications zone and transient personnel, and of unit and area censors.
  5. Maintain general and special watch lists.
- (4) *Intelligence branch.*
- (a) *Chief, intelligence branch.*
    1. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the branch.
    2. Determine requirements for and recommend procurement and employment of military intelligence specialists.
    3. Direct and supervise the preparation of appropriate parts of periodic intelligence reports.
  - (b) *Plans section.* Prepare and coordinate as necessary such operational intelligence plans as may be directed by the chief, intelligence branch.
  - (c) *Operations section.*
    1. Provide for collection of information, process information, and disseminate resultant intelligence.
    2. Maintain G2 situation map and worksheet.
    3. Prepare terrain studies, town plans, and special studies of potential sites of service and supply installations (in coordination with special staff sections concerned).
    4. In the event of tactical operations in communications zone, maintain intelligence maps and documents in the war room and conduct intelligence briefings for the commander and staff.
    5. Detail attached interpreters as required.
    6. Exploit captured documents for intelligence required by communications zone.
- (5) *Technical intelligence branch.*
- (a) Plan for and exercise general staff supervision of the exploitation of captured materiel by technical service intelligence personnel.
  - (b) Assist technical service intelligence personnel in accordance with their mission and capabilities.
  - (c) Prepare technical intelligence summaries and reports.
  - (d) Disseminate technical intelligence to likely users.
  - (e) Maintain inventory records and data on exploited materiel.
  - (f) Prepare and publish critical-item lists to establish priorities for the exploitation of materiel.
- (6) *Administrative branch.*
- (a) *Chief, administrative branch.*
    1. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the branch.
    2. Recommend intelligence administrative policy for communications zone.
    3. Prepare duty and staff visit roster for entire intelligence division.



(b) *Message center.*

1. Receive or dispatch, and record, all messages, and documents pamphlets, books, etc., entering or leaving the intelligence division.
2. Maintain the division journal and journal file.
3. Provide intradivision messenger service.
4. Examine all incoming material, determine the proper recipients for action or information, and make prompt delivery.

(c) *Library and central files.*

1. Maintain library of intelligence books, pamphlets, and other source and reference material for use of the intelligence division.
2. Maintain central files and records.
3. Establish TOP SECRET control procedures for the intelligence division.
4. Coordinate with adjutant general on TOP SECRET control for the communications zone headquarters.

(d) *Personnel, supply, and fiscal section.*

1. Determine requirements for, procure, distribute, and document intelligence personnel, supplies, and funds. Coordinate with other sections and branches.
2. Coordinate with finance officer on intelligence funds.
3. Determine requirements for, procure, and issue all office supplies and equipment for the intelligence division.
4. Assign office space and perform housekeeping tasks for the intelligence division.
5. In coordination with the headquarters commandant, arrange for quartering of personnel, mess facilities, displacement of the division, and similar matters.
6. Prepare, in coordination with other sections and branches, all personnel reports for the intelligence division.

(e) *Publications section.*

1. Reproduce all intelligence division publications and make bulk distribution. (Arrange with adjutant general, engineer, and signal officer for reproduction of material to be printed.)
2. Edit and assemble, in coordination with other sections and branches, the reports, summaries, and other documents prepared by the intelligence division.
3. Maintain a typing pool for the intelligence division.

(f) *Liaison section.*

1. Coordinate activities of intelligence liaison personnel.
2. Provide liaison officers as desired by the intelligence division to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters.
3. Provide signal communications, transportation, and similar requirements for liaison officers.

4. Prepare reports of liaison activities and distribute to interested agencies.
5. Assist other branches in the supervision of communications zone intelligence activities.
6. Receive, direct, and assist liaison officers from other headquarters.

### 179. Theater Army Intelligence Division

a. Theater army headquarters is engaged primarily in the coordination and supervision of the execution of operational, logistical, and territorial responsibilities which have been delegated to subordinate elements. Accordingly, the theater army intelligence division decentralizes intelligence and counterintelligence operations to subordinate commands of theater army. Thus, the organization of the theater army intelligence division provides a functional grouping which facilitates coordination with theater headquarters and also provides for planning, coordinating, and supervising the intelligence and counterintelligence operations of subordinate commands. Figure 16 is a guide to the organization of the theater army intelligence division.




Figure 16. Type organization, theater army intelligence division.

b. Assignment of functions which may be appropriate is described in the paragraphs which follow. However, in many cases the indicated functions may be delegated in their entirety to the communications zone, or may be assumed by theater headquarters.

(1) *Deputies.*

- (a) Represent the G2 as directed, and in his absence.
- (b) Assist the G2 in the coordination of intelligence planning and production, and in the control of intelligence operations.
- (c) Assist the G2 in the direction, supervision, and control of the planning, administrative, and operational activities of the intelligence division.

(2) *Executive.*

- (a) Direct the staff management of the intelligence division, to include preparation of planning programs.
- (b) Recommend policies for intelligence training within the theater army.
- (c) Direct and supervise the operations of the theater army military intelligence organization.
- (d) Determine requirements for and recommend procurement and allocation of military intelligence specialists.

(3) *Operational intelligence branch.*

(a) *Branch chief.*

- 1. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the branch.
- 2. Recommend operational intelligence policies, based on the recommendations of the sections.
- 3. Recommend intelligence training objectives and policies based on recommendations of sections.

(b) *Strategic and combat intelligence section.*

- 1. Prepare intelligence estimates, plans, annexes, summaries, and reports. Indicate parts of these to be prepared by other sections and branches, and coordinate the results of their work.
- 2. Provide for the collection of strategic and combat information, process the information received, and disseminate the resultant intelligence. Coordinate with scientific and technical section.
- 3. Recommend and, upon approval, place in effect broad policies governing responsibilities, functions, and procedures relative to operational intelligence within the theater army.
- 4. Prepare, with the assistance of the reconnaissance and mapping group, and disseminate terrain, hydrographic, and weather studies and strategic studies of the theater army area. Arrange for preparation of technical terrain analyses by the theater army engineer.
- 5. Recommend intelligence training objectives and policies and provide staff supervision for such training.

(c) *Order of battle section.*

1. Provide order of battle information and intelligence.
2. Recommend theater army order of battle policies.
3. Recommend order of battle training objectives and policies and provide staff supervision for such training.

(d) *Interrogation section.*

1. Plan for, supervise, and coordinate the interrogation of prisoner of war and civilian refugees throughout the theater army.
2. Recommend broad interrogation policies.
3. Control interrogation agencies not assigned or attached to subordinate echelons.
4. Operate the theater army interrogation center.
5. Process information obtained through interrogation and disseminate the resultant intelligence, in coordination with strategic and combat intelligence section.
6. Recommend interrogation training objectives and policies and provide staff supervision for such training.

(e) *Documents section.*

1. Plan, supervise, and coordinate the collection and exploitation of documents throughout the theater army.
2. Recommend policy for collecting, handling, and exploiting documents.
3. Control document agencies not assigned or attached to subordinate echelons.
4. Operate the theater army documents center.
5. Process information obtained through exploitation of documents and disseminate resultant intelligence, in coordination with strategic and combat intelligence section.
6. Recommend training objectives and policies for translator and documents personnel.

(f) *Target analysis section.*

1. Make continuous analysis of potential tactical and strategic targets, recommend attacks on such targets, and make assessments of damage inflicted.
2. By study of enemy operations, industrial systems, lines of communications, and population centers, determine critical factors therein and their vulnerability to attack. (Coordinate with strategic and combat intelligence section and scientific and technical section.)
3. When broad objectives have been determined, make detailed examination of specific targets to ascertain their relative importance and vulnerability to attack with available weapons.
4. Serve as secretariat and staff for theater army target analysis and priority committee, if one is appointed.

(g) *War room section.*

1. Maintain the intelligence division war room.
2. Provide administrative assistance (such as maps and training aids) for intelligence participation in the maintenance of other war rooms in the theater army headquarters.
3. Provide briefing officers for briefings of commander and staff.

(4) *Counterintelligence branch.*

(a) *Chief, counterintelligence branch.*

1. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the branch.
2. Recommend counterintelligence policy based on recommendations of the sections.
3. Prepare consolidated counterintelligence estimates, plans, directives, and reports based on those of sections.
4. Recommend augmentation of CIC detachments as necessary.
5. Based on section requirements, procure, distribute, and, in conjunction with administrative branch, maintain records of counterintelligence funds, special equipment, and supplies.
6. Provide staff supervision and control of operations of CIC detachment, including inspection of operation plans.

(b) *Military security section.*

1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports for all matters pertaining to military security.
2. Recommend military security policy.
3. Supervise and coordinate military security activities.
4. Determine requirements for and recommend employment of CIC detachments for military security purposes.

(c) *Civil security section.*

1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports for all matters pertaining to civil security.
2. Recommend civil security policy.
3. Supervise and coordinate civil security activities.
4. Determine requirements for and recommend employment of CIC detachments.
5. Interrogate friendly and enemy civilians.
6. Maintain records of enemy agents and collaborators.
7. Coordinate activities of theater army and communications zone CIC detachments in civil security operations.
8. Establish liaison, through administrative branch, with military government, military police, indigenous authorities, and other agencies, etc., for circulation control and other counterintelligence activities.

(d) *Port, frontier, and travel security section.*

1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports for all matters pertaining to port, frontier, and travel security.
2. Recommend port, frontier, and travel security policy.

3. Supervise and coordinate port, frontier, and travel security operations.
4. Coordinate with Navy and Air Force on security of sea frontiers, seaports, and airports.
5. Determine requirements for and recommend employment of CIC detachments for port, frontier, and travel security.

(e) *Censorship section.*

1. Recommend censorship policy.
2. Prepare censorship estimates, plans, directives, and reports.
3. Recommend procurement and employment of censorship units.
4. Supervise and coordinate censorship activities.
5. Control and supervise operations of attached censorship units attached to communications zone.
6. Maintain general and special watch lists.
7. Insure compliance with SR 380-80-1, Armed Forces Censorship, by all subordinate commands.
8. Coordinate with provost marshal on employment of prisoner of war censorship units.
9. Plan for and supervise censorship training.

(f) *Special operations section.*

1. Prepare estimates, plans, directives, and reports for all matters pertaining to special counterintelligence operations.
2. Supervise and coordinate special counterintelligence operations.
3. Determine requirements for, procure, and employ special CIC units and agents.
4. Determine requirements for, procure, and issue special CIC funds, equipment, and supplies.
5. Establish and operate special interrogation centers, if required.
6. Plan for and supervise the execution of intelligence security throughout the theater army.

(5) *Special intelligence branch.*

(a) *Branch chief.*

1. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the branch.
2. Formulate plans and policies concerning special intelligence operations.
3. Determine requirements for and recommend procurement and employment of special intelligence personnel and units in accordance with recommendations of sections.
4. Recommend special intelligence operations training objectives and policies based on recommendations of sections.

(b) *Field operations intelligence section.*

1. Prepare plans for employment of field operations intelligence within the theater.

2. Collect and process information obtained by field operations intelligence means and disseminate the resultant intelligence. (Coordinate with strategic and combat intelligence section.)
  3. Coordinate field operations intelligence activities with present and future military operations. Coordinate with theater army G3 and with counterintelligence section and agencies.
  4. Establish liaison with field operations intelligence groups of higher and adjacent headquarters and coordinate activities of respective agencies.
  5. Determine requirements for and recommend procurement, training and employment of field operations intelligence personnel.
- (c) *Communications intelligence section.*
1. Provide communications intelligence to commander and staff. Coordinate with strategic and combat intelligence section.
  2. Supervise operations of communications intelligence agencies.
  3. Coordinate with counterintelligence branch on communications security.
  4. Recommend communications intelligence and communications security training objectives and policies and exercise staff supervision over such training.
- (d) *Evasion and escape section.*
1. Establish a system for assisting friendly personnel to evade capture by the enemy, or to escape if captured.
  2. Prepare plans to exploit evaders and escapers for intelligence purposes, including establishment of policy for handling and processing.
  3. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of evasion and escape units and agencies.
  4. Determine requirements for and recommended procurement and employment of evasion and escape units.
  5. Recommend evasion and escape training objectives and policies and exercise staff supervision over this training.
- (e) *Scientific and technical section.*
1. Collect and process scientific and technical information, and disseminate the resultant intelligence. (Coordinate with strategic and combat intelligence section.)
  2. Formulate policies and prepare plans for the exploitation of captured enemy scientists and enemy materiel throughout the theater.
  3. Operate the theater army materiel center.
  4. Determine the requirements for and recommend the procurement and employment of technical intelligence coordinator detachment.

5. Coordinate with chiefs of technical services to insure adequacy of trained technical service intelligence personnel to exploit captured hostile materiel.
- (6) *Reconnaissance and mapping branches.*
- (a) *Branch chief.*
    1. Direct, supervise, and coordinate the activities of the branch.
    2. Recommend map and air photo policies as they affect theater army.
    3. Recommend training objectives and policies.
  - (b) *Operations section.*
    1. Recommend policies on visual and photo air reconnaissance and, when approved, prepare plans and directives to put them into effect.
    2. Determine requirements for and recommend procurement and employment of air-ground operations personnel.
    3. Recommend training objectives and policies for air-ground operations personnel, and provide staff supervision for such training.
    4. Maintain, in conjunction with the target analysis section, information files regarding the location, characteristics, and significance of all identified installations which may be considered as targets.
  - (c) *Mapping and charting section.*
    1. Prepare plans and directives concerning procurement, production, and dissemination of maps and charts.
    2. Supervise maintenance of map library facilities to meet the requirements of theater army headquarters.
    3. Provide technical assistance to and act as secretariat for the theater army mapping committee, if one is appointed.
  - (d) *Topographic and hydrographic section.*
    1. Prepare technical military and engineer studies of hostile installations.
    2. Provide assistance to the strategic and combat intelligence section in the preparation of tactical studies of weather and terrain and of strategic studies of the theater army area.
    3. Provide for production and distribution of terrain models required by theater army forces.
  - (e) *Air photo section.*
    1. Determine future requirements for air photos and prepare long range photo reconnaissance plans.
    2. Prepare plans, policies, and directives for the production and dissemination of photo intelligence and the distribution of air photos.
    3. Provide technical supervision of all photo interpreters in the theater army, including recommendations for training objectives and policies.



(f) *Weather section.*

1. Obtain weather forecasts of the operational area and detailed upper air analysis.
2. Prepare data on climate and weather to assist the strategic and combat intelligence sections in preparation of studies of weather and terrain.

(7) *Administrative branch.* Although this branch is essentially the same as the administrative branch of lower echelon intelligence sections, the committee and liaison section, in addition to furnishing liaison officers, provides representatives on committees requiring intelligence participation. The section also provides clerical and other administrative assistance for liaison officers and committee members.

## CHAPTER 11

### INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

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#### Section I. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

##### 180. Purpose

The purpose of intelligence training is to insure efficient performance of intelligence duties by all military personnel.

##### 181. Scope

Training in intelligence is not restricted to personnel assigned to intelligence sections. Since all military personnel have some intelligence responsibilities, instruction in intelligence, to include counterintelligence is given to all. Personnel assigned to intelligence duties are given additional instruction appropriate to their assignments.

##### 182. Responsibility

a. *The Commander.* Intelligence is produced for the commander. Intelligence training is his responsibility. He insures that all persons under his command understand their intelligence duties and responsibilities.

b. *The Intelligence Officer.* The intelligence officer is responsible for the planning and supervision of intelligence training of his own section and, in coordination with the operations officer, exercises staff supervision for intelligence training within the entire command. He prepares the intelligence training program, conducts intelligence schools, makes staff visits, supervises intelligence training, conducts tests, and assists lower units in obtaining training aids and qualified instructors.

c. Close coordination between G2 and G3 is as essential during training as it is during combat. *G3 is charged with the staff responsibility for training, but it is G2 who prepares the intelligence part of the unit training program and who supervises its execution.* He informs the G3 of the amount of time needed for intelligence training, of requirements for facilities, training aids, and instructors; details are worked out in collaboration. The close relationship between G2 and G3 in accomplishing the intelligence training mission does not end with the publication of a formal training directive. Much intelligence training is not specifically reflected in the training program, but is integrated with other types of training and if properly planned and executed, enhances the value of other training. For example, enemy representation (Aggressor) during field exercises increases the realism of operations, and at the same time provides practical training in combat

intelligence. Similarly, the preparation of tactical studies of weather and terrain affords practice to intelligence personnel and at the same time assists G3 in the preparation of terrain exercises.

*d.* Unit training pertaining to reconnaissance and the collection of information is planned and supervised by G2, in coordination with G3. Orders directing the conduct of reconnaissance and other intelligence training are issued by G3 in the name of the commander.

### **183. Personnel To Be Trained**

Personnel to receive intelligence training are in four categories:

- a.* Intelligence section personnel.
- b.* Reconnaissance units, Army aviators, air observers, and special information services.
- c.* Military Intelligence Specialists.
- d.* All other troops.

### **184. Intelligence Section Personnel**

*a.* The training program for intelligence section personnel includes the following subjects:

- (1) Intelligence agencies: their organization, functions, capabilities and limitations.
- (2) Description of sources.
- (3) Methods of collecting and reporting information.
- (4) Recording and filing information, to include preparing overlays and posting situation maps.
- (5) Examination of personnel, documents, and materiel.
- (6) In war, the enemy armed forces; in peace, the maneuver enemy.
- (7) Counterintelligence and security measures.
- (8) Theory and practice of observation.
- (9) Military sketching, map reading, and photo reading.

*b.* In addition, officers and selected enlisted personnel will be trained in such subjects as the following to the extent required by their duties:

- (1) Evaluation of information.
- (2) Interpretation of information.
- (3) Estimation of the enemy situation, to include determination of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.
- (4) Dissemination of information and intelligence.
- (5) Capabilities and limitations of ground and air reconnaissance.
- (6) Photo interpretation and photo interpretation reports.
- (7) Terrain evaluation.
- (8) Order of battle analysis.
- (9) Intelligence specialist teams; their organization, functions, capabilities and limitations.
- (10) Intelligence and counterintelligence planning.
- (11) Intelligence standing operating procedure.
- (12) Map and photo planning.

## **185. Reconnaissance Units, Army Aviators, Air Observers, and Special Information Services.**

The divisional reconnaissance battalion or company, the intelligence and reconnaissance platoons of the infantry regiments, the reconnaissance section of engineer combat battalions, the artillery reconnaissance agencies and the reconnaissance platoon of the tank and armored infantry battalions, as well as Army aviators, air observers, and special information services must be given specialized training in their appropriate duties. These duties are covered in detail in branch field manuals.

## **186. Military Intelligence Specialists**

a. Personnel of military intelligence units activated in the zone of interior, and subsequently attached to divisions and larger units during the organization and training phase, undergo the following training:

- (1) Attendance at an appropriate intelligence school.
- (2) Participation in military intelligence unit training.
- (3) Participation in integrated intelligence training with the unit to which attached.

b. Within a theater army, the training of intelligence specialists is accomplished as follows:

- (1) When requirements cannot be met from replacement sources, theater army intelligence schools are established under the staff supervision of the theater army G2.
- (2) Limited training is accomplished within military intelligence augmentation units, to maintain individual proficiency of replacement and augmentation personnel.
- (3) Normal training is conducted within operational military intelligence units, and in the units to which intelligence specialists are attached.

## **187. Intelligence Training of All Other Personnel**

a. Each soldier is a potential information collecting agent and must be trained in collecting and reporting information. He should be able to report on such things as enemy attitude, defensive or offensive; fire received; obstacles, natural and artificial; and terrain, including cover, concealment, and trafficability. Reports are limited only by the ability of the soldier to *see, think, remember and report*. The combat frontline soldier is the foundation of information collecting. Since our troops are a potential source of information to the enemy, instruction must also be given in counterintelligence and defense against enemy propaganda.

b. All officers and enlisted men of the combat arms receive training in the following:

- (1) *Intelligence subjects.*
  - (a) Scope and purpose of combat intelligence.
  - (b) Secrecy discipline.

- (c) Defense against enemy propaganda.
- (d) Collecting and reporting information.
- (e) Observation.
- (f) Handling prisoners of war, enemy deserters, civilians, evaders and escapers and captured documents.
- (g) Safeguarding of captured supplies and equipment.
- (h) Use of countersigns.
- (i) Shelling reports.
- (j) Enemy identifications (uniforms and insignia, mechanized vehicles, and aircraft).
- (k) Use of enemy weapons and equipment.
- (l) Counterintelligence.
- (m) Characteristics of the enemy armed forces.
- (2) *Related subjects.*
  - (a) Message writing. This includes training in the objective reporting of facts, rather than subjective reporting of the individual's interpretation of facts.
  - (b) Map and photo reading, and use of the compass.
  - (c) Use of communications systems.
  - (d) U. S. Army organization.
  - (e) Camouflage.
  - (f) Evasion, escape, and the code of conduct.

### **188. Methods of Instruction**

*a.* The methods of instruction prescribed by FM 21-5, Military Training, are applicable to intelligence training. In most cases specialized intelligence training is best accomplished by centralized instruction; however, unit schools and on-the-job training are also of value.

*b.* When a division is assembled as a unit, or its various elements are close to each other, a division intelligence school should be established to conduct instruction for all officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties.

*c.* Subsequent to the division school, subordinate units of the division conduct intelligence schools to train the regularly assigned intelligence personnel and others of battalions and companies. These schools are conducted by unit intelligence officers, with the assistance and under the supervision of the division G2. Personnel who attended the division school instruct in the lower unit schools. Tests of proficiency include a demonstration of ability to perform appropriate duties in unit intelligence sections.

*d.* A system of schools within the division enables G2 to establish standard practices throughout the command. It also promotes understanding, confidence, and cooperation between all intelligence officers of the command.

*e.* Training is not concluded with the completion of the divisional and subordinate intelligence schools, but continues and is perfected by repetition and continuous on-the-job training.

## **189. Creating Intelligence Consciousness**

*a.* The efficient performance of the intelligence functions of a command depends largely upon the degree of intelligence consciousness created and maintained in the individual members of that command. G2, through his initiative, imagination, and practical knowledge, in both training and actual operations, brings intelligence constantly to the attention of all personnel.

*b.* Intelligence training is included in all types of field exercises and maneuvers, from squad problems to exercises involving the largest commands. A squad, in an exercise in which it is learning to maneuver, should practice concealment and cover and find some "enemy" upon which to report accurately. Marches have their monotony broken by sudden "attacks" or "enemy fire." "Documents," "materiel," and "prisoners" become an interesting and instructive part of field problems. Not only does this prompt and accurate reporting of information become habitual with the troops, but zest is also added to their training.

## **190. Maneuvers**

*a.* So far as possible, intelligence play in maneuvers should be designed to furnish realistic training in every aspect of combat intelligence, from the collection of information by reconnaissance units and other agencies to include all intelligence collection and production activities including such specialized procedures as order of battle, interpretation of photos and exploitation of documents, materiel, and prisoners of war. The use of Aggressor as a maneuver enemy helps make commanders, staffs, and troops conscious of the enemy as a real opposing force.

*b.* Intelligence measures that may be employed in maneuvers include promptness in reporting information, visual and photographic air reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance (both day and night) by combat elements, ground observation, supervision in all units of measures for the safeguarding of military information, use of camouflage and camouflage discipline, restrictions on the use of lights, identification of aircraft, preparation and distribution of photos as supplements to maps, policies regarding maps to be used and map allowances, and the requisition and distribution of maps. ○

## **Section II. INTELLIGENCE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES**

### **191. General**

*a.* Standing operating procedures (SOP) are discussed in FM 101-5.

*b.* The intelligence officer is responsible for two SOP's: A general intelligence SOP for the command (which becomes the intelligence par. of the command SOP), and a SOP for his own section. Outline forms for these two SOPs appear in appendixes XIV and XV. An example of a division intelligence section SOP appears in appendix XVI.




Figure 17. Sequence of intelligence planning.

## CHAPTER 12

### INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

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#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

##### 192. Timeliness

a. Timeliness is of exceptional importance in intelligence planning. Planning must begin as early as possible, to provide that knowledge of the enemy, the weather, and the terrain which other members of the staff will use as a basis for their own plans.

b. Since the commander's decision is based on the intelligence estimate, planning by other staff agencies depends on the *completion* of intelligence operations. Intelligence planning for an operation must precede initiation of other planning. The G2 finishes all available intelligence relating to a particular operation before the commander can announce his decision and his staff can prepare plans for the proposed operation.

##### 193. Initiation

Intelligence planning must be initiated early enough to permit concurrent planning by subordinate echelons. The intelligence officer must anticipate his commander's requirements for intelligence in order to have the intelligence available when needed. This anticipation of requirements is the most difficult of G2's responsibilities. At division, intelligence plans are projected at least one operation in advance of the operation in progress. At higher levels, plans are projected even further into the future.

##### 194. Sequence

The sequence of staff planning, and the relationship of intelligence planning thereto, are indicated in figure 17. The diagram does not include reference to the preliminary planning phase (par. 200a).

#### Section II. DIVISION PLANNING

##### 195. Coordination

Intelligence plans, orders, and actions usually require coordination with one or more general or special staff sections. The following list indicates some of the staff coordination necessary in division intelligence planning:

Prisoners of war.....	G1, G4, provost marshal, adjutant general and surgeon.
Censorship.....	G1, G5, provost marshal, and public information officer.
Use of combat troops for intelligence	G3.



Escort, supervision, and briefing of visitors.	G3, public information officer, and headquarters commandant.
Location and construction of observation posts.	G3, engineer, and artillery officer.
Examination of captured equipment.	G4 and special staff.
Requirement for maps, photos, and studies.	All sections.
Map procurement, storage, and distribution.	G3 and engineer.
Air reconnaissance, photo and visual.	G3, aviation officer, signal officer, air liaison officer, engineer and artillery officer.
Civil internees	G1, G4, G5, provost marshal, and surgeon.
Intelligence training	G3 and special staff.
Procurement and replacement of intelligence specialists.	G1.

## 196. Intelligence Planning Phases

The sequence of intelligence planning phases is generally as follows:

a. *Preliminary Phase (Before the Receipt of a Specific Operational Mission).* Before the completion of a current operation, and before the commander receives orders for further action, his staff must consider what further action is likely to be required. This applies particularly to the intelligence officer for when the commander receives a directive or warning for further action, G2 must furnish immediately the intelligence on which the commander's initial estimates and decisions will be based. A similar situation also exists when a headquarters is organized, or at the beginning of a war or campaign.

b. *Initial Phase (From Receipt of Mission to Commander's Decision).* When a unit receives a new mission, all available intelligence is furnished to the staff as a basis for operational and administrative planning. An intelligence estimate is presented at the initial staff conference.

c. *General Planning Phase (From Commander's Decision to D-Day, H-Hour).* During this phase definite plans and studies are prepared. The most important steps are—

- (1) Determination of the essential elements of information required to complete the planning phase, and development and implementation of collection plan based on these EEI.
- (2) Preparation of a counterintelligence plan for the security of the operation.
- (3) Preparation of a plan for securing and distributing intelligence aids. These aids may include charts and models of the area of operations, maps, photos, photo interpretation reports, sketches, hydrographic charts, intelligence reports, enemy uniforms and equipment, climatic studies, and weather forecasts.
- (4) Preparation of plans for ground, air and sea reconnaissance and methods of reporting results.

- (5) Revision of the intelligence estimate. The initial estimate is based on available intelligence supplemented by logical assumptions. It is revised continually throughout the general planning phase, on the basis of changes and developments in the enemy situation.
- (6) Revision of the list of essential elements of information to delete those no longer applicable and to add new EEI concerning either the planning or the operational phase.
- (7) Preparation of a collection plan based on the revised essential elements of information.
- (8) Preparation of an intelligence plan.

*d. Operational Phase (From D-Day, H-Hour to Accomplishment or Change of Mission).* Intelligence planning during the operational phase provides for collecting information, producing intelligence, and disseminating information and intelligence. Concurrently, preliminary planning for anticipated future action continues, or is initiated.

## 197. The Intelligence Plan

*a. General.* The intelligence plan is an annex to the operation plan. Its form is the same as that of an intelligence annex to an operation order, with the addition of an eighth paragraph, "Auxiliary agencies," and sometimes a ninth paragraph, "Miscellaneous" (ch. 6).

*b. Paragraphs in the Intelligence Plan Are as Follows:*

- (1) *Summary of the enemy situation* (par. 1). Reference may be made to a periodic intelligence report or an intelligence estimate.
- (2) *Essential elements of information* (par. 2). The first subparagraph lists the essential elements of information. Additional subparagraphs indicate the information required during specific planning and operational phases. Reference may be made to the combat intelligence plan which announces the essential elements of information.
- (3) *Reconnaissance and observation missions* (par. 3). This paragraph assigns missions to the available collection agencies for specific planning and operational phases. Reference may be made to combat intelligence and air reconnaissance plans containing further or detailed instructions.
- (4) *Measures for handling personnel, documents, and material.* Each of these sources of information is discussed in a separate subparagraph, generally with respect to their value, methods of processing, and special handling of particular types of personnel, documents, and equipment.
- (5) *Maps and photos.* Instructions regarding supplies and distribution of planning and operational maps, photos, defense overprints, and relief models are announced in this paragraph. Reference may be made to air reconnaissance and map and photo plans containing detailed instructions.

- (6) *Counterintelligence.* This paragraph contains instructions on counterintelligence measures during both the planning and operational phases, as well as special counterintelligence measures, counterintelligence agencies, and reports. Reference may be made to a counterintelligence plan for details.
- (7) *Reports and distribution.* A subparagraph on reports lists the types of intelligence reports required and states how and when they will be submitted by subordinate headquarters. A second subparagraph outlines the intelligence publications which will be distributed by the headquarters issuing the plan. One subparagraph usually defines intelligence dissemination policies. Reference may be made to the combat intelligence and intelligence administrative plans for more complete instructions.
- (8) *Auxiliary agencies.* A subparagraph under this heading indicates the employment of specialized intelligence agencies in planning and operational activities. Other subparagraphs list—
  - (a) Agencies which are controlled by the intelligence officer.
  - (b) Agencies under the control of higher headquarters but with elements under G2's operational control.
  - (c) Agencies supervised by other staff sections but whose operations require close coordination with G2.
- (9) *Miscellaneous.* This paragraph discusses intelligence personnel, intelligence training, espionage, tactical propaganda, liaison, intelligence funds, and organization of the intelligence section. It is used only when material cannot be included in the first eight paragraphs, nor in appendixes to the plan.

*c. Appendixes.* The intelligence plan is normally a concise document to which are appended separate plans for the operations listed in several paragraphs of the basic plan.

- (1) Appendixes may include—
  - (a) Reconnaissance (combat intelligence) plan.
  - (b) Air reconnaissance plan.
  - (c) Intelligence map plan.
  - (d) Counterintelligence plan.
  - (e) Intelligence administrative plan.
  - (f) Auxiliary agencies plan.
  - (g) Intelligence estimate. (Other documents containing detailed data regarding such factors as weather, terrain, and enemy defense may be included as tabs to the estimate.)
- (2) When the intelligence plan becomes the intelligence annex to the operation order, the plans listed above, with the exception of the auxiliary agencies plan, become appendixes to the intelligence annex. The auxiliary agencies plan usually is not published, since it deals with matters of interest only to the G2 section.

### 198. Corps Intelligence Planning

a. Intelligence planning at corps is based on army plans and is primarily a matter of determining how, by whom, and when the intelligence functions of the corps will be performed. The general discussion of intelligence planning in paragraphs 192 through 197 is applicable to corps.

b. Corps intelligence plans are not normally so voluminous as to require that the bulk of the detail appear in appendixes to the plan. Appendix XVII illustrates the form of an army intelligence plan sufficiently large to require appendixes; it may be used at corps by covering as much of the material as is applicable in paragraphs of the plan, rather than in appendixes thereto. In amphibious and other special operations, corps G2 may find appendixes to be necessary. Responsibility for the preparation of the paragraphs or corresponding appendixes is usually as follows:

c. The combat intelligence branch has overall responsibility for the plan. The combat intelligence branch itself prepares paragraphs 1 and 2, most of paragraph 3, and portions of paragraphs 5, 7, 8, and 9 (if appropriate). It prepares, if necessary, the corresponding appendixes or portions thereof, such as—

- (1) Combat intelligence plan.
- (2) Intelligence map plan.
- (3) Intelligence administrative plan.
- (4) Auxiliary agencies plan.

d. The miscellaneous branch prepares paragraph 4 and, if required, part of the combat intelligence plan.

e. The G2 Air branch prepares parts of paragraphs 3 and 5, and if necessary, the air reconnaissance plan.

f. The counterintelligence branch prepares paragraph 6, part of paragraph 7, and part of paragraph 8. When appendixes are used, the counterintelligence branch prepares the counterintelligence plan, and parts of the administrative and auxiliary agencies plans.

g. The administrative branch prepares most of paragraph 7 and part of paragraph 9 (if appropriate), or it prepares, when required, most of the administrative plan. It also reproduces and distributes the completed plan.

### 199. Army Intelligence Planning

a. The scope and long range of operations at army level affect intelligence planning as follows:

- (1) Preliminary and initial intelligence planning must be based largely on assumptions. As planning progresses, particularly as operation details are made firm, the assumptions can either be considered as fact or, if they are shown to be erroneous, be discarded.

- (2) Intelligence planning must be flexible. The further an operation is projected into the future, the more likely that changes in the situation will alter plans radically.
  - (3) Concurrent planning by subordinate echelons ordinarily is impracticable *in the early stages* of planning for operations scheduled far in the future. Corps intelligence staffs usually are working to capacity on the operation in progress and the planning of the next operation.
- b. A form for an army intelligence plan, and appendixes thereto, is in appendix XVII to this manual.

## 200. Communications Zone Intelligence Planning

- a. Intelligence planning in the communications zone follows the same principles and the same general pattern as planning in combat units.
- (1) The bulk of communications zone intelligence planning is concerned with counterintelligence, but there still must be provisions for the determination of enemy ground, air, and naval capabilities against communications zone. Much of the planning is based on assumptions and is directly dependent on the expected operations of communications zone in furnishing support to the combat units.
  - (2) Counterintelligence planning is begun early in order to insure security for other types of planning. Much of this planning ultimately becomes standing operating procedure.
  - (3) Additional intelligence plans are required for such special operations as are executed by airborne units, amphibious forces, and task forces. They include not only the provision of security for marshalling areas but also plans for later assumption of territorial control of areas no longer required by those combat forces for operations.
- b. Although concerned principally with logistics rather than tactics, communications zone planning is divided into the same four phases as the planning of combat units. However, once the communications zone is established and functioning, there is no sharp line of demarcation between phases. Communications zone, once it begins providing support for major operations, must continue to furnish administrative supply and service support regardless of pauses in combat operations. Although there may be surges of activity in providing a supply buildup for an imminent large-scale operation, the phases of intelligence planning do not coincide with the logistical operations of communications zone. Definite changes in intelligence activity occur upon the assumption by communications zone of territorial responsibility for areas no longer required by armies. The date of forward movement of the combat zone rear boundary marks the end of a planning period and the commencement of a new period for planning the next forward movement. Likewise, the date on which communications zone is to commence support of airborne, am-

phibious, or task force operations is a similar period. In either case, the establishment of phases in connection with these dates assists in achieving completeness, coordination, timeliness, and efficiency in planning. Appendix XVII may be adapted for use by a communications zone intelligence division.

- (1) The preliminary phase is devoted to counterintelligence and the assembly of available intelligence for use by the commander and other staff divisions. Much of the planning is based on assumptions.
  - (2) The initial phase produces a greater emphasis on intelligence both for determination of enemy capabilities and their effects on communications zone operations and for specific counterintelligence purposes. An additional task is the intensification of efforts to obtain for communications zone units specific information of the operational area over which territorial control will be assumed.
  - (3) During the general phase, the principal task is establishing a detailed plan for systematic intelligence operations during the period for which communications zone operations are projected. The emphasis is on counterintelligence planning.
  - (4) In the operational phase, planning is directed toward keeping intelligence operations current and preparation of plans for future operations.
- c. Intelligence plans appropriate for the communications zone follow the form given in paragraph 197.
- (1) Appendixes to the intelligence plan normally are not necessary. Normally, only the counterintelligence plan is of sufficient size to warrant being prepared as an appendix. In some situations a separate censorship plan may be included as a tab to the counterintelligence appendix.
  - (2) Whenever possible, all intelligence matters which can be made standing operating procedure are so treated and announced to the command; the intelligence plan need only refer to the appropriate document.

#### **Section IV. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

##### **201. General.**

a. The planning processes outlined in paragraphs 195 through 200 may be used in any type of operation; however, certain special operations may require additions or shifts in emphasis or in timing.

b. These special operations may be divided into two general types. The first type involves special operational methods, including airborne and amphibious operations. The second type is concerned with special conditions of environment, including operations in areas of extreme con-

ditions of climate or terrain. Both types of special operations may take place simultaneously.

c. Strategic intelligence, possibly produced prior to hostilities, is the principal source of intelligence used in the planning of special operations. It must be checked and supplemented by current reconnaissance.

## **202. Airborne and Amphibious Operations**

a. Planning for airborne and amphibious operations must take into account the following:

- (1) A preliminary marshalling phase. Counterintelligence plans must cover this preliminary phase as well as the actual combat phase.
- (2) Each action is an "initial engagement." There is no accumulated combat intelligence background of local details, as there is in continuous land operations. Intelligence furnished to participating units must be extensive and detailed.
- (3) Combat troops are completely committed to action at the beginning of operations. Details of coordination cannot be modified or adjusted as combat develops, but must be carefully planned and directed and rehearsed prior to initial contact.
- (4) Objectives are always at a distance which is beyond the ground reconnaissance capabilities of the participating army forces. Reconnaissance missions must be adjusted to the types and limited number of agencies that will be able to perform them.

b. The preceding considerations usually require emphasis on the following points:

- (1) Inasmuch as the attacking units are especially vulnerable in assembly, transit, and at the moment of landing, the principal object of counterintelligence will be to preserve secrecy concerning the departure areas and times, routes to be followed, and objectives of the operation.
- (2) Because of the critical nature of the actual landing, the intelligence effort will be directed to the production of accurate, complete, and detailed intelligence of the landing areas and the local enemy situation. The prompt establishment of intelligence collection activities by the assault force is of extreme importance and, consistent with security, may sometimes precede the assault.
- (3) Because of the sudden commitment to action, dissemination of detailed intelligence and distribution of intelligence aids frequently include the individual soldier. In a normal land action, units entering action move slowly enough for troops to keep oriented as they move forward. In an amphibious or airborne action, there is no opportunity for this progressive orientation; it must be accomplished prior to commitment.

c. In airborne and amphibious operations, it may be advisable to have two intelligence plans: one to provide the necessary security, intelligence, and organization prior to the assault; and one to cover intelligence activities in combat.

### **203. Operations in Extremes of Environment**

a. The intelligence problems peculiar to extremes of weather and terrain are of three general categories—

- (1) The problem of reporting and interpreting the significance of abnormal conditions accurately and in time for units to prepare to meet them.
- (2) Problems of impeded signal communications, which must be considered in planning for reports, distribution, and dissemination.
- (3) Problems of impeded visibility or restricted operating conditions which must be considered in planning reconnaissance.

b. These problems usually entail the use of strategic intelligence to furnish information which includes—

- (1) Determining and reporting the environmental conditions. This information must be interpreted so as to indicate appropriate operational techniques; the types of weapons, clothing, equipment and rations which should be used; as well as special or modified equipment which must be obtained or improvised.
- (2) Signal Communications may be affected by great distances, difficult terrain, extreme heat or cold, rain and ice, and electrical disturbances.
- (3) Observation—land, naval, and air—may be seriously restricted by precipitation, fogs, clouds, dust, or prolonged periods of darkness. Inclement weather may restrict or prevent the movement of many reconnaissance agencies.



## APPENDIX 1

### REFERENCES

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- |                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| FM 3-5            | Tactics and Technique of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare. |
| FM 19-40          | Handling Prisoners of War.   |
| FM 20-100         | Army Aviation.   |
| FM 21-6           | Techniques of Military Instruction.                                      |
| FM 21-5           | Military Training.   |
| FM 21-30          | Military Symbols.  |
| FM 30-7           | Combat Intelligence, Regiment Combat Command and Smaller Units.          |
| FM 30-15          | Examination of Personnel and Documents.                                  |
| FM 30-16          | Technical Intelligence (U).  |
| FM 30-19          | Order of Battle Intelligence.  |
| FM 30-28          | Armed Forces Censorship (Army).  |
| FM 30-101         | The Maneuver Enemy.  |
| FM 30-102         | Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces (U).                               |
| FM 30-103         | Aggressor Order of Battle.   |
| FM 31-71          | Operations in the Arctic.  |
| FM 33-5           | Psychological Warfare Operations.  |
| FM 100-5          | Operations.  |
| FM 100-15         | Larger Units.  |
| FM 100-31         | Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons (U).                                      |
| FM 101-5          | Staff Organization and Procedure.  |
| FM 101-10         | Organization, Technical and Logistical Data                              |
| DA Pam 108-1      | Index of Army Motion Pictures, Television Recordings, and Filmstrips.    |
| DA Pam 310-series | Military Publications Indexes (as applicable).                           |
| DA TC 8           | Combat Deception (U).  |
| DA TC 21-1        | Code of Conduct.   |
| AR 320-1          | Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.              |
| AR 380-5          | Safeguarding Defense Information.  |
| AR 381-100        | (Classified).  |
| AR 381-101        | Personnel Administration, and Training of Counterintelligence Corps (U). |

SR 320-5-1	Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
SR 320-50-1	Authorized Abbreviations.
SR 380-80-1	Armed Forces Censorship.
SR 380-305-10	Standardization of Photo Intelligence Reports Designation and Content.
AR 381-115	Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies.
TM 3-240	Field Behavior of Chemical Agents.
TM 5-545	Geology and Its Military Applications.
TM 30-210	(Classified).
TM 30-245	Photographic Interpretation Handbook.
TM 30-246	Tactical Interpretation of Air Photos.

## APPENDIX II

### EXAMPLE OF A CLIMATIC SUMMARY

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#### CLIMATIC SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 20TH INFANTRY DIVISION AREA

1. *General:* The information contained in this summary is general in nature. It will be useful in pointing out those features of the climate which may impose problems on operations.

2. *Precipitation:* October has an average of 4.1 inches of rainfall. This is a sizeable decrease from the 10.5 inches experienced in September. The average number of days with rain shows a decrease also, dropping from 18.6 in September to 9.8 in October.

3. *Visibility:* Visibility is only slightly poorer in October than in September, but whereas the chief restrictive factor in September is rain that in October is fog. Very poor visibility, less than one-half mile, may be expected on an average of 4 days during the month. Poor visibility, less than 3 miles but better than one-half mile, may be expected on 14 days. These periods of restricted visibility will normally prevail for only a few hours after daybreak on those days when they occur.

4. *Cloudiness:* Amount of cloudiness for the month of October is considerably less than that for the month of September. An average of 10 days during October will have more than 80 percent cloud cover. This amount of cloud cover, even though it is considerably less than that for September, will continue to hamper air operations. An average of only 5 days during the month will have less than 20 percent cloud cover.

5. *Temperature:* There will be a considerable decrease in the temperature during October. The monthly average of 57° F. is a 13° drop from the September average of 71° F.

6. *Winds:* Winds will be much lighter in October than they were in September with the average wind dropping from 13.9 mph in September to 6.8 mph in October. This drop is even more noticeable when the frequencies of strong winds of more than 35 mph are compared. This comparison shows a drop from 6.5 days in September to 0.6 days in October.

7. *Thunderstorms:* Thunderstorms infrequent in October, occurring on an average of only 1 day during the month.

#### COMPARATIVE CLIMATIC SUMMARY

##### PRECIPITATION

	SEP	OCT	NOV
Mean (inches).....	10.5	4.1	3.1
Greatest (inches).....	14.8	6.9	6.1
Least (inches).....	4.2	2.1	1.1

# COMPARATIVE CLIMATIC SUMMARY

## PRECIPITATION

	SEP	OCT	NOV
Greatest amount in 24 hours (inches)-----	6.0	3.5	3.1
Average No. days w/precipitation (0.0004 in or more)---	18.6	9.8	8.1
Average number days w/snow-----	0.0	0.8	2.8
Average No. days w/specified amounts of precipitation			
0.01-0.49 inches-----	10.6	4.7	4.6
0.50-0.99 inches-----	4.2	0.8	0.6
1.00-1.99 inches-----	1.8	0.5	0.3
2.00 or more-----	0.9	0.5	0.1

## TEMPERATURE

Average daily mean (degrees F.)-----	71	57	49
Average daily maximum (degrees F.)-----	80	68	59
Average daily minimum (degrees F.)-----	60	48	40
Extreme maximum (degrees F.)-----	95	86	80
Extreme minimum (degrees F.)-----	49	30	18

## WINDS

Average wind speed (MPH)-----	13.9	6.8	7.5
Average number days wind speed exceeds 25 MPH--	12.1	5.0	6.9
Average number days wind speed exceeds 35 MPH--	6.5	0.6	1.7
Prevailing wind direction-----	WSW	NW	NW

## CLOUDS AND VISIBILITY

Average number days w/more than 80 percent cloud cover-----	18.0	10.0	12.0
Average number days w/less than 20 percent cloud cover-----	3.0	5.0	7.0
Average number days w/visibility less than 3 miles--	11.0	14.0	13.0
Average number days w/visibility less than ½ mile---	1.7	1.8	0.9

## THUNDERSTORMS

Average number days w/thunderstorms-----	1.9	0.9	0.2
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## APPENDIX III

### EXAMPLE OF A CLIMATIC STUDY

#### CLIMATIC STUDY

##### Conditions Affecting Artillery Firing Problem

##### Prepared for 20th Inf Division Artillery

1. *Statement of Problem:* A static condition exists in the 20th Inf Division area. A number of bunkers and strong points have been prepared in recent weeks by the opposing forces. 20th Inf Division Commander desires to eliminate these strong points by laying on a program of artillery firing during the first two weeks of October. The nature of these targets is such as to require visual observation of effectiveness of fires. Artillery OPs are so located as to necessitate visibilities of more than three miles to insure generally effective observation of fires on these targets. An analysis of daylight hour visibilities for the first two weeks of October is required.

2. *Solution to Problem:* Since firing must be done during that period of the day when sufficient light is present for visual observation of the targets, only the period between 0600 hours and 1800 hours is considered. An examination of the average hourly visibilities during this period of the day reveals the following:

#### NUMBER OF INSTANCES IN 20 YEARS WHEN VISIBILITY LESS THAN 3 MILES (DATE: 1-14 October)

Hour of observa- tion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
0630-----	12	10	11	13	9	11	10	11	12	12	13	12	10	12
0730-----	12	12	10	11	12	11	11	11	10	11	12	10	8	11
0830-----	10	10	11	9	11	10	11	9	12	8	7	9	10	9
0930-----	9	10	11	11	9	9	8	9	10	10	9	8	7	10
1030-----	5	5	6	4	3	5	4	6	7	4	3	2	4	6
1130-----	6	4	4	6	5	3	6	5	4	4	5	3	6	4
1230-----	4	4	6	3	4	5	4	4	3	4	5	4	5	6
1330-----	2	2	3	2	1	2	3	4	2	2	2	1	3	1
1430-----	1	2	4	2	1	3	1	4	3	2	2	2	3	3
1530-----	2	2	1	2	1	2	3	3	2	1	1	2	1	2
1630-----	3	2	1	1	2	1	3	3	1	2	3	2	3	1
1730-----	1	1	3	4	3	1	2	3	3	4	2	1	3	4

3. Examination of the figures given in the above table indicates the following:

a. Between the hours 0600 and 1000 visibility of three miles or more can be expected on only 45-50 percent of a given number of occasions.

b. Between the hours of 1000 and 1300 visibility of three miles or more can be expected on about 75 percent of any given number of occasions.

c. Between the hours of 1300 and 1800 visibility of three miles or more can be expected on 85-90 percent of any given number of occasions.

4. *Conclusions:* Visibility will be suitable for this mission during all daylight hours after 1000 hours but that the most suitable period will be between the hours of 1300 and 1800.

## APPENDIX IV

### SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR WEATHER INFORMATION WITHIN THE FIELD ARMY

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#### ARMY

At army level requirements exist for climatic information, forecasts, reports of current weather, and weather summaries. Specific requirements for each of these classes of information are as follows:

##### 1. Climatic information

At army level, there is a requirement for the following climatic summaries and studies:

*a. Climatic summaries.* One summary to cover a 3-month period (period covered to be based on seasons). This summary, which is to be issued each 3 months on a recurring basis, is to be issued 6 months prior to the beginning of the period covered by the summary. Example: Summary for the months of June, July, and August is to be issued in December. This summary will be used by all sections of the army commander's staff in the preparation of plans, estimates, and recommendations.

*b. Climatic studies.* There will be numerous requirements for special studies in connection with specific operations and activities. These studies may be required by all of the staff in some instances; but in many cases the requirement will be peculiar to a limited number of sections or to a single section. Information will be required about specific weather parameters or combinations of such parameters as they affect the operation or activity in question. Although operations and/or activities which might require special studies are too numerous to list in their entirety, some examples are listed to illustrate the requirement:

- (1) Study of the relation between wind direction and speed, cloud conditions, and visibility at specified locations—used by aviation officer in selecting sites for airstrips.
- (2) Study of the relation between precipitation, snow cover, and thaw dates—used by engineer teams in preparing analyses of stream flow and cross-country trafficability.
- (3) Study of the relation between amount and height of clouds, turbulence of air, visibility, and winds, both surface and aloft—used by staff sections planning airborne or paratroop operations.

##### 2. Weather forecasts

There is a requirement for both general and special forecasts to be utilized by the army commander and his staff.

*a. The following general forecasts are required:*

- (1) Three to five day long period forecast issued every other day.

- (2) Forty-eight hour forecast issued daily.
- (3) Twenty-four hour forecast issued twice daily; morning and afternoon.

The above forecasts will keep the army commander and his staff apprised of the expected weather situation in the army area.

b. The following *special* forecasts are required:

- (1) Twelve hour area flight forecast for army aviation (to include forecast of terminal conditions at specified terminals)—to be issued four times daily to army airstrip operations and to army flight control office.
- (2) Weather forecasts (as required) for routes and terminals of individual flights by army aviation—to be disseminated to user through aviation communications facilities.
- (3) Forecasts, as required, for employment of atomic weapons. These forecasts will be specified by G3. They will normally consist of cloud cover, precipitation, and distribution of temperatures and winds aloft.
- (4) Forecasts, as required, for radiological defense—these forecasts will be specified by radiological defense officer.
- (5) Severe weather warnings, as required. Warnings of such severe weather as hurricanes, tornadoes, and thunderstorms are required by *all* using agencies. Warnings of heavy snowfall, heavy rain, high winds, and other such occurrences are required by certain using agencies. Extent of requirements of this nature will be dependent on the local situation and should be established in local SOPs.
- (6) Rainfall forecasts are required by engineer officer. These forecasts, which are used in prediction of stream conditions should include intensity, duration, and total amount of rainfall over specified areas which constitute watersheds of those streams in question.

### 3. Reports of current weather

Reports of current weather will be required from time to time by the army commander and various members of his staff to assist them in analyzing the progress of current operations. These reports may consist simply of weather observations or portions thereof or they may be graphic or pictorial representations of the current weather situation for specified areas. Exact nature of individual requirements will be specified by the requesting agency. In addition to requirements of this nature, certain special requirements exist for current weather information.

a. Current reports of airstrip weather—required at airstrip for normal flight operations—required on an hourly basis or at any other frequency at which available.

b. Current reports of winds, air density, and air temperature at specified intervals above the earth to be used in computing ballistic data to



be used by army artillery. (This information is furnished by artillery meteorological sections.)

#### 4. Weather summaries

Summaries of various weather parameters for specified periods of time in the past will be required from time to time by the army commander and various members of his staff. Information required and period for which information is desired will be specified by requesting agency.

### CORPS

At corps level requirements exist for climatic information, forecasts, reports of current weather, and weather summaries. Specific requirements for each of these classes of information are as follows:

#### 5. Climatic information

At corps level there is a requirement for the following climatic summaries and studies:

*a. Climatic summaries.* One summary to cover a 3-month period (period covered to be based on seasons). This summary, which is to be issued each 3 months on a recurring basis, is to be issued 3 months prior to the beginning of the period covered by the summary. Example: Summary for the months of June, July, and August is to be issued in March. This summary will be used by all sections of the corps commander's staff in preparation of plans, estimates, and recommendations.

*b. Climatic studies.* Special studies required by the corps staff will be similar to those required by the army staff. The number and complexity of studies required by corps will be less than for army due to the reduced nature of the corps planning period and the limited nature of corps activities as compared with army activities.

#### 6. Weather forecasts

There is a requirement for both general and special forecasts to be utilized by the corps commander and his staff.

*a. The following general forecasts are required:*

- (1) Three to five day forecast issued every other day.
- (2) Forty-eight hour forecast issued daily.
- (3) Twenty-four hour forecast issued twice daily; morning and afternoon.

The above forecasts will keep the corps commander and his staff appraised of the expected weather situation in the corps area.

*b. The following special forecasts are required:*

- (1) Twelve hour corps area flight forecast for corps aviation (to include forecast of terminal conditions at specified corps terminals)—to be issued four times daily to corps airstrip operations and to corps flight control office.
- (2) Weather forecasts (as required) for routes and terminals of individual flights by army aviation—to be disseminated to users through aviation communications facilities.

(3) Forecasts, as required, for radiological defense—these forecasts will be specified by radiological defense officer.

(4) Severe weather warnings, as required.

#### 7. Reports of current weather

Reports of current weather will be required from time to time by the corps commander and various members of his staff to assist them in analyzing the progress of current operations. These reports may consist simply of weather observations or portions therefrom or they may be graphic or pictorial representations of the current weather situation for specified areas. Exact nature of individual requirements will be specified by the requesting agency. In addition to requirements of this nature, certain special requirements exist for current weather information.

a. Current reports of airstrip weather—required at airstrip for normal flight operations—required on an hourly basis or at any other frequency at which available.

b. Current reports of winds, air density, and air temperature at specified intervals above the earth to be used in computing ballistic data to be used by corps artillery. (This information is furnished by artillery meteorological sections.)

#### 8. Weather summaries

Summaries of various weather parameters for specified periods of time in the past will be required from time to time by the corps commander and various members of his staff. Information required and period for which information is desired will be specified by requesting agency.

### DIVISION

At division level requirements exist for climatic information, forecasts, reports of current weather, and weather summaries. Specific requirements for each of these classes of information are as follows:

#### 9. Climatic information

At division there is a requirement for the following climatic summaries and studies:

a. *Climatic summaries.* One summary to cover a three-month period (period covered to be based on seasons). This summary, which is to be issued each three months on a recurring basis, is to be issued every three months prior to the beginning of the period covered by the summary. For example, the summary for June, July, and August is to be issued in March. This summary will be used by the division commander and staff in the preparation of plans and estimates.

b. *Climatic studies.* Special studies are required at division level just as they are required at corps and army, but the number of activities at this level for which such studies are required is limited.

#### 10. Weather forecasts

There is a requirement for both general and special forecasts to be utilized by the division commander and his staff.

a. The following general forecasts are required:

- (1) Three to five day forecast issued every other day.
- (2) Forty-eight hour forecast issued daily.
- (3) Twenty-four hour forecast issued twice daily, morning and afternoon.

The above forecasts will keep the division commander and his staff appraised of the expected weather situation in the division area.

b. The following *special* forecasts are required:

- (1) Twelve hour division area flight forecast for division aviation (to include forecast of terminal conditions at locally specified division and corps terminals)—to be issued four times daily to division airstrip operations. This forecast should be disseminated from corps weather station over aviation communication facilities.
- (2) Weather forecasts (as required) for routes and terminals of individual flights by division aviation—to be disseminated in the same manner as indicated in *b*(1).
- (3) Forecasts, as required, for radiological defense—these forecasts will be specified by radiological defense officer.
- (4) Forecasts, as required, for use by chemical officer. The target for which a forecast is required will be specified by the chemical officer. Forecasts should be available upon request and should cover periods up to six hours in advance of the time of issue.
- (5) Severe weather warnings, as required.

#### 11. Reports of current weather

Reports of current weather will be required from time to time by the division commander and various members of his staff to assist them in analyzing the progress of current operations. These reports may consist simply of weather observations or portions thereof or they may be graphic or pictorial representations of the current weather situation for specified areas. Exact nature of individual requirements will be specified by the requesting agency. In addition to requirements of this nature, certain special requirements exist for current weather information.

a. Current reports of airstrip weather—required at airstrip for normal flight operations—required on an hourly basis or at any other frequency at which available.

b. Current reports of winds, air density, and air temperature at specified intervals above the earth to be used in computing ballistic data to be used by division artillery. (This information is furnished by artillery meteorological sections.)

#### 12. Weather summaries

Summaries of various weather parameters for specified periods of time in the past will be required from time to time by the division commander and various members of his staff. Information required and

period for which information is desired will be specified by requesting agency.

## REGIMENT

### 13. Climatic information

At regiment (combat command) there is a requirement for the following climatic summaries and studies:

*a. Climatic summaries.* One summary to cover a 1-month period. This summary, to be issued on a monthly basis, should be issued one month prior to the beginning of the period covered. For example, the summary for the month of June should be issued at the beginning of May.

*b. Climatic studies.* There are limited requirements for special climatic studies.

### 14. Weather forecasts

There is a requirement for both general and special forecasts to be utilized by the regimental commander and his staff.

*a.* The following general forecasts are required:

- (1) Three to five day forecast issued every other day (to combat command, armored division only).
- (2) Forty-eight hour forecast issued daily.
- (3) Twenty-four hour forecast issued twice daily; morning and afternoon.

The above forecasts will keep the regimental commander and his staff apprised of the expected weather situation in the regimental area.

*b.* In addition, severe weather warnings are required.

### 15. Reports of current weather

Reports of current weather will be required from time to time by the regimental commander and various members of his staff to assist them in analyzing the process of current operations. These reports may consist simply of weather observations or portions therefrom or they may be graphic or pictorial representations of the current weather situation for specified areas. Exact nature of individual requirements will be specified by the requesting agency. Normally, this information will be procured from battalions.

### 16. Weather summaries

Summaries of various weather parameters for specified periods of time in the past will be required from time to time by the regimental commander and various members of his staff. Information required and period for which information is desired will be specified by requesting agency.

## BATTALION

At battalion level requirements exist for climatic information, forecasts, reports of current weather, and weather summaries. Specific requirements for each of these classes of information are as follows:

### 17. Climatic information

At battalion there is no requirement for climatic information on a recurring basis. When information of this nature is required, it will be available from regiment or division.

### 18. Weather forecasts

There is a requirement for both general and special forecasts to be utilized by the battalion commander and his staff. In addition to the above forecasts, severe weather warnings are required.

### 19. Reports of current weather

Normally the requirements of the battalion commander and his staff for current weather will be satisfied by visual observation or by reports from elements of the battalion.

### 20. Weather summaries

Summaries of various weather parameters for specified periods of time in the past will be required from time to time by the battalion commander and his staff. Information required and period for which information is desired will be specified by requesting agency. Battalion requirements for weather summaries will normally be quite limited.

## APPENDIX V

### EXAMPLE OF TACTICAL STUDY OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

(Classification)

G2 Section, 20th Inf Div  
TEBANU, (6037), FARBEN  
040700 July 19 . . . .

#### TACTICAL STUDY OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN NO. 10

Map: FARBEN, 1:50,000, TEBANU—QUILMIN

#### 1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS

- a. Purpose. To analyze and evaluate weather and terrain in the GIRONNE—QUILMIN area.
- b. Mission, 20th Inf Div. Upon seizure of GIRONNE (4442) be prepared to continue attack; seize high ground—PENDU (4245)—PERU School (4749); protect crossing of I Corps at QUILMIN (5236).

#### 2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

- a. Climatic or weather conditions.
  - (1) Climate. Climate, Jul (Annex 1).
  - (2) Weather. Weather report, I Corps, 4 Jul—8 Jul (Annex 2).
    - (a) Precipitation. None predicted 4–8 Jul.
    - (b) Fog. Slight fog during early morning hours.
    - (c) Temperature. Temperature range 60° F. to 75° F.
    - (d) Wind. Southeast 5 to 8 miles per hour.
    - (e) Cloudiness. None predicted.
    - (f) Moon. Full moon 5 Jul.
    - (g) Light data.

(Tac Study of Wea and Terrain No. 10—20th Inf Div)

Date	BMNT	Sunrise	Sunset	EENT	Moonrise	Moonsset
4 July . . . . .	0329	0443	1940	2054	1916	0324
5 July . . . . .	0330	0444	1939	2053	2002	0414
6 July . . . . .	0330	0444	1939	2053	2046	0507
7 July . . . . .	0332	0445	1938	2051	2124	0604
8 July . . . . .	0333	0446	1938	2051	2156	0705

(Classification)

b. Terrain.

- (1) Relief and drainage systems. (Overlays 1 and 3.) Area is drained by the MEEN, UDY, and CARGO Creeks on the south and by the Range River on the north. South of the Range River the terrain rises evenly to the ridge from vicinity GIRONNE to the north edge of CHENEY; south of this ridge the slope is quite steep to the vicinity of the UDY Creek where it levels off again. The area south of Meen Creek is dominated by high ground to its east which is the highest terrain in the area. The Range River is unfordable; however, all streams are fordable at numerous points. The width of the Range River averages 150 feet and it is approximately 6 feet deep. The streams throughout the area vary in width from a few feet to as much as 25 feet with an average depth of 20 inches.
- (2) Vegetation. (Overlay 2.) Vegetation consists of row-crops, pasture land, orchards, and wooded area. Corn is the main crop and most crops are completely cut from the fields by the end of September. The large wooded area along the GIRONNE—PENDU—PERU School ridge is the only one in this area. Most trees in the area are deciduous, 10 inches in diameter, and approximately 10 to 12 yards apart. Underbrush has been cleared throughout the area.
- (3) Surface materials. (Overlay 3.) Surface material throughout most of the area consists of a medium-textured soil that is trafficable except during and immediately after heavy precipitation. The fine-textured soil that exists along the immediate banks of the MEEN, UDY, and CARGO Creeks is nontrafficable except during dry weather, such as is forecast for the period.
- (4) Manmade features. (Overlay 4.) No railroads exist in our zone of advance. The main roads include axial highways connecting GIRONNE, PENDY and FORVILLE and GIRONNE, CHENEY and PERU. Other secondary roads connect the primary highways. The towns of GIRONNE, CHENEY and PERU have populations of 4,000, 10,000 and 2,500 respectively. The majority of all buildings are constructed of wood and numerous small isolated farm buildings are prevalent. All bridges on main roads are two-way, class 50.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

a. Observation and fields of fire.

- (1) Weather conditions. The very slight fog forecast for the early morning hours will have no effect on observation.
- (Classification)

(Classification)

No precipitation is predicted. Weather conditions permit good observation and observed fire.

- (2) Relief. The high ground now held by Aggressor affords him excellent observation over approaches into his position. Excellent observation is also afforded Aggressor over the UDY Creek—CHENEY area as well as over the area to the north of MEEN Creek by the high ground vicinity PENDU and south of PERU.
- (3) Vegetation. The almost continuous wooded area along the ridge GIRONNE—PENDU—PERU School severely restricts observation and fields of fire in the northeast portion of our zone. The row-crops will to some extent limit observation and fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons. Fields of fire for high-angle weapons are good.
- (4) Manmade features. Several excellent points of observation such as church steeples in the numerous villages exist. Fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons will be limited by villages and farm buildings.

b. Concealment and cover.

- (1) Relief. Good concealment from ground observation and a fair degree of cover from small-arms fire is offered by the numerous ridges and folds in the ground.
- (2) Vegetation. Limited concealment and cover are provided by the vegetation in the southern part of our zone. Excellent concealment is provided by the woods along the GIRONNE—PENDU—PERU School ridge.
- (3) Manmade features. Villages and many scattered buildings afford a fair degree of concealment and cover.

c. Obstacles.

- (1) Drainage system.
  - (a) RANGE River.
  - (b) CARGO, UDY and MEEN streams.
- (2) Vegetation. Woods listed in subparagraph b(3) will impede the cross-country movement of all vehicles, including track-laying vehicles. The cultivated areas will limit wheeled vehicles only.
- (3) Surface materials. Soil trafficability is good throughout the area except along the beds of CARGO, UDY, and MEEN Creeks, all of which are fordable at numerous points.
- (4) Manmade features. The town of CHENEY is the only serious obstacle.

d. Critical terrain features.

- (1) High ground immediately south of GIRONNE. Dominating terrain controlling GIRONNE. Seizure by Aggres-

(Classification)



(Classification)

sor would prevent the successful launching of our attack.

- (2) Ridge extending southeast-northwest through south edge of CHENEY (4444). Dominates the area south of CHENEY to the UDY Creek. Seizure denies Aggressor critical observation over his left sector and forces him to withdraw to the north.
- (3) Ridge from the vicinity GIRONNE extending southwest-northeast through the north edge of CHENEY including the high ground extending south from the vicinity of PERU School. Seizure of this terrain will deny Aggressor the ability to defend any area south of the Range River. It is the last good defensive position available to Aggressor.
- (4) High ground vicinity of HAYE (3572). This high ground, if retained by the Aggressor, gives him a marked advantage in his defense south of the Range River.
- (5) Bridge over RANGE River at QUILMIN. Seizure of this bridge intact is very important to our advance.

e. Avenues of approach.

- (1) Available to Aggressor into our position.
  - (a) Into our position when the line of contact is Hill 72—COTZ.
    1. UDY and CARGO Creeks—adequate secondary road network, good concealment and cover but poor observation.
    2. GIRONNE—Hill 72. Considered the most desirable because of the good observation and continuous control of most direct route.
  - (b) Into our position when the line of contact is in the vicinity of GIRONNE.
    1. PERU School—CHENEY Ridge. Best avenue available to Aggressor—high ground facilitates movement even though it doesn't have the best road net.
    2. FORVILLE—GIRONNE Ridge.
    3. Valley approach on south.
- (2) Available to U. S. into Aggressor's position.
  - (a) To GIRONNE, the best approach is the Hill 72—GIRONNE Ridge approach, combining the best road with favorable trafficability and observation. The CARGO and UDY Creek approaches are about equal and considered poor in comparison to the ridge approach.
  - (b) To PENDU—PERU School from vicinity GIRONNE, the northern approach from CHENEY through PERU School to PENDU has the poorest road net

(Classification)

(Classification)

but leads directly to the high ground and is considered the best. The GIRONNE—FORVILLE approach does not possess the best observation, does not lead to dominating terrain and even though it does have a good road net is considered much inferior to the northern approach. The valley approach on the south is poor.

#### 4. TACTICAL EFFECT OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

##### a. Effect on enemy.

##### (1) Effect on enemy defense.

(a) Most logical Aggressor defensive or delaying positions astride our axis of advance are—

1. Present line of contact.
2. HAYE—CHENEY Ridge.
3. RANGE River position.

(b) Best defensive position available to Aggressor is the RANGE River position.

(c) The excellent weather conditions will permit Aggressor to use his supporting fires with maximum results.

##### (2) Effect on enemy attack.

(a) Aggressor's best avenue of approach is the ridge approach from PERU School—CHENEY—GIRONNE—Hill 72. Other avenues of approach available to Aggressor are—FORVILLE—GIRONNE, Valley approach on the south, CARGO and UDY Creeks.

(b) Weather conditions are such that Aggressor will not be able to maneuver toward our positions without being observed except during the hours of darkness. The lack of precipitation will favor cross-country mobility.

(c) Wind direction favors Aggressor's use of smoke.

##### b. Effect on courses of action required to accomplish our mission.

(1) Our best avenue of approach to GIRONNE is the Hill 72—GIRONNE Ridge approach, thence to PENDU—PERU School by the north ridge approach through CHENEY.

(2) The lack of any weather restrictions on observation will permit our forces to use supporting fires to their maximum; however, we will not be able to maneuver toward the enemy without being observed except during the hours of darkness. Fair weather insures good cross-country mobility. Stream depths will remain the same.

(3) Wind direction does not favor our use of smoke.

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SHORT

G2

- Annexes: A—Climatic Information (omitted)  
B—Weather Forecast (omitted)  
C—Relief Overlay (omitted)  
D—Vegetation Overlay (omitted)  
E—Surface Materials Diagram (omitted)  
F—Cultural Features Overlay (omitted)

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## APPENDIX VI

### EXAMPLE OF STATEMENT OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

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#### 1. *Situation.*

- a. At 011900 July, the US 20th Infantry Division, an interior division of I Corps, seized Hill 100 and received orders to continue the attack at 020700 July to seize Hill 101 (fig. 18).
- b. The enemy situation at 011900 July is as shown in figure 7.
- c. Foot elements of an unidentified, reinforced rifle regiment are moving south, and are now just north of Hill 102, marching in column of twos.
- d. Thirtieth Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with 150 fighter, 100 ground attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily, although the enemy can mass all aircraft within an operational radius of the army area and make a maximum of 1,250 fighter, 500 ground attack, and 400 bomber sorties daily.
- e. The 20th Infantry Division commander has directed G2 to present his estimate of enemy capabilities at 012000 July.
- f. End of evening nautical twilight is 012130 July.

#### 2. *Determination of Enemy Capabilities.*

- a. The friendly mission is to attack in zone at 020700 July to seize Hill 101. The enemy can delay the accomplishment of this mission by attacking, by defending against attack, and by reinforcing the enemy troops now in contact. The enemy can favor the accomplishment of the friendly mission by withdrawing beyond the division objective prior to the attack.
- b. Under attack, only one specific capability is selected: an attack along our front. Both flanks are secure and no other form of enemy ground attack appears to be possible. The *what* of this enemy capability is "frontal attack." The *when* of this attack capability is "now." The *where* is "along our front." The *in what strength*, considering forces locally available, is "three rifle battalions supported by all available artillery and air." (The reinforced rifle regiment north of Hill 102 is probably in division reserve and will be treated under the reinforcement capability.) In statement form: "The enemy can attack now along our front with three rifle battalions, supported by all available artillery and air."
- c. Under defense, again only one specific enemy capability is selected: to defend on Hill 101. The *what* is to "defend"; the *when* is "now"; the *where* is "on Hill 101"; and the *in what strength* is "three rifle



battalions supported by all available artillery and air." In statement form: "The enemy can defend now on Hill 101 with three rifle battalions supported by all available artillery and air."

- d. The next general capability open to the enemy is his capability of reinforcing his present units in contact. The *what* is to "reinforce"; the *where* is any local point which the reinforcement must reach in order to reinforce the elements in contact. Road Junction 200 is selected. The *in what strength* is the reinforced rifle regiment reported at 011900 July to be near Hill 102. The *when* involves enemy time and space computations as follows:

- (1) Point at which reinforcement becomes effective: Road Junction 200.
- (2) Only the arrival of foot elements of infantry units is computed since in enemy time and space calculations it is assumed that all motorized and armored elements of a reinforced rifle regiment can be in position to support the foot elements by the time the foot elements have closed.
- (3) Only travel time and closing time are computed.
- (4) Calculations:

Time last reported .....	1900
Travel time (4½ miles at 2½ MPH) .....	0148
Closing time (2 Bn at 10 min each) .....	0020
<hr/>	
Arrival time .....	2108 (2110)

In statement form: "The enemy can reinforce his attack or defense on Hill 101 with one reinforced rifle regiment by 012110 July."

- e. Capability to withdraw. In statement form: "The enemy can withdraw any time prior to our attack beyond the division objective."
- f. Capability for air action. In statement form: "Thirtieth Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with 150 fighter, 100 ground attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily; however, by massing all aircraft within an operational radius the enemy can mount a maximum of 1,250 fighter, 500 ground attack, and 400 bomber sorties daily."

## APPENDIX VII

## GUIDE TO DETERMINATION OF INDICATIONS\*

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
1. ATTACK-----	<p>a. Establishment or strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen.</p> <p>b. Movement of hostile units forward.</p> <p>c. Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas.</p> <p>d. Location of artillery well forward.</p> <p>e. Increased patrolling-----</p> <p>f. Enemy units disposed on relatively narrow frontages.</p>	<p>Counterreconnaissance screens are used to cover possible assembly areas, routes of troop movement, or regrouping of forces to be used in an attack.</p> <p>Prior to launching an attack troops may be moved to assembly areas from which they can deploy.</p> <p>Location of enemy assembly areas from which an attack can be launched.</p> <p>Disposition of artillery in areas from which it can support an attack. Artillery located well forward, and generally in line.</p> <p>Patrolling by infantry and armored cavalry is usually more active prior to an attack.</p> <p>The yardstick is normal frontage of the battalion in the attack.</p>	<p>Location enemy elements beyond which you are unable to penetrate. Particularly along line * * *.</p> <p>Movement of hostile units towards possible assembly areas vicinity of * * *.</p> <p>Movement hostile unit along road(s) * * *.</p> <p>Location bodies of troops in area(s) * * *.</p> <p>Location, type, and caliber of artillery vicinity * * *.</p> <p>Location, type, and caliber of artillery in area(s) * * *.</p> <p>Number, size, and activity of infantry and armored cavalry patrols in area * * *.</p> <p>Location flanks of enemy units along line * * *.</p>

	g. Covering forces being reinforced or replaced by new units.	Reconnaissance elements being replaced or reinforced by infantry may indicate an attack.	New identifications, particular attention infantry and armored units. Armored cavalry identifications. Location infantry and armored cavalry, particularly along line * * *.
	h. Increased activity rear areas-----	Prior to an attack, supply and administrative activities generally increase in the rear areas.	Numbers, type, movement, and direction of traffic in area * * *.
	i. Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations well forward.	Command posts, supply and evacuation installations usually located well forward for an attack.	Location command posts, supply and evacuation establishment. Supply and evacuation installations vicinity * * *.
	j. Registration of hostile field artillery fire upon points within our defensive position.	Hostile field artillery may register preliminary to artillery preparation in support of the attack.	Shell reports from subordinate units.
	k. Increased air reconnaissance-----	Air reconnaissance is usually more active prior to an attack.	Reports as to the amount and type of air activity over our position.
	l. Systematic air bombardment----	Preliminary to the attack the enemy may engage in systematic "softening up" of our positions by bombardment.	Reports as to the amount and type of air activity over our position.
2. DEFENSE-----	a. Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, and minefields.	The installing or presence of demolitions and minefields, etc., covering approaches to enemy position is additional protection.	Location and extent of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, minefields, front and flanks present position.

\*NOTE. For indications concerning employment of atomic weapons, see FM 100-31.



(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
2. DEFENSE—Con.	<p>b. Deployment of infantry on good defensive terrain.</p> <p>c. Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment and fortifying buildings.</p> <p>d. Entrenching and erection of bands of wire.</p> <p>e. Artillery disposed in depth (To include antitank weapons.)</p>	<p>Dominating terrain with good fields of fire is usually selected by infantry for a defensive position. Engineer tools and equipment may be used in the digging of trenches and erection of obstacles.</p> <p>Digging of trenches and erection of wire may mean the enemy is preparing to hold his present position.</p> <p>Artillery is usually disposed in depth and located centrally to support a defensive position.</p>	<p>Installation demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, minefields along line * * *.</p> <p>Installation demolitions, gassed areas, obstacles, radiological and biological contamination, minefields on high ground * * *.</p> <p>Location infantry on high ground along * * *.</p> <p>Location infantry along * * * River.</p> <p>Dumping ammunition or engineer supplies and equipment on present location.</p> <p>Dumping ammunition or engineer supplies and equipment on * * *.</p> <p>Entrenching and erection of wire on present position.</p> <p>Entrenching and erection of wire on * * *.</p> <p>Entrenching and erection of wire along line * * *.</p> <p>Location of artillery.</p> <p>Location of artillery in area * * *.</p>

### 3. WITHDRAWAL---

f. Reserves located to support the defense.	Reserves are usually located in a position where they can be used on either flank to strengthen or counterattack.	Location of troops in rear present line of contact. Troops located in area * * *.
g. Movement to rear of troops previously located in forward areas.	Reconnaissance and covering forces may withdraw to the flanks or move to locations within the defensive position.	Movement of hostile units along road * * *.
h. Location command post, supply and evacuation installations to rear.	Command posts, supply and evacuation installations usually located well to the rear out of reach of long-range artillery fire.	Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations. Supply and evacuation installations vicinity * * *.
a. Rearward movement of supply and evacuation installations.	Movement of these installations to the rear would generally indicate the forces which they were supporting were to move rearward.	Movement of supply and evacuation installations to the rear. Location supply and evacuation installation. Movement of fully loaded supply vehicles to the rear.
b. Movement of small elements straight to the rear from the frontline.	Small bodies of troops often assemble into larger groups (platoons, companies, and battalions) out of effective range of small arms before a general withdrawal.	Movement small bodies of troops straight to rear.
c. Movement of larger units to the rear.	Large bodies of troops moving to rear would indicate the enemy was to occupy a position farther to the rear or a complete withdrawal.	Movement large bodies of troops to rear. Movement large bodies of troops along road * * *.

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
3. WITHDRAWAL— Continued	<p>d. Movement to and occupation by reserves of positions in rear of or on flanks of the initial position.</p> <p>e. Organization of defensive positions in rear.</p> <p>f. Extensive demolitions, obstacles, minefields, areas behind or on flanks of present line of contact contaminated with chemical, biological or radioactive agents.</p> <p>g. Loss of contact by any elements.</p> <p>h. Rearward displacement of artillery by echelon.</p>	<p>Troops located in these positions can cover the withdrawals as well as counterattack pursuing forces.</p> <p>Entrenching, barbed wire, obstacles on suitable terrain to the rear indicates the enemy may occupy that position.</p> <p>This action could indicate preparations for delaying our pursuit when the enemy moved to the rear.</p> <p>Withdrawal of enemy may be preceded by our loss of contact with enemy elements at points along the line.</p> <p>Artillery units are often displaced by echelon to protect the covering force and furnish protection for new positions.</p>	<p>Location of troops in rear or on flanks of present position.</p> <p>Troops located in area * * *.</p> <p>Entrenching, erection of wire on * * *.</p> <p>Dumping engineer supplies and equipment on * * *.</p> <p>Demolitions, minefields, obstacles, areas behind present line of contact contaminated with chemical, biological, or radioactive agents.</p> <p>Demolitions, minefields, obstacles, areas along line contaminated with chemical, biological, or radioactive agents.</p> <p>Loss of contact.</p> <p>Movement of artillery between * * * and * * *.</p> <p>Location and strength of artillery in area * * *.</p> <p>Number of batteries at * * * (last known position).</p>

#### 4. DELAYING ACTION.

i. Local counterattacks by both ground and air forces.	Counterattacks and air attacks may be used to cover disengagement.	Strength, composition, and location of counterattacks against subordinate units.
j. Location, density and size of smoke screens in area(s).	Delaying forces may disengage under cover of smoke or darkness.	Strength and type of air attacks against subordinate units.
k. Movement of medium and heavy antiaircraft artillery from a pattern of position areas which is roughly parallel to the front to a pattern which is perpendicular to the front; i. e., from the defense of depots and field artillery and headquarters areas to a defense of likely routes of withdrawal.	Antiaircraft protection needed as supplies and personnel withdraw.	Location, density and size of smoke screens in area(s) * * *
Same as WITHDRAWAL with the following additions:		Locations and strength of medium and heavy antiaircraft artillery.
a. Enemy disposed on a broad front with little depth.	Early development of maximum firepower for short periods may increase delay.	Location of reserves and organization of the ground in areas * * *.
	Disposition on a broad front will allow enemy to oppose encircling force on routes leading to his rear.	Examine air photographs of area in rear of the line of contact.



b. Increased traffic toward present position.

This increased traffic may bring up additional troops and supplies.

Traffic (motor, rail, shipping, etc.) from north, south, east, or west.  
Traffic (motor, rail, shipping, air transport, etc.) from \* \* \*.  
Traffic (motor, rail, etc.) along road(s) \* \* \* and railroad(s) \* \* \*.

c. Identification of new units in combat zone.

The presence of new units in addition to units already present will increase enemy's strength.

Type, number, speed enemy vehicles moving toward present enemy position from \* \* \* particularly along road \* \* \*.

d. Increased aggressiveness or patrolling on part of force in contact.

This activity might indicate the presence of additional units.

Are decks of vessel crowded with troops and gear, or empty?

New identifications \* \* \*.

Identify \* \* \*.

Number, size, identification, and activities patrols in area \* \* \*.

Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations particularly in area \* \* \*.

Battalions or larger units unable to gain contact.

Capture of critical objectives-----

Capture of objective.

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
5. REINFORCEMENT—Continued	e. Additional command posts, supply and evacuation installations.	Presence of additional units could cause an increase in number of these installations.	Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations.
6. LOCAL DEFEAT <sup>1</sup>	a. Loss of contact by major elements in advance or attack. b. Large number of dead, or prisoners from same unit.	Withdrawal by enemy or penetration of defended locality. Collapse of organized resistance by unit. Loss of leaders; death, casualty, or capture. Low morale-----	Lessening of small arms and supporting fires at * * *. Identification of battalion or larger unit (in numbers). Capture of field officers.
7. TERRAIN-----	c. Capture of command posts of major units. d. Capture of artillery positions; supply installations, hospitals, and other rear area installations.	Elements penetrating deep into enemy's defensive position. Elements have passed through defensive position. Organized resistance by scattered service elements.	Capture of 50 percent of battalion or larger unit. Capture of regimental or higher command posts. Capture of artillery batteries or battalions. Capture of large amounts of enemy weapons or equipment.
	a. Conditions of terrain affecting our own and enemy operations.  b. Critical terrain features-----	Width, velocity, depth, banks, and bottoms of rivers are examples of terrain conditions affecting military operations.  Hills, ridges, valleys, plains, roads, routes of communications, etc., influence any operation and must be taken into consideration.	Width, velocity, depth, banks, bottoms, and approaches to * * * River.  Military description of terrain in zone of action, particular attention to * * *.

<sup>1</sup> Recognition of local defeat permits maximum exploitation by commander. Report apparent defeat by fastest means.

## APPENDIX VIII

### EXAMPLE, INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

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(Classification)

Copy No. 8  
20th Inf Div  
DAVIDSON (5580) FARBEN  
012030 May . . . .  
HM 456

Annex A (Intel) to OpO 12

Map: FARBEN, 1: 50,000, MOUNT CHARLES—BALTHIS

#### 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

See ISUM, this headquarters, 011800 May.

#### 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Will the enemy defend the SWIFT River position? If so, with what organization of the ground, to include location and activities of reserves?
- b. Will the enemy reinforce units now in contact? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special attention to rifle division at MORRISTOWN (0079), rifle battalion vicinity MARSHALL (3785), and tank regiment vicinity PARKERSBURG (3782).
- c. Will the enemy attack prior to our attack? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Particular attention to avenues of approach northeast of HYLE (4868) and southeast of LAMONT (4587).
- d. Will the enemy withdraw beyond the MOUNT CHARLES area prior to or during our attack? If so, to what position?
- e. Will the enemy delay in present position and in successive positions to MOUNT CHARLES (3086)? Special attention to high ground north of the line CHEROKEE (3392)—MOUNT CHARLES—DAKOTA (3080).
- f. What natural or artificial obstacles exist within the division zone? What are their nature and extent?

#### 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

Appendix 1, Reconnaissance and Observation Missions.

#### 4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL

Prisoners of war of the rank of Colonel or higher will be reported to division G2 without delay.

#### 5. MAPS AND PHOTOS

24 hour notice required for preplanned airphoto missions. Requests due at division CP by 1400 daily.

(Classification)



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6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
SOP

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

Effective 020001 May units will submit intelligence summaries at 0600, 1200, 1800, 2400 daily in lieu of times heretofore in effect.

Acknowledge.

MOSES  
Maj Gen

Distr: Same as OpO 12

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Rice

RICE

G2

(Classification)

(Classification)

Copy No. 8

20th Inf. Div.

DAVIDSON (5580) FARBEN

012030 May.....

HM

Appendix 1 (Reconnaissance and Observation Missions) to Annex A (Intel) to OpO 12

Map: FARBEN, 1: 50,000, MOUNT CHARLES—BALTHIS

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. Annex A (Intel) to OpO 12.
- b. Friendly forces. OpO 12.

2. MISSION

Seize MOUNT CHARLES (3086); continue attack to the west on corps order to seize SHAWNEE (1393).

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Orders to attached and subordinate units.

(1) 58th Inf (when committed, or if appropriate):

(a) Report, as obtained, to division command post; negative report every 4 hours beginning 012000 May.

- 1. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, minefields, and CBR contaminated areas in hostile position within your zone. Special attention to area between 4284 and 4791.
- 2. Dumping of engineer supplies and equipment vicinity HARDIN (4487).
- 3. Evidences of fortification of buildings in your zone. Particular attention to vicinity of HARDIN (4487) and HANKSTON (4488).
- 4. Extent of hostile entrenching in areas vicinity 4286 and 4791.
- 5. All command posts, supply and evacuation installations east of the line MOUNT CHARLES (3086)—BALTHIS (2867).
- 6. Activity and number of troops employed in areas vicinity 4186.
- 7. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, and minefields in areas near 4286 and 4791.

(b) Report, as obtained, to division command post:

- 1. Location of battalion strongpoints in your zone, particularly those disposed for all-round protection. Special attention to area between 4284 and 4791.
- 2. Identification of command post located in DAVIDSON (3283).

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(Classification)

3. Number, extent, and frequency of enemy aerial reconnaissance flights over area.
  4. Location of antitank defenses in your zone.
  5. Condition of banks, bottom, width, and depth of water in the SWIFT River and the HALL River (4281).
- (2) 59th Inf:
- (a) Report, as obtained, to division command post; negative report every 4 hours beginning 012000 May:
    1. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, minefields, and CBR contaminated areas in hostile positions within your zone.
    2. Hostile entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present line of contact.
    3. Movement and activity of infantry or armored elements in the vicinity of PARKERSBURG (3782) and MARSHALL (3785).
    4. All command posts, supply and evacuation installations east of the line MOUNT CHARLES (3086)—BALTHIS (2867).
    5. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling along the line of contact.
    6. Movement and activity of infantry elements northeast of NEWLAND (4084).
    7. Estimated strength and location of enemy troops in 6. above.
    8. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in your zone.
    9. Activity and number of troops employed in areas vicinity 4186 and 4989.
    10. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, and minefields in areas near 4286 and 4791.
    11. Loss of contact by any element along the present position.
  - (b) Report, as obtained, to division command post:
    1. Location of battalion strong points in your zone, particularly those disposed for all-round protection. Special attention to area between 4284 and 4791.
    2. Identification of command post located in DAVIDSON (3283).
    3. Number, size, composition, routes, and time observed of enemy patrols in your zone.
    4. Flanks of each enemy unit identified in your zone.
    5. Location of tanks and self-propelled guns in your zone.

(Classification)

(Classification)

6. Volume and type of traffic on roads: HEYMONT (4983)—LONGVILLE (4283); HEYMONT—READ (4180).
  7. Location of supply and evacuation installations in your zone east of the line BEYER (3685)—TALBOTT (3460).
  8. Number, extent, and frequency of enemy aerial reconnaissance flights over area.
  9. Location of antitank defenses in your zone.
  10. Condition of banks, bottom, width, and depth of water in the SWIFT River and the HALL River (4281).
- (c) Report, as obtained, consolidated report at 0800, 1400, and 2000 daily to division command post:  
Location of long-range artillery of forces opposing you.
- (3) 60th Inf:
- (a) Report, as obtained, to division command post; negative report every 4 hours beginning 012000 May:
    1. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, minefields and CBR contaminated areas in hostile position within your zone.
    2. Evidences of fortification of buildings in your zone, particularly in BECK CITY (4289) and CASSIBRY (3877).
    3. Hostile entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present line of contact.
    4. All command posts, supply and evacuation installations east of the line MOUNT CHARLES (3086)—BALTHIS (2867).
    5. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling along the line of contact.
    6. Movement and activity of infantry elements near TAYNTON (4078).
    7. Estimated strength and location of enemy troops in 6. above.
    8. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in your zone.
    9. Loss of contact by any element along the present position.
  - (b) Report, as obtained, to division command post:
    1. Location of battalion strong points in your zone, particularly these disposed for all-round protection.
    2. Number, size, composition, routes, and time observed of enemy patrols in your zone.
    3. Flanks of each enemy unit identified in your zone.

(Classification)

(Classification)

4. Location of tanks and self-propelled guns in your zone.
5. Volume and type of traffic on road 406899—KAILVILLE (4478).
6. Location of supply and evacuation installations in your zone east of the line BEYER (3685)—TALBOTT (3460).
7. Number, extent, and frequency of enemy aerial reconnaissance flights over area.
8. Location of antitank defenses in your zone.
9. Condition of banks, bottom, width, and depth of water in the SWIFT River and the HALL River (4281).
- (c) Report, as obtained, consolidated report at 0800, 1400, and 2000 daily to division command post:  
Location of long-range artillery of forces opposing you.
- (4) Div Arty:
  - (a) Report, as obtained, to division command post; negative report every 4 hours beginning 012000 May:
    1. Movement and activity of infantry or armored elements in the vicinity of PARKERSBURG (3782) and MARSHALL (3785).
    2. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.
  - (b) Report, as obtained, to division command post:
    1. Dumping of ammunition near battery positions Vicinity DE REUS JUNCTION (4176), BIRRER (4982), and BOLLING WOODS (3580).
    2. Volume and type of traffic on roads:  
406899—KAILVILLE (4478); HEYMONT (4983)—LONGVILLE (4283); HEYMONT (4983)—READ (4180).
    3. Location of supply and evacuation installations in division zone east of the line BEYER (3685)—TALBOTT (3460).
    4. Number, extent, and frequency of enemy aerial reconnaissance flights over area.
    5. Movement of long-range artillery to rear in division zone.
  - (c) Report, as obtained consolidated report at 0800, 1400, and 2000 daily to division command post:
    1. Location of all artillery and mortar positions in division zone, to include those occupied and unoccupied, and number of pieces.
    2. Unoccupied artillery positions prepared and stocked with ammunition in division zone.

(Classification)

(Classification)

3. Location of long-range artillery of forces opposing this division.
- (5) 20th Tk Bn:  
Report, as obtained, to division command post the number, extent, and frequency of enemy aerial reconnaissance flights over area.
- (6) 20th Recon Co:
  - (a) Report, as obtained, to division command post; negative report every 4 hours beginning 012000 May:
    1. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, minefields, and CBR contaminated areas in hostile positions within your zone. Special attention to area between 4284 and 4791.
    2. Dumping of engineer supplies and equipment vicinity HARDIN (4487).
    3. Evidences of fortification of buildings, particularly in vicinity of HARDIN (4487) and HANKSTON (4488).
    4. Hostile entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present line of contact.
    5. Extent of hostile entrenching in areas vicinity 4286 and 4791.
    6. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling along the line of contact.
    7. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in your zone.
    8. Activity and number of troops employed in area vicinity 4186.
    9. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, and minefields in area near 4286 and 4791.
    10. Loss of contact by any element along the present position.
  - (b) Report, as obtained, to division command post:
    1. Location of battalion strong points in your zone, particularly those disposed for all-round protection. Special attention to area between 4284 and 4791.
    2. Number, size, composition, routes, and time observed of enemy patrols in your zone.
    3. Flanks of each enemy unit identified in your zone.
    4. Location of tanks and self-propelled guns in your zone.
    5. Location of supply and evacuation installations in your zone east of the line BEYER (3685)—TALBOTT (3460).
    6. Number, extent, and frequency of enemy aerial reconnaissance flights over area.

(Classification)

(Classification)

7. Location of antitank defenses in your zone.
  8. Condition of banks, bottom, width, and depth of water in the SWIFT River (4080) and the HALL River (4281).
  - (c) Report, as obtained, consolidated report at 0800, 1400, and 2000 daily to division command post:  
Location of long-range artillery of forces opposing you.
- (7) 20th Engr Bn:
- (a) Report, as obtained, to division command post; negative reports every 4 hours beginning 012000 May:
    1. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, minefields, and CBR contaminated areas in hostile positions within division zone. Special attention to area between 4284 and 4791.
    2. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.
  - (b) Report, as obtained, to division command post:
    1. Number, extent, and frequency of enemy aerial reconnaissance flights over area.
    2. Location of antitank defenses in division zone.
    3. Condition of banks, bottom, width, and depth of water in the SWIFT River and the HALL River (4281).
- b. Requests to higher, adjacent and cooperating units.
- (1) I Corps is requested to provide information of—
- (a) As obtained, to division command post; negative reports every 4 hours beginning 012000 May:
    1. Extent of hostile entrenching in areas vicinity 3573 and 3588.
    2. Location of command posts, and supply and evacuation installations in area: MOUNT CHARLES (3086)—BATES (2400)—LYNCHBURG (2983).
    3. Movement and activity of infantry or armored elements in the vicinity of PARKERSBURG (3782) and MARSHALL (3785).
    4. Movement and activity of estimated rifle division at MORRISTOWN (0079).
    5. Changes in estimated strength of rifle division at MORRISTOWN (0079).
    6. Amount, type, and direction of movement of motor and rail traffic on highways and railroads through FRANKLIN (1888), CULPTON (2074), BALTHIS (2867), and WILHM (3555).

(Classification)

(Classification)

7. Volume, type, and direction of movement of traffic on roads: 365817-499809; 379873-429865.
8. Volume, type, and direction of movement of traffic on highways: SHAWNEE (1292)—MOUNT CHARLES (3086); CULPTON (2074)—MOUNT CHARLES: CULPTON—BALTHIS (2867), and DE LUCA (1055)—WILHM (3555).
9. All command posts, supply and evacuation installations east of the line MOUNT CHARLES (3086)—BALTHIS (2867).
10. Movement of fully loaded supply vehicles to the rear along the roads through FRANKLIN (1888), CULPTON (2074), BALTHIS (2867), and WILHM (3555).
11. Activity and number of troops employed in areas vicinity 3573, 3588, 3182, and 3087.
12. Construction or occupation of positions in area CHEROKEE (3392)—MOUNT CHARLES (3086)—DAKOTA (3080).
13. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, and minefields in areas near 3573, 3588, 3182, and 3087.
- (b) As obtained, to division command post:
  1. Identification of command post located in DAVIDSON (3283).
  2. Movement of long-range artillery to rear in division zone.
  3. Location of antitank defenses in division zone.
  4. Location of antitank defenses in area between the line CASSIBRY (3877)—HEYMONT (4983) and MOUNT CHARLES (3086).
  5. Condition of banks, bottom, width, and depth of water in the SWIFT River (4080) and the HALL River (4281).
  6. Condition of banks, bottom, width, and depth of water in the TREDENNICK River (3584) and the DAY-KIN River (3080).
- (c) As obtained, consolidated report at 0800, 1400, and 2000 daily to division command post:
  1. Location of all artillery and mortar positions in zone, to include those occupied and unoccupied and number of pieces.
  2. Unoccupied artillery positions prepared and stocked with ammunition in division zone.

(Classification)



(Classification)

(2) 1st Bn, 201st Armd Cav is requested to provide information of—

(a) As obtained, to division command post; negative reports every 4 hours beginning 012000 May:

1. Installation of demolitions, obstacles, minefields, and CBR contaminated areas in hostile position within your zone.
2. Hostile entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present line of contact.
3. Activity and size of units blocking your patrolling along the line of contact.
4. Loss of contact by any element along the present position.

(b) As obtained, to division command post:

1. Location of battalion strong points in your zone, particularly those disposed for all-round protection.
2. Number, size, composition, routes, and time observed of enemy patrols in your zone.
3. Flanks of each enemy unit identified in your zone.
4. Location of tanks and self-propelled guns in your zone.
5. Location of supply and evacuation installations in your zone east of the line BEYER (3685)—TALBOTT (3460).
6. Movement of long-range artillery to rear in your zone.
7. Location of antitank defenses in your zone.

(c) As obtained, consolidated report at 0800, 1400, and 2000 daily to division command post:

Location of long-range artillery of forces opposing you.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

AdminO 5.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

Annex C (Signal) to OpO 12.

Acknowledge.

MOSES

Maj Gen

Distribution: Same as OpO 12

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Rice

RICE

G2

(Classification)

## APPENDIX IX

### FORM, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

---

(Classification)

Issuing subdivision and headquarters

Place

Date/time group

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. ....

References: (Maps, charts, and relevant documents.)

1. MISSION

(If the mission is multiple, state priorities; if there are intermediate tasks, list them.)

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS<sup>1</sup>

(Characteristics of the area and their effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations and on our counterintelligence operations.)

a. Weather.

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations.

(3) Effect on our counterintelligence operations.

b. Terrain.<sup>1</sup>

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE SITUATION

a. Disposition.

b. Composition.

c. Strength, including efficiency of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage organization.

d. Recent and present significant intelligence, subversive, and sabotage activities (including enemy's knowledge of our intelligence situation).

e. Reinforcements.

f. Peculiarities and weaknesses.

4. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES

a. Note all capabilities under the following headings:

(1) Intelligence (include all methods of which the enemy is known or estimated to be capable).

(2) Sabotage (include all capabilities of military, political, and economic sabotage possible of execution by agents and guerillas).

<sup>1</sup> The following additional factors may be considered, as appropriate, under appropriate subparagraphs of paragraph 2: c. Sociology; d. Politics; e. Economics; f. Other factors (such as sensitive personnel and sensitive points). They are analyzed under the same headings as weather.

(Classification)

(Classification)

- (3) Subversion (include all types of psychological warfare propaganda, sedition, treason, disaffection, and the like, affecting own troops, allies, and local civilians, and assistance in evasion and escape of hostile politicians, criminals, and refugees).
  - b. Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities to justify (when possible) the selection of relative probability of adoption of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage capabilities.
5. CONCLUSIONS
- a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage capabilities.
  - b. Effects of enemy intelligence, sabotage, and subversive capabilities.
    - (1) Consider what general and (where possible) specific effects enemy capabilities will have on the accomplishment of the mission of the command.
    - (2) Consider what effects capabilities will have on our own operation including requirements for personnel and material, on—
      - (a) Military security.
      - (b) Civil security.
      - (c) Port, frontier, and travel security.
      - (d) Censorship.
      - (e) Special operation.

/s/ .....

Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

(Classification)

## APPENDIX X

### EXAMPLE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, CORPS

(Classification)

G2 Section  
I Corps  
CHINNE, FARBEN  
011800 Aug. ....

#### COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 3

Map: FARBEN, 1:50,000, BERNARD-LEWISTON

##### 1. MISSION

Corps continues attack to the west on army order to seize ST BRIEUC (52404).

Moves 55th Inf Div to vicinity of BERNARD (6582), prepared to relieve 20th Inf Div about 6 Aug.

##### 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

###### a. Weather.

- (1) Expected situation. During period 1-6 Aug: weather clear. Visibility restricted from 300 to 600 yards by fog from 0400 until 0900; unrestricted after 1000. Wind from west 10 to 12 mph on 1 Aug; no appreciable wind thereafter. Full moon 1 Aug.

###### Light Data

	BMNT	EENT	MOONRISE	MOONSET
1 Aug	0310	2059	2030	0710
	*	*	*	*
6 Aug	0319	2046	2345	1025

- (2) Effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations. Moonlight will increase the difficulty of concealing movement in open areas and will make undetected parachute drops difficult. Use of air reconnaissance will be restricted during periods of low visibility.
- (3) Effect on our counterintelligence operations. Weather conditions will impose no particular restrictions on our counterintelligence operations.

(Classification)

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b. Terrain.

- (1) Existing situation. The area south of LEWISTON is covered by orchards and cultivated fields separated by hedgerows. Small wooded areas exist along streams in the area, no obstacles to foot movement exist in the area. The RAPID River is fordable with difficulty. All bridges across this river have been destroyed except those at 709889 and 725864. All bridges across the KUHN River have been destroyed. Corps engineers has built two ponton bridges across this river at BERNARD. BERNARD, population 12,000, is the only urban center of any size in the area. A railroad runs through the area from SUTTER (615803) to CHRISTIN (644742).
- (2) Effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations. The orchards, woods, and buildings will furnish enemy agents hiding places during daylight. Orchards, woods, and hedgerows will conceal movement at night. BERNARD will afford enemy agents opportunities to conceal their identity by mingling with the local population. The cultivated fields surrounded by orchards afford drop and landing sites for enemy agents and supplies. Bridges across the RAPID River afford targets for saboteurs.
- (3) Effect on our counterintelligence operations. Enemy agents operating out of BERNARD can infiltrate the bivouac area making detection difficult. Orchards and woods afford us natural camouflage.

c. Sociology.

- (1) Existing situation. The people of the BERNARD area are predominantly engaged in farming or marketing of agricultural products. They are glad to be rid of Aggressor who requisitioned most of their produce. Various fraternal organizations are patriotic and friendly to us.
- (2) Effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations. Majority of citizens are not susceptible to recruitment as Aggressor agents or informers.
- (3) Effect on our counterintelligence operations. Individuals may voluntarily report suspected Aggressor agents or informers. Fraternal organizations provide a source of information on Aggressor sympathizers, agents, or informers.

d. Politics.

- (1) Existing situation. The BERNARD area is in the EAND PUB Department. Departments are similar to our states. The local government is the commune, headed by the mayor, who is elected by popular vote. Aggressor policy during oc-

(Classification)

(Classification)

cupation was to use existing framework as much as possible, controlling nationally and supervising locally. The present mayors of BERNARD, CANTRELL, BYKERK, and COL-FAX have been in office for 2 years. They have reputations for collaborating with the enemy only to the extent necessary to maintain office, while their sympathies are with us. Additional details regarding the political situation may be obtained from civil affairs platoon.

- (2) Effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations. Aggressor has had ample opportunity to infiltrate collaborators into local government; however, present attitude of local officials (friendly to us) will make further infiltration difficult.
- (3) Effect on our counterintelligence operations. Friendly civilian officials are excellent sources of information of enemy agents, persons sympathetic to the enemy, and enemy sabotage or subversive groups.

e. Economics.

- (1) Existing situation. Economy of the BERNARD area is predominantly agricultural. BERNARD itself is primarily an agricultural marketing town, with little industry. Food stocks are adequate for local consumption.
- (2) Effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations. The adequate food supply will make it more difficult for subversive elements to incite discontent.
- (3) Effect on our counterintelligence operations. Probability of food riots and pilferage of U. S. food supplies is reduced.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE SITUATION

a. Composition. Aggressor clandestine agents belong to 1 of 3 organizations.

- (1) Agents collecting combat intelligence information are part of the armed forces and are under control of field army headquarters. They are part of an organization known as SU. Units below army sometimes send their agents through our lines, but this is contrary to Aggressor doctrine.
- (2) Aggressor agents collecting strategic intelligence information, and those engaging in sabotage and subversion are controlled from the Aggressor central government, and operate independently of the armed forces under an organization named KUR.
- (3) Aggressor counterintelligence activities are carried out by a third organization, not part of the armed forces, known as MURSH.

(Classification)

(Classification)

- b. Strength, including efficiency of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage organization. It is estimated that there are at least 10 Aggressor agents at large in the BERNARD area. Aggressor is known to rely on large numbers of poorly trained operatives rather than a small, select group. Three or four percent of all Aggressor armed forces are engaged in intelligence activities. Aggressor radio intelligence operations are of the same efficiency as ours. Aggressor techniques of questioning prisoners of war, deserters, and civilians are very effective.
  - c. Disposition. Little is known of present disposition of Aggressor agents in the area. KUR agents are often found masquerading as businessmen or journalists and carrying passports of neutral countries or fraudulent identification cards.
  - d. Recent and present significant intelligence, subversive, and sabotage activities. Many civilians have been apprehended recently for minor infractions of our security regulations. These civilians made no attempt to hide their activities and seemed to welcome arrest and interrogation. The purpose is believed to be to enable Aggressor to learn our methods, who questions suspects, what line our questioning takes, etc. A small Aggressor radio transmitter and receiver were discovered 29 Jul buried in an orchard at 643830. Five parachutes were discovered 30 Jul near 633804. Aggressor characteristically leaves agents behind in evacuated areas. These agents remain inactive for a short time, then send reports to Aggressor by radio or line crossers. Such agents also engage in sabotage of lucrative targets.
  - e. Logistics. Aggressor has left buried radios, explosives, and other supplies in other evacuated areas, and can be presumed to have done so in the BERNARD area. The quantity of supplies in the BERNARD area is not known. Aggressor drops radios and other supplies at night by parachute, and is believed to have sufficient supplies to undertake extensive intelligence, subversive, or sabotage operations.
  - f. Reinforcements. Aggressor has adequate French-speaking personnel trained for activities behind our lines to reinforce the agents in any area that is important to him.
  - g. Peculiarities and weaknesses. None.
4. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES

- a. (1) Intelligence. Aggressor can collect information on our concentration by visual and photo air reconnaissance; by interception of our communications, particularly radio; by interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, Aggressor's evaders and escapers, and refugees; by monitoring civilian press and radio;

(Classification)

(Classification)

and by examination of captured documents, maps, and orders. Aggressor can collect information from agents dropped by parachute, infiltrated through the frontlines, or left behind when he evacuated the area.

- (2) Sabotage. Aggressor agents or sympathizers can attempt to damage our installations, supplies, and equipment. They can attempt to destroy the bridges across the RAPID River.
- (3) Subversion. Aggressor agents or sympathizers can create alarm or dissention between our troops and the friendly population by disseminating propaganda and spreading false rumors.

b. Analysis and discussion.

- (1) Intelligence. Information on our concentration is important to Aggressor; to obtain it, he can be expected to utilize all sources and agencies available. Air reconnaissance, radio intercept, and agents are particularly productive agencies. Our personnel on reconnaissance and 20th Inf Div personnel who have knowledge of our mission are subject to capture and interrogation.
- (2) Sabotage. The bridges across the RAPID River, supply installations, motor parks, and gun parks are profitable sabotage targets.
- (3) Subversion. Dissemination of propaganda and spreading of false rumors are carried on continually by persons sympathetic to Aggressor. Contact between our troops and civilians, particularly those from BERNARD, unavoidably assists these activities.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Relative probability of adoption. Aggressor can be expected to carry out all his activities with emphasis on collection of information. He will engage in sabotage at every opportunity. Subversive activities will be conducted concurrently with other capabilities.

b. Effects of enemy intelligence, sabotage, and subversive activities.

(1) Effect on our mission.

- (a) Intelligence. Enemy intelligence activities cannot prevent the continuation of our attack and relief of the 20th Inf Div. However, if Aggressor is successful in his intelligence measures, we will lose the advantage of surprise in our relief of the 20th Inf Div.
- (b) Sabotage. If Aggressor succeeds in his attempts to sabotage our supply installations, logistical support of forthcoming operations will be impaired.
- (c) Subversion. Enemy subversive activities cannot prevent our relief of the 20th Inf Div. Dissention or alarm among

(Classification)



(Classification)

our troops will have a negligible effect on the accomplishment of our mission.

(2) Effect on our counterintelligence operations.

(a) Military security. The measures announced in the Corps SOP are considered to be effective for this operation except that the following must be emphasized:

1. Secrecy discipline.
2. Communications security.
3. Security of troops movements.

(b) Civil security. The following must be emphasized:

1. Control of circulation.
2. Curfew.

/s/ .....

Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

(Classification)

APPENDIX XI  
FORM, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORKSHEET

(Classification)

(1) <i>References (pertinent orders, annexes, map and overlay references, standing operating procedures, and similar material)</i>			(5) <i>Agencies responsible for execution of counterintelligence measures</i>												(6)  <i>Instructions regarding entries in columns 4 and 5, and notes for future action</i>		
(2) <i>Phases or periods of operation</i>	(3) <i>Categories of counterintelligence operations involved</i>	(4) <i>Counterintelligence measures to be adopted</i>															

(Classification)

## APPENDIX XII

### EXAMPLE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORKSHEET

(Partial)

[illegible]



## APPENDIX XIII

### FORM, DAILY CIC DETACHMENT REPORT

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(Classification)  
Numerical designation of CIC detachment  
Headquarters to which attached  
Location of headquarters  
Date and time of report

DAILY CIC DETACHMENT REPORT NO. ....

From ..... to .....

1. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Include in first report; thereafter "No change" until change in area.

2. DISPOSITION OF PERSONNEL

Include in first report; thereafter "No change" until any redistribution.

3. ACTIVITIES DURING PERIOD (Omit inapplicable paragraphs.)

- a. Counterespionage.
- b. Countersabotage.
- c. Countersubversion.
  - (1) Treason.
  - (2) Sedition.
  - (3) Disaffection.
  - (4) Subversive activities.
- d. Political.
- e. Propaganda and rumors.
- f. Personnel security investigations.
- g. Miscellaneous.

4. CASES INVESTIGATED (Use annexes if desirable.)

- a. Military.
- b. Civil.

5. CASES PENDING

- a. Military.
- b. Civil.

6. ARRESTS AND DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS

7. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. Information of intelligence value.
- b. Breaches of security.
- c. Recommendations.

.....  
CO, ..... CIC Det.

(Classification)

## APPENDIX XIV

### OUTLINE FORM, INTELLIGENCE PARAGRAPH, DIVISION SOP

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(Classification)

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date

\* \* \* \* \*

#### 3. INTELLIGENCE.

(Concise instructions relating to each of the following, when applicable.)

##### a. *Reconnaissance and observation.*

- (1) Air (including organic air).
- (2) Ground.
- (3) Observation.
- (4) Observation reports.

##### b. *Measures for handling prisoners of war, captured documents, and materiel.*

- (1) Prisoners of war.
  - (a) Searching.
  - (b) Segregation.
  - (c) Selected prisoners of war.
  - (d) Initial interrogation.
  - (e) Interrogation by prisoner of war specialists.
  - (f) Suspect civilians.
  - (g) Security of command posts.
- (2) Documents.
  - (a) Instruction to troops on necessity of turning in documents.
  - (b) Marking of documents.
  - (c) Document searches.
  - (d) Responsibility of unit intelligence officers.
  - (e) Documents found on prisoners of war.
  - (f) Souvenirs.
- (3) Materiel.
  - (a) Particular items desired.
  - (b) Guarding and reporting.
  - (c) Souvenirs.

##### c. *Maps and photos.*

- (1) Basis of map distribution.
- (2) Requests for maps and other intelligence aids.
- (3) Distribution of photos.

(Classification)

(Classification)

- (4) Requests for photos.
- (5) Disposition of maps, photos, and other intelligence aids upon relief of unit.
- d. *Counterintelligence.*
  - (1) Security of information.
  - (2) Radio and radar silence.
  - (3) Communication security monitoring, reports of violations.
  - (4) Censorship.
  - (5) Compromise of countersign, parole, codes, or other classified matter.
  - (6) Camouflage, dispersion, and light discipline.
  - (7) Evaders and escapers.
- e. *Reports and distribution.*
  - (1) Routine reports.
  - (2) Special reports.
  - (3) Spot reports.
  - (4) Contents of reports.
  - (5) Negative reports.
  - (6) Division reports to subordinate units.
  - (7) Reports from higher headquarters.

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(Classification)

## APPENDIX XV

### OUTLINE FORM, DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SECTION SOP

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(Classification)

G2 Section . . . . Division

Place of Issue

Date

#### STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE, G2 SECTION

1. ORGANIZATION.
2. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES.
3. SHIFTS.
4. DETERMINATION OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.
5. COLLECTION PLAN.
6. MISSIONS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS.
7. REQUESTS TO HIGHER AND ADJACENT HEADQUARTERS.
8. RECORDS AND FILES.
  - a. *Situation map.*
  - b. *Journal.*
  - c. *Worksheet.*
  - d. *Files.*
9. PRODUCTION.
  - a. *Estimates.*
  - b. *Summaries.*
  - c. *Tactical studies of weather and terrain.*
  - d. *Annexes.*
10. DISSEMINATION.
  - a. *Own headquarters.*
  - b. *Subordinate units.*
  - c. *Adjacent units.*
  - d. *Higher headquarters.*
11. LIAISON AND STAFF VISITS.
12. PLANS.
13. WAR ROOM.
14. COMMAND POST MOVEMENT.
15. HEADQUARTERS AND G2 SECTION SECURITY.
  - a. *Signal communication and communication security.*
  - b. *Security of information.*
  - c. *Visitors.*
  - d. *Security checks.*

(Classification)



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16. MAPS, PHOTOS, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS.
  - a. *Procurement.*
  - b. *Allocation.*
  - c. *Storage, distribution and disposition.*
17. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AND SYSTEMS.
18. REPORTS.
  - a. *Routine.*
  - b. *Spot (or immediate).*
  - c. *Periodic.*
  - d. *Order of battle.*
  - e. *Interrogation.*
  - f. *Air photo interpretation.*
  - g. *From higher and adjacent headquarters.*
19. AUXILIARY AGENCIES.
  - a. *Military intelligence specialists.*
  - b. *Communications reconnaissance support platoon.*
  - c. *Technical service intelligence detachments.*
  - d. *Others.*
20. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.
21. EVADERS AND ESCAPERS.
22. COORDINATION WITH OTHER GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS.
23. TRAINING.
  - a. *Rotation of duties.*
  - b. *Advice and assistance to subordinate sections and auxiliary agencies.*

/s/ .....

G2

(Classification)

## APPENDIX XVI

### EXAMPLE, G2 SECTION SOP, INFANTRY DIVISION

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(Classification)

#### STANDING OPERATION PROCEDURE, G2 SECTION

G2 Section  
...th Inf Div  
Place of Issue  
Date

#### 1. ORGANIZATION

The section consists of personnel organic to the division and attached military intelligence specialists, and communication reconnaissance support platoon.

#### 2. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES

##### a. G2, assistant G2

- (1) Direct, supervise, and coordinate the planning, administration, and operation of the functions pertaining to military intelligence and counterintelligence.
- (2) Prepare the intelligence and counterintelligence planning program, schedule, or time table for each projected operation.
- (3) Coordinate and direct the dissemination of all intelligence to the commander and all other interested staff sections and headquarters.
- (4) Inform the section of the plans, planning progress, and activities of other staff sections and the concepts and desires of the commander.
- (5) Coordinate with other staff sections.
- (6) Assign and reassign personnel and tasks within the section.
- (7) Supervise the training and operations of all personnel assigned or attached.
- (8) Plan and supervise, in coordination with G3, the intelligence and counterintelligence training of all troops in the division.

##### b. Administrative branch.

- (1) Operate G2 section message center.
- (2) Maintain G2 section journal.
- (3) Distribute all reports and publications of the G2 section.
- (4) Circulate appropriate documents and disseminate all information from other staff sections, and other headquarters.

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- (5) Maintain central intelligence files and records.
  - (6) Prepare all personnel reports for G2 section.
  - (7) Prepare duty rosters and staff visit roster.
  - (8) Receive or transmit, register, handle, and file classified documents.
  - (9) Supervise moving of G2 section and arrange with headquarters commandant for transportation and allocation of space in new area.
  - (10) Prepare and issue credentials and passes for intelligence personnel.
  - (11) Supervise the G2 section's transportation.
  - (12) Arrange for receiving and administering intelligence liaison personnel.
  - (13) Furnish administrative support to attached auxiliary agencies as directed by the Assistant G2.
- c. Combat intelligence branch.
- (1) Provide for collection of information, process information received, and disseminate resultant intelligence.
  - (2) Consolidate, edit, and produce routine intelligence reports.
  - (3) Maintain G2 situation map and worksheet.
  - (4) Prepare intelligence estimate, plans, annexes, and summaries.  
Indicate parts of these documents to be prepared by other branches and consolidate results of their work.
  - (5) Maintain intelligence documents in war room and conduct briefings on enemy situation and area of operations.
  - (6) Conduct research and planning for future operations.
  - (7) Arrange intelligence liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters.
  - (8) Prepare daily journal summary and furnish to administrative branch for entry as last item in journal.
  - (9) Prepare appropriate portions of command report.
  - (10) Direct operations of order of battle analysts to:
    - (a) Evaluate and interpret information received on enemy order of battle.
    - (b) Maintain order of battle records and files.
    - (c) Keep current order of battle.
    - (d) Prepare order of battle studies as required.
  - (11) Direct or coordinate the operations of special collection units or teams.
- d. G2 Air Branch.
- (1) Receive, screen, and process requests for visual air reconnaissance and air photos.
  - (2) Forward division planned air reconnaissance requests to corps

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- and immediate air reconnaissance requests to joint operations center.
- (3) Prepare town plans and defense overprints with the assistance of the engineer.
- (4) Supervise the procurement and distribution of maps, map supplements and air photos.
- (5) Monitor spot report receiver system and air request net in conjunction with G3 Air.
- (6) Supervise the briefing and interrogation of division pilots and observers.
- (7) Disseminate, in coordination with the combat intelligence branch, information obtained by air reconnaissance.
- (8) Supervise operations of photo interpreter personnel, which interpret air photos and prepare air photo interpretation reports.
- (9) Coordinate with signal officer on procurement, reproduction, and delivery of organic air and ground photography.
- (10) Coordinate dissemination of weather information.
- e. Counterintelligence branch.
  - (1) Recommend counterintelligence policy.
  - (2) Prepare counterintelligence estimates, plans, directives, and reports.
  - (3) Supervise measures for counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion.
  - (4) Coordinate operations with corps and other division counterintelligence teams.
  - (5) Check internal security of headquarters.
  - (6) Coordinate censorship operations.
  - (7) Recommend program and supervise counterintelligence training.
  - (8) Interrogate friendly and enemy civilians.
  - (9) Maintain records of enemy agents and collaborators.
- f. Military intelligence specialists—
  - (1) Detachment headquarters administer military intelligence detachments.
  - (2) Interpreter team provide interpreter service for commander and staff.
  - (3) Translator detachment translate documents of intelligence value.
  - (4) Prisoner of War Interrogators—
    - (a) Interrogates prisoners of war and enemy civilians.
    - (b) Prepares appropriate interrogation reports.
- g. Communication reconnaissance support platoon (par. 19b).

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### 3. SHIFTS

Personnel are organized into three shifts—0800 to 1600, 1600 to 2400, 2400 to 0800. Chief, administrative branch, maintains a roster and rotates personnel once each 2 weeks. Between 0800 and 2400 each shift is composed of the following personnel: duty officer, order of battle noncommissioned officer, photo interpreter noncommissioned officer, intelligence clerk, draftsman, and typist. The 2400 to 0800 shift is composed of the following personnel: duty officer and two enlisted assistants.

### 4. DETERMINATION OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. The G2, in coordination with other staff section, formulates and recommends essential elements of information (EEI) to the commander.
- b. The EEI of higher headquarters, if appropriate to mission and capabilities of unit, are announced by the G2.
- c. Approved EEI are announced personally by the commander or by G2 through media of the intelligence plan, intelligence annex, operation order, or separate messages.

### 5. COLLECTION PLAN

The collection plan is prepared and kept up to date by the combat intelligence branch.

### 6. MISSIONS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS

Directives to subordinate units are announced in an intelligence annex, operation order, or separate message.

### 7. REQUESTS TO HIGHER AND ADJACENT HEADQUARTERS

Requests to higher or adjacent headquarters are contained in intelligence annex, or forwarded as a special request. All special requests to higher and adjacent headquarters are made in message form and approved by G2 prior to submission.

### 8. RECORDS AND FILES

- a. Situation maps. The following maps, which reflect the situation as to the enemy and terrain, are maintained in the section:

- (1) General situation of at least the corps zone and adjacent division not part of the corps. This map also includes order of battle and information of enemy rear areas. Scale of 1:250,000 or 1:100,000 as appropriate.
- (2) Special situation of the division zone and adjacent units. Scale of 1:50,000 or 1:25,000 as appropriate.
- (3) Terrain map of the division zone showing information derived from all sources. Scale of 1:50,000 or 1:25,000 (Preferred) is utilized.

- b. Journal.

- (1) The section journal covers a 24-hour period ending at 1200.

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The journal is prepared in duplicate: 1 copy for G2 journal file and 1 copy to the chief of staff for consolidation with the other journals of the headquarters.

- (2) All incoming and outgoing messages are recorded serially in the journal, or, if the message is lengthy, a brief synopsis is made in the journal and a copy entered in the journal files.
  - (3) The journal summary is prepared by the combat intelligence branch.
- c. Worksheet. A worksheet is maintained and covers periods of specific operations. It is the responsibility of the combat intelligence branch to insure prompt and accurate entry of information. Items of information are not deleted until of no current intelligence value.
- d. Files.
- (1) The following files are maintained in the section:
    - (a) Administrative.
    - (b) Information file. An information file for referenced material is maintained by the combat intelligence branch. Only information that is no longer of any value is removed from this file.
    - (c) Historical (journal, ISUMS, periodic intelligence reports, intelligence summaries, situation overlays, and operation orders).
    - (d) Periodic intelligence reports of higher and adjacent units.
    - (e) Unit reports.
    - (f) Interrogation prisoner of war reports.
    - (g) Document translations.
    - (h) Counterintelligence.
  - (2) All material for file is plainly marked "G2 File Copy."
  - (3) A screening of the administrative file is made at least once each 3 months, supervised by the assistant G2. Material not pertinent, no longer of value, or permanently filed elsewhere, will be eliminated.

## 9. PRODUCTION

- a. Summaries. Intelligence summaries (ISUM) are prepared by assistant G2, or chief, combat intelligence branch. The format and frequency of submission are as required by higher headquarters.
- b. Estimates. Complete intelligence estimate is prepared at the beginning of each separate operation, or as required by the commander. Fragmentary estimates, as revisions to original intelligence estimate become necessary to meet changed conditions, are given to the commander by the G2 or assistant G2. The chief, combat intelligence branch, immediately informs the

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G2 or assistant G2 of any significant enemy action likely to alter the current estimate. The briefing officer ascertains, and, if called upon to do so, presents the current intelligence estimate. The combat intelligence branch is responsible for maintaining current estimate.

c. Tactical studies of weather and terrain.

- (1) Tactical studies of weather and terrain are prepared by the combat intelligence branch assisted by the senior photo interpreter and division engineer.
- (2) Tactical studies of weather and terrain are issued to the command on the basis of 6 per division artillery, 4 per regiment, and 1 per separate battalion or company assigned or attached.
- (3) Tactical studies of weather and terrain are prepared as soon as practicable after receipt of new mission for the command.

d. Annexes.

- (1) The intelligence plan is kept current by the combat intelligence branch so that when the operation plan becomes an operation order the intelligence plan requires a minimum of changes or additions to become the intelligence annex thereto.
- (2) Appendixes to the intelligence annex are published as necessary.

10. DISSEMINATION

- a. Information and intelligence are disseminated by the combat intelligence branch to subordinate, adjacent and higher headquarters by spot reports, ISUMS, and special reports and studies.
- b. Information or intelligence requiring action by other staff section(s) is provided that section(s) by telephone, personal contact by G2 representative on duty, or message form, according to urgency of information (intelligence). ISUMs are distributed to each staff section within the headquarters.

11. LIAISON AND STAFF VISITS

- a. During combat, daily visits will be made by members of the G2 Section (assigned and attached personnel) to subordinate units and intelligence staffs, as arranged by Administrative Branch. The visit must be prepared for by contacting each branch for pertinent items. Informal reports of results of visits will be made to assistant G2 and appropriate branch. It is emphasized that staff visits are made for the G2 Section in the spirit of helpfulness, not as personal visits.
- b. Liaison officers under control of G3 section are utilized to establish intelligence liaison with higher and adjacent units: G2 Section personnel will make staff visits to higher and adjacent intelligence staffs as frequently as required.

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c. The assistant G2:

- (1) Coordinates the daily visits by members of the section to subordinate units.
- (2) Arranges for periodic visits by members of the section to higher and adjacent units for orientation, observation and training.

12. PLANS

See paragraphs 2a(1) and 9d. The section planning program is organized, supervised, and coordinated by the assistant G2. Planning program reflects current and future operational plans.

13. WAR ROOM

The combat intelligence branch coordinates with chief of staff and G3 representative in establishment and maintenance of the war room. The chief, combat intelligence branch, is responsible for G2 support of the G2 war room.

14. COMMAND POST MOVEMENT

- a. During command post moves, the section personnel and equipment are split into two echelons. The first echelon is composed of the following personnel:
  - 1—Assistant G2
  - 1—G2 Air
  - 1—Intelligence clerk
  - 1—Draftsman
  - 1—Counter Intelligence Corps officer
  - 2—Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted men
  - 1—Order of battle analyst
  - 1—Photo interpreter officer
  - 2—Photo interpreter enlisted men
  - 1—Translator officer
  - 2—Translator enlisted men
  - 2—Interpreter enlisted men

b. Personnel of the second echelon conduct operations until notified of opening of new command post.

c. Transportation for command post moves is provided by headquarters commandant.

15. HEADQUARTERS AND G2 SECTION SECURITY

- a. Counter Intelligence Corps detachment checks old command post areas to insure that no material of value to the enemy is overlooked.
- b. Material classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET is kept in a combination type safe.
- c. Assistant G2 is designated as TOP SECRET control officer for the section.
- d. Each application for security clearance is processed by the commander, Counter Intelligence Corps detachment. He maintains current clearance files on division personnel.



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- e. Assistant G2 coordinates with senior member communications reconnaissance liaison team for necessary guard requirements to provide security for equipment.
- f. Representatives of public information mediums desiring information are directed to the public information officer. Members of the section do not discuss combat operations with these representatives or other unauthorized persons without approval of the G2.

16. MAPS, PHOTOS, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS

- a. For general distribution, and disposition of maps, see division SOP.
- b. G2 Air is responsible on procurement, storage, and distribution of maps, map supplements and air photos for the G2 Section.
- c. Initial allowances:
  - 1. General Maps: Combat Intelligence branch.
  - 2. Strategic Map: 2 per branch.
  - 3. Tactical Maps: 2 per branch except Combat Intel—6.
  - 4. Road Map: 1 per vehicle.
  - 5. Map supplement: as required.
- d. POW interrogators will draw maps, map supplements and air photo from G2 air as required.

17. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AND SYSTEMS

See current division signal operation instructions.

18. REPORTS

(See par. 10.)

- a. Routine.
  - (1) ISUMS are prepared by the combat intelligence branch under supervision of assistant G2 who coordinates with the commander, Counter Intelligence Corps detachment, on the counterintelligence portion.
  - (2) Cover the periods from 0001 to 0600, 0601 to 1200, 1201 to 1800 and 1801 to 2400 unless otherwise directed by higher headquarters.
- b. Spot. Reports containing information (or intelligence) that is of such urgency as to require immediate reports to higher, adjacent, or subordinate headquarters are made by the combat intelligence branch.
- c. Order of battle. Oral or written order of battle reports are submitted to higher headquarters as directed, and to subordinate units daily with 1800 ISUM.
- d. Interrogation.
  - (1) Spot interrogation reports are made to higher, adjacent and subordinate units on all new identifications. Other spot reports are made as deemed advisable by the senior interrogator.

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- (2) Routine interrogation reports are made to higher headquarters in accordance with instructions from that headquarters.

## 19. AUXILIARY AGENCIES

### a. Military intelligence specialists.

- (1) The attached military intelligence specialists are under operational control of G2. Personnel of the organization are integrated into the G2 section for the accomplishment of overall mission.
- (2) The duties of the military intelligence detachment are to furnish interrogation, interpreter, translator, order of battle, photo interpretation, counterintelligence, censorship, and field operations intelligence support.

### b. Communication reconnaissance support platoon. The attached communication reconnaissance support platoon provides assistance as prescribed in current regulations.

### c. Such logistical or administrative support as required by attached auxiliary agencies to accomplish their mission is provided by this headquarters. Assistant G2 coordinates such support with appropriate staff sections.

## 20. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The assistant G2 recommends targets profitable for employment of psychological warfare for submission to G3 and makes estimates of effectiveness of psychological warfare operations as requested.

## 21. EVADEES AND ESCAPERS

Evadees and escapers are evacuated to army headquarters as expeditiously as possible. Such personnel will not be interrogated by division personnel as to methods of their evasion or escape.

## 22. COORDINATION WITH OTHER GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS

Coordination with appropriate staff section is effected by officer responsible for specific function.

## 23. TRAINING

- a. Rotation of duties. The assistant G2 arranges for rotation of duties of enlisted personnel, insofar as is possible, among section personnel. All personnel receive training in drafting and typing.
- b. Advise and assist subordinate sections and auxiliary agencies. Assigned and attached intelligence personnel will advise and assist subordinate units in intelligence training. Assistant G2 coordinates such activity with respective unit S2s.

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## APPENDIX XVII

### FORM, ARMY INTELLIGENCE PLAN, WITH APPENDIXES

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Annex. .... (Intelligence Plan) to Operation Plan. ....

References: (Maps, charts, and relevant documents.)

#### 1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

- a. Refer to current intelligence estimate.
- b. State when revised estimates will be published. See Appendix 6, Intelligence Administrative Plan.

#### 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION. (For details, see Appendix 1, Combat Intelligence Plan.)

- a. General planning phase. State general factors with which EEI are concerned. Exact statement of individual EEI is made in Appendix 1, Combat Intelligence Plan.
- b. Operational phase. Same as paragraph 2a.

#### 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS (For details, see Appendix 1, Combat Intelligence Plan, and Appendix 2, Air Reconnaissance Plan.)

- a. General planning phases. State which higher, adjacent, and cooperating headquarters and which subordinate units will be exploited in the collection effort. Include statement as to general categories of missions, i. e., air, ground, etc.
- b. Operational phase. State which higher, adjacent, and cooperating headquarters and which subordinate units will be exploited in the collection effort. Specify general types of missions and authorize direct coordination where desirable.

#### 4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL (For details, see Appendix 1, Combat Intelligence Plan.)

- a. Prisoners of war. State general aspects of handling and refer, if necessary, to administrative instructions (G1 and G4).
- b. Documents. State general aspects of processing and handling.

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- c. Materiel. State general aspects of handling and refer, if necessary, to administrative instructions (G4 and technical service annexes).
- 5. MAPS AND PHOTOS (For details, see Appendix 2, Air Reconnaissance Plan, and Appendix 3, Intelligence Map Plan.)
  - a. Map supply.
    - (1) General statement as to issue of planning maps.
    - (2) General statement as to issue of operation maps.
    - (3) Coordination of additional reproduction (normally by army engineer. Reference to engineer annex, if necessary.)
  - b. Photo coverage. General statement as to coverage. Refer to Appendix 2, Air Reconnaissance Plan.
  - c. Other aids. General statement about availability and distribution of such items as—
    - (1) Terrain models.
    - (2) Vectographs.
    - (3) Anaglyphs.
    - (4) Special aids.
- 6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (For details, see Appendix 4, Counterintelligence.)
  - a. Phases.
    - (1) Planning phase. Broad statement concerning measures to be adopted.
    - (2) Operational phase. Broad statement of particular additional measures to be adopted and/or measures upon which greater emphasis will be placed.
  - b. Special counterintelligence measures. State when and how instructions for counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion activities by special agencies will be issued.
  - c. Counterintelligence instructions. State when and how supplementary instructions will be issued.
  - d. Counterintelligence reports. Refer to Appendix 6, Intelligence Administrative Plan.
- 7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION (For details, see Appendix 6, Intelligence Administrative Plan.)
  - a. Reports. General statement concerning intelligence reports to be submitted.
  - b. Publications. General statement concerning intelligence publications to be distributed by Army.
  - c. Distribution. General statement as to distribution.
- 8. AUXILIARY AGENCIES (For details, see Appendix 5, Auxiliary Agencies Plan.)
  - a. Agencies under G2 control. Statement of general plan for use of agencies of this type.

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- b. Army agencies available to G2. Statement of general plan for use of these agencies.
- c. Other agencies available to G2. Statement of general plan for use of these agencies.

9. MISCELLANEOUS

Matters pertinent to intelligence planning and not provided for elsewhere in the plan. (For details, see Appendix 6, Intelligence Administrative Plan.)

Acknowledgement instructions.

.....  
Commander

- Appendixes: 1—Combat Intelligence Plan  
2—Air Reconnaissance Plan  
3—Intelligence Map Plan  
4—Counterintelligence Plan  
5—Auxiliary Agencies Plan  
6—Intelligence Administrative Plan

Distribution: List units to whom plan is to be sent or indicate standard distribution.

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Appendix 1 (Combat Intelligence Plan) to Annex.....(Intelligence) to Operation Plan.....

References: (Maps, charts, and relevant documents.)

1. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. General planning phase. State EEI including information desired by higher, lower, or adjacent headquarters.
- b. Operational phase. State as best as can be foreseen at this time EEI applicable to combat operations.

2. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

- a. General planning phase.
  - (1) Orders to subordinate and attached units.
  - (2) Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.
- b. Operational phase.
  - (1) Orders to subordinate and attached units.
  - (2) Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.

3. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL

- a. Prisoners of war.
  - (1) Special prisoners.
  - (2) Special handling procedures.
  - (3) Instructions regarding documents and materiel found with prisoners.
  - (4) Army interrogation center—location, delivery of prisoners, etc. (Plan for establishment in Appendix 5, Auxiliary Agencies Plan to Intelligence Plan.)
  - (5) Specific types of information desired from prisoners.
- b. Documents.
  - (1) Expediting important documents, including types.
  - (2) Method of forwarding.
  - (3) Search for documents in captured enemy headquarters and other installations, on enemy dead, in crashed aircraft, etc.
  - (4) Army documents center—location, delivery of documents, etc. (Plan for establishment in Appendix 5, Auxiliary Agencies Plan to Intelligence Plan.)
  - (5) Specific types of information desired from documents.

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c. Materiel.

- (1) List of items desired for examination.
- (2) Methods of handling and safeguarding.
- (3) Procedure for souvenirs.
- (4) Technical service intelligence teams—availability, areas of responsibility, coordination. (Specific plan in Appendix 5, Auxiliary Agencies Plan to Intelligence Plan.)
- (5) Army materiel center, if any—location, delivery of items, records, etc. (Plan for establishment in Appendix 5, Auxiliary Agencies Plan to Intelligence Plan.)

4. REPORTS

Refer to Appendix 6, Intelligence Administrative Plan to Intelligence Plan.

Acknowledgement instructions.

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Commander

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Appendix 2 (TAF Air Reconnaissance Plan) to Annex.....(Intelligence) to Operation Plan.....

Reference: (Maps, charts, and relevant documents.)

1. GENERAL

- a. General planning phase. General procedure for requesting TAF visual and air photo missions.
- b. Operational phase. General procedure for requesting TAF visual and air photo missions.

2. GENERAL PLANNING PHASE

- a. Establishment of joint operations center.
- b. Establishment of army air photo center.
- c. Plan for missions and cover expected.
  - (1) Visual reconnaissance missions.
  - (2) Air photo missions.
- d. Distribution of basic cover for planning. Indicate number of sets of prints to each major subordinate command.

3. OPERATIONAL PHASE

- a. Air photo interpretation responsibilities.
  - (1) Divisions.
  - (2) Corps.
  - (3) Army (normally by army air photo center forward of areas assigned to corps).
- b. Distribution of TAF air photo coverage.
  - (1) Intelligence photography.
    - (a) Basic cover.
    - (b) Frontline cover.
  - (2) Map supplement photography.
- c. Other types of air photos. (Availability, requests, distribution.)
  - (1) Composites.
  - (2) Obliques.
  - (3) Stereopairs.
  - (4) Wide-angle.
  - (5) Vectographs.
  - (6) Mosaics.
- d. Visual air reconnaissance.
  - (1) Air force capabilities.
  - (2) TAF missions available on call.

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4. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

- a. Procedures for requests for missions. (State any variation from normal procedure prescribed in manuals.)
- b. Dissemination of photo interpretation reports.
- c. Frequencies. Refer to current signal operation instructions.

Acknowledgement instructions.

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Commander

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Appendix 3 (Intelligence Map Plan) to Annex.....(Intelligence)  
to Operations Plan.....

References: (Maps, charts, and relevant documents.)

## 1. MAP SUPPLY

### a. Planning maps.

(1) Types and numbers of maps to be allotted to each major command.

(2) Reserve stocks.

### b. Operational maps.

(1) Types and numbers of maps to be allotted to each major command.

(2) Reserve stocks.

(3) Designate "army operation map."

## 2. MAP DISTRIBUTION

a. Schedule for distribution.

b. Special instructions.

c. Storage, shipment, etc. Refer to engineer annex.

## 3. TERRAIN MODELS

a. Availability and issue.

b. Requests.

## 4. PHOTOS

Information and instruction pertaining to intelligence photography other than air photos. For air photos, refer to Appendix 2, Air Reconnaissance Plan to Intelligence Plan.

## 5. OTHER AIDS

a. Availability and issue.

b. Requests.

Acknowledgment instructions.

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Commander

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Appendix 4 (Counterintelligence Plan) to Annex.....(Intelligence) to Operation Plan.....

References: (Maps, charts, and relevant documents.)

## 1. MILITARY SECURITY

- a. Reference to current standing operating procedure.
- b. Special safeguarding of classified military information and equipment at headquarters and in field units and installations.
- c. Security of troop movements and concentrations.
- d. Communication security.
- e. Secrecy discipline and training.
- f. Area and unit censorship (refer to par. 4 as necessary).
- g. Counterespionage within the military establishment (refer to par. 4 as necessary).
- h. Countersabotage.
- i. Countersubversion within the military establishment.
- j. Tactical measures, as required, including concealment and counter-reconnaissance.
- k. Special handling of prisoners of war.
- l. Special handling of military evaders and escapers.
- m. Special handling of enemy agents and security risks not normally classified as prisoners of war.
- n. Security control of friendly secret agents and relations with resistance groups operating in enemy territory.
- o. Security control of visitors, including press representatives and photographers.
- p. Security control of prohibited, regulated, restricted, and protected areas.
- q. Protection of military leaders and personnel performing critical duties.
- r. Reports of security violations.
- s. Target lists.

## 2. CIVIL SECURITY

- a. Registration of civilians, including neutrals and enemy aliens.
- b. Control of circulation.
- c. Passes and permits.
- d. Curfew—hours, enforcement responsibility.
- e. Labor—registration, screening, security control.

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- f. Censorship (refer to par. 4 as necessary).
  - g. Surveillance of suspect political groups.
  - h. Communications monitoring.
  - i. Mutual and allied diplomatic and consular officials and staffs—how controlled, privileges granted.
  - j. Security control of refugees and displaced persons.
  - k. Action on denunciations of individuals.
  - l. Interrogation and detention centers.
  - m. Security responsibility of special civilian police agencies.
  - n. Counterintelligence functions of civilian defense agencies.
  - o. Prohibited, regulated, restricted, and protected areas.
  - p. Protection of civil leaders and personnel performing critical duties.
  - q. Control of international commerce, especially trade with neutral states.
  - r. Counterespionage.
  - s. Countersabotage.
  - t. Countersubversion, including counterpropaganda.
  - u. Target lists.
3. PORT, FRONTIER, AND TRAVEL SECURITY
- a. Definition of jurisdictional responsibilities of Army, Navy, Air Force, Allied, and civil authorities.
  - b. Security control of seaports, including—
    - (1) Fishing fleets—permits.
    - (2) Coastside trading vessels—permits, control.
    - (3) Merchant seamen—screening, shore-leave permits.
    - (4) Visa and passport control.
    - (5) Stevedores, pilots, dockhands—screening, control.
    - (6) Counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion.
    - (7) Action taken against suspects.
  - c. Security control of airports, including—
    - (1) Handling permits for commercial aircraft.
    - (2) Commercial aircraft crews—screening, landing, and leave permits.
    - (3) Passengers—screening, entry permits.
    - (4) Visa and passport control.
    - (5) Civilian ground crews and airport personnel—screening, control.
    - (6) Counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion.
    - (7) Action taken against suspects.
  - d. Security control of frontiers, including—
    - (1) Establishment of frontier crossing points.
    - (2) Security screening and control of frontiers.
    - (3) Patrol of coastline and land frontiers—coastwatcher service.
    - (4) Visa and passport control.

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- (5) Security control and surveillance of immigrants.
- (6) Action taken against suspects.
- e. Security control of travel, including—
  - (1) Military travel permit system.
  - (2) Screening of train crews, truck and bus drivers, and the like.
  - (3) Travel control stations and patrols.
  - (4) Action taken against suspects.
- f. Target lists.
- 4. CENSORSHIP
  - a. Area and unit censorship.
  - b. Censorship of press dispatches, press photos, and films.
  - c. Press briefings prior to operation.
  - d. Types of releasable information.
  - e. Types of information to be withheld.
  - f. Mail covers and special surveillance.
  - g. Primary localities of censorship coverage.
  - h. Prisoner of war and internee censorship.
  - i. Control of civilian communications, press, and radio.
  - j. Responsibilities for civil censorship.
  - k. Evaluation and dissemination of information derived from censorship.
  - l. Reports of violations.
  - m. Target lists.
- 5. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
  - a. Prevention of introduction of clandestine agents into area.
    - (1) Radar surveillance.
    - (2) Special observation.
  - b. Intelligence security.
  - c. Deployment and operation of special counterintelligence units.
    - (1) Special surveillance.
    - (2) Special agents.
  - d. Special interrogation centers.
  - e. Special deceptive measures.
  - f. Special funds and special supplies.
  - g. Target lists.
- 6. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
  - Requirements for units.
  - a. Counter Intelligence Corps.
  - b. Military censorship organization.
- 7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL TRAINING
  - a. Status of training of presently assigned personnel.
  - b. Prospects for obtaining trained personnel in the future.
  - c. Training for newly assigned individuals.
    - (1) Establishment of training center.

(Classification)

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- (2) Number and qualifications of agents in training.
  - d. Schools operated by subordinate units.
  - e. On-the-job training.
  - 8. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FUNDS
    - a. Funds for planning phase.
    - b. Funds for operational phase.
    - c. Instructions regarding disbursement and accounting for funds.
  - 9. MISCELLANEOUS
    - a. Administration of assigned units and individuals.
    - b. Counterintelligence cooperation among Army, Navy, Air Force, Allied, and civilian agencies.
    - c. Counterintelligence orders, messages, and reports.
    - d. Special modification in organization and operation of counterintelligence branch (group).
- Acknowledgment instructions.

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Appendix 5 (Auxiliary Agencies Plan) to Annex.....(Intelligence) to Operation Plan.....

References: (Maps, charts, and relevant documents.)

## 1. GENERAL

- a. Types of agencies. Considered of three types—
  - (1) Agencies under G2 control.
  - (2) Agencies assigned or attached to army.
  - (3) Agencies under control of higher or adjacent headquarters.
- b. Assistance, coordination, and supervision. Specific measures with respect to all types of agencies and—
  - (1) Agencies under G2 control.
  - (2) Agencies assigned or attached to army.
  - (3) Agencies under control of higher or adjacent headquarters.
- c. Channels of communication.
  - (1) Agencies under G2 control.
  - (2) Agencies assigned or attached to army.
  - (3) Agencies under control of higher or adjacent headquarters.
- d. Orders and identification.

## 2. AGENCIES UNDER G2 CONTROL

Determine requirements for these agencies during both general planning and operational phase and plan for their allocation to army and subordinate units. Specify any necessary command and administrative arrangements.

- a. Military Intelligence Service Organization teams.
- b. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments.
  - (1) Own detachments.
  - (2) Detachments temporarily attached from theater or communications zone.
- c. Strategic intelligence team.
- d. Clandestine intelligence team.
- e. Interrogation, documents, and/or materiel centers. (Plans for establishment, etc.)
- f. Others.

## 3. AGENCIES ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO ARMY

Determine requirements for and plan employment of such agencies, including means of coordination and supervision.

- a. Corps and divisions.

(Classification)

(Classification)

- b. Technical service intelligence teams.
- c. Engineer brigade.
- d. Reconnaissance units.
- e. Artillery units.
- f. Armored units.
- g. Other troops or special agencies.
  - (1) Civil affairs/military government.
  - (2) Public information agencies.
  - (3) Military police.

#### 4. AGENCIES UNDER CONTROL OF HIGHER OR ADJACENT HEADQUARTERS

Plan for coordination with such agencies and means of obtaining information and intelligence from them.

- a. Clandestine agencies.
- b. Communications zone agencies.
- c. Air defense command agencies.
- d. Air Force agencies.
- e. Naval agencies.
- f. U. S. Government agencies.
- g. Allied agencies.

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Appendix 6 (Intelligence Administrative Plan) to Annex.....  
(Intelligence) to Operation Plan.....

References: (Maps, charts, and relevant documents.)

1. ORGANIZATION OF G2 SECTION

Show branches of section and number, type, and rank of personnel in each. Include names of personnel, if desired.

2. G2 PUBLICATIONS

Indicate purpose and general contents of publication, schedule for issue, and headquarters to whom distributed.

- a. Tactical studies of weather and terrain.
- b. Intelligence estimates, army.
- c. Periodic intelligence report, army.
- d. G2 information bulletins.
- e. Intelligence summaries.
- f. Intelligence publications of other headquarters.

3. DISSEMINATION

- a. General. Plan for dissemination of information and intelligence other than by means of G2 publications. Indicate types disseminated automatically and types furnished on request.
- b. General planning phase.
- c. Operational phase.

4. INTELLIGENCE FUNDS

- a. Requirements and allocation.
- b. Agent finance officers.
- c. Accounting procedures.
- d. Captured enemy intelligence funds.

5. REPORTS

Type of report	By whom submitted	How submitted	Time
Spot reports			
Intelligence summaries			
Periodic intelligence reports			
Counterintelligence periodic reports			
Counterintelligence situation reports			

(Classification)

(Classification)

Technical intelligence  
reports

Interrogation reports

Photo interpretation  
reports

Special reports

6. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING (Refer to Army Training Program.)

- a. General planning phase. State plans for intelligence training of all troops and training of intelligence specialists.
- b. Operational phase. State plans for training of all troops and of intelligence specialists.
- c. Intelligence schools. Plans for establishment, personnel to operate, location, courses to be given, and personnel to attend. (Coordinate with G3.)

7. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON

Plan for establishment of liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters.

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# INDEX

	Paragraph	Page
Accuracy, determination.....	46	29
Administrative branch of G2 section.....	174c(2)	144
Air photo:		
Coverage.....	147	121
Reconnaissance.....	130	112
Production and distribution.....	141	118
Responsibilities.....	145	120
Types.....	144, 146	120, 121
Air reconnaissance:		
Defined.....	127a	110
Targets.....	128	110
Agencies, counterintelligence. (See Counterintelligence.)		
Agencies, collecting and intelligence:		
Availability.....	31	19
Counterintelligence.....	159	133
Defined.....	156b, 29a	16, 130
Intelligence specialists.....	30a	16
Reconnaissance.....	123	107
Selection.....	103	95
Special information services.....	30c	16
Troops.....	30b	16
Agencies available:		
Army.....	34	21
Army group.....	35	22
Communications zone.....	36	22
Corps.....	33	21
Division.....	32	21
Theater army.....	37	22
Aggressor.....	182c	165
Airborne operations, planning.....	202	178
Air ground communication system.....	133	113
Air reconnaissance support agency:		
Capabilities.....	149d	127
Mission.....	149c	127
Organization.....	132c, d; 149a	113, 124
Air photo interpretation unit.....	132d	113
Air photo reproduction and delivery unit.....	132c; 149e	113, 125
Air request net.....	133a(2)	113
Air weather service, USAF.....	79a	65
Amphibious operations, planning.....	202	178
Analysis:		
As step in interpretation.....	49	30
EEI.....	100	92
Annexes.....	197a	173

	Paragraph	Page
Appendixes.....	118, 163, 197c, 198c, 200c(2)	102, 135, 174, 175, 177
Area of operations, characteristics.....	59	34
Area search.....	129b(1)	111
Army:		
Collecting agencies available.....	34	21
G2 section.....	173a, 176	143, 150
Intelligence plan.....	App XVII	246
Army air reconnaissance.....	135, 136	115
Army group:		
Collecting agencies available.....	35	22
G2 section.....	177	151
Artillery:		
Adjustment mission.....	129b(4)	111
Atomic weapons, effects of weather and terrain.....	85d	81
Auxiliary agencies.....	197a, 197b(8)	173, 174
Avenues of approach.....	84f	75
Basic cover.....	147a(1)	121
Battle reconnaissance.....	119b(1)	105
Battlefield surveillance.....	10b	8
Capability of collecting agencies.....	103b	95
Capabilities, enemy:		
Analysis and discussion.....	61b	43
Definition.....	64a	47
Determination.....	65	48
Enumeration.....	61a	42
EEI pertaining.....	89	85
Examples.....	App. IX	221
Statement.....	65a	48
CBR agents, effect of weather.....	85e	81
Categories of intelligence:		
Combat.....	4	3
Counterintelligence.....	7	5
Other.....	8	5
Strategic.....	5	4
Censorship.....	158e, 165a(3), 168b	132, 136, 139
Charting cover. (See Mapping cover.)		
Civil security.....	158c, 165a(3), 168b	131, 136, 139
Climate, as used in tactical study of weather and terrain.....	78d	63
Climatic:		
Study.....	78f	64
Summary.....	78c	63
Close reconnaissance.....	119b(2)	105
Code, evaluation.....	47	29
Collection agencies, selection.....	103	95

Collection plan:	Paragraph	Page
Example .....	107b	97
Form .....	107b	97
Use .....	108	97
Color photography .....	147a(3)(e)	124
Collecting agencies. (See Agencies, collecting.)		
Combat intelligence:		
Comparison w/strategic intelligence .....	6	4
Definition .....	4	3
Purpose .....	16a	9
Combat intelligence branch of intelligence section .....	174c(3)	146
Combat intelligence, production:		
Collection .....	10	6
Direction .....	13	8
Processing .....	11	8
Steps .....	9a	6
Use .....	12	8
Combat reconnaissance, definition .....	119b	105
Communications intelligence .....	8c	6
Communication reconnaissance units, as collecting agencies .....	30c(3)(b)	17
Communications security .....	158b(3)	131
Communications zone:		
Collecting agencies available .....	36	22
Intelligence division .....	173, 178	143, 151
Compartments, terrain .....	84f(3)	76
Composite photo .....	146b	121
Composition subparagraph of intelligence estimate .....	60c	36
Concealment and cover .....	84c	72
Conclusion paragraph of intelligence estimate .....	62	44
Contact reconnaissance .....	129b(5)	112
Controlled mosaic .....	148a	124
Corps:		
Collecting agencies available .....	33	21
G2 section .....	173, 175	143, 147
Corridors .....	84f(3)	76
Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) .....	159b	133
Counterintelligence:		
Agencies .....	159	133
Army operations .....	166	138
Army group operations .....	167	138
Categories of operations .....	158	131
ComZ operations .....	168	139
Corps operations .....	165	138
Definition .....	7a, 155	5, 130
Division operations .....	164	135
Measures .....	156	130
Plan .....	App. XVII	246
Procedures .....	160	134
Orders and requests .....	163	135
Responsibility .....	157	131
Theater army operations .....	169	141
Worksheet .....	162	135
Counterintelligence branch of intelligence section .....	174c(5)	147

Counterintelligence estimate:	Paragraph	Page
Example .....	App X	223
Form .....	App IX, 161c, 165b 221, 134,	138
Purpose .....	161	134
Counterpropaganda planning .....	157	130
Counterreconnaissance .....	126	109
Courses of action .....	62b	45
Critical terrain features .....	84e	73
Cross compartments .....	84f(3)(b)	76
Damage assessment photos .....	147a(3)(f)	124
Deception planning .....	157b	131
Definitions .....	3, 4,	3, 4, 5,
5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 21, 48, 56a 60d(2)(b), 60d(3)(b), 64a 78, 84,		6, 8, 10,
87, 99a, 119, 127a, 148, 155.		14, 30,
		33, 37,
		38, 47,
		63, 71,
		84, 91,
		105, 110,
		124, 130.
Deserters .....	19c	13
Detailed reports .....	152b(5)	128
Determination of indications, guide .....	App VIII	202
Direction of the collection effort, steps .....	13, 86c	8, 83
Dissemination:		
EEI .....	95	89
ISUM .....	72	59
Means .....	69, 70, 71	57
PERINTREP .....	76	63
Requirements and criteria .....	68	56
Distant reconnaissance .....	119b(3)	105
Division, agencies available .....	32	21
Division G2 section .....	173, 174	143, 144
Documents .....	21, 71	14, 57
Duds, shell fragments, craters, as source .....	24	15
Effect of weather and terrain on atomic weapons .....	85d	81
Effects of weather and terrain on CBR agents .....	85c	80
Emergency issue of maps .....	142d(3)	119
Enemy capabilities paragraph of intelligence estimate .....	61	42
Engineer units, as collecting agencies .....	30c(3)(c), 4c	18
Essential elements of information:		
Analysis .....	100	92
Answers .....	96	89
Cancellation .....	97	90
Definition .....	87a	84
Dissemination .....	95	89
Form and content .....	88	84
Of other echelons .....	94	89
Use .....	98	91
Estimate, intelligence. (See intelligence estimate.)		
Evaluation:		
As step in processing .....	11a(2)	8
At higher echelons .....	54	32

Evaluation—Continued	Paragraph	Page
Code.....	47	29
Definition.....	11a(2)	8
Extremes of environment operations, planning.....	203	179
Files, intelligence.....	43	27
Flash report.....	152b(1)	127
Forecasts. (See Weather forecasts.)		
Forms, intelligence:		
Daily CIC report.....	App XIII	232
Division intelligence section SOP.....	App XV	235
Estimate, counterintelligence.....	App IX	221
Intelligence paragraph, division SOP.....	App XIV	233
Plan, army intelligence.....	App XVII	246
Worksheet, counterintelligence.....	App XI	229
Fragmentary orders and requests.....	117	101
Frontline cover.....	147a(2)	122
G2 air division.....	127	110
G2 air branch of intelligence section.....	174,	144,
	175c, 176b(3)	148, 150
Ground liaison officer.....	132b,	113, 124
	133a(3), 149d(3)	
GLO reconnaissance net.....	133c	113
Immediate report.....	152b(2)	127
Indications:		
Definition.....	99	91
Discussion.....	61b(2)	43
Use.....	101	93
Information:		
File.....	43b	27
Processing.....	38	24
Recording.....	39	24
Information as basis for combat intelligence:		
Sought by Army.....	17b	10
Sought by Army Group.....	17c	11
Sought by ComZ.....	17d	11
Sought by Corps.....	17a	10
Sought by Divs.....	16	9
Sought by Theater Army.....	17c	11
Information net.....	133a	113
Initial issue of maps.....	142d(1)	119
Integrated intelligence system.....	11b	8
Integration, as step in interpretation.....	49b	30
Intelligence annex:		
As means of dissemination.....	71c	58
Example.....	App. VIII	211
Preparation.....	118, 163	102, 135
Intelligence consciousness, methods of creating.....	189	169
Intelligence documents, in dissemination.....	71	57
Intelligence estimate:		
As means of dissemination.....	71d	58
Definition.....	56a	33
Heading.....	57	33
Purpose.....	56b	33

	Paragraph	Page
Intelligence files.....	43	27
Intelligence section, mission.....	173b	143
Intelligence security.....	7b	5
Intelligence specialists.....	30a, 172b, 183	16, 143, 166
Intelligence summary (ISUM).....	71a, 72	57, 59
Intelligence training. (See Training, intelligence.)		
Interpretation:		
As step in processing.....	11a(3)	8
At higher echelons.....	55	32
Definition.....	48	30
Interrogation reports.....	71k	58
Journal, G2:		
Description.....	40	25
File.....	43a	27
Separate.....	53b	32
Locally available forces.....	60d(2)(b)	37
Maneuvers.....	190	169
Map(s):		
Allowances.....	142d	119
As source.....	26	15
Classification.....	141	118
Distribution.....	143	120
Requirements.....	142	118
Mapping (or charting) cover.....	147b	124
Materiel, enemy.....	22	14
Medical units as collecting agencies.....	30c(3)(c) 4(d)	18
Methods of intelligence instruction.....	188	168
Military aspects of an area, factors.....	84	71
Military information:		
Processing.....	38	24
Recording.....	39	24
Military intelligence:		
Categories.....	8	5
Definition.....	3	3
Units.....	172	143
Military police units as collecting agencies.....	30c(3)(c) 4(e)	19
Military security.....	158b, 165a(3)	131, 136
Miscellaneous branch, corps intelligence section.....	175b	147
Mission review report.....	152b(3)	128
Mosaics.....	148	124
Night photography.....	147a(3)(b)	122
Oblique photograph.....	146c, 147a(3)(d)	121, 122
Observation and fields of fire.....	84b	71
Obstacles.....	84d	72
Orders and requests:		
Basis.....	111	99
Counterintelligence.....	163	135
For information.....	102	93
Fragmentary.....	117	101
Transmittal.....	116	101



	Paragraph	Page
Order of battle books:		
As means of dissemination .....	71i	58
Order of Battle Files .....	43c	27
Order of battle handbooks:		
As means of dissemination .....	71j	58
Order of battle intelligence:		
Definition .....	8a	6
EEI pertaining .....	91	88
Ordnance Corps units, as collecting agencies .....	30c(3)(c)4(f)	19
Panoramic photography .....	153	129
Peculiarities and weaknesses subparagraph of intelligence estimate .....	60f	40
Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) .....	71b, 73, 74, 75	57, 60, 62
Personnel, documents and materiel, measures for handling .....	118c, 197b(4)	103, 173
Pertinency, examination .....	44	27
Photographs, as sources .....	25	15
Photo intelligence reports .....	152	127
Photo interpretation unit .....	149c	125
Photo interpreters .....	150, 151	126
Photo interpretation reports .....	71l, 152	58, 127
Plan, intelligence:		
Army .....	App XVII	246
Division .....	197	173
Planning intelligence:		
Army .....	199	175
ComZ .....	200	176
Coordination required .....	195	171
Corps .....	198	175
Phases .....	196	172
Sequence .....	194	171
Special Operations .....	201	177
Fort, frontier, and travel security .....	158, 165a(3), 168b	131, 136, 139
Principles:		
Army air reconnaissance .....	135	115
Ground reconnaissance .....	122	106
Prisoners of war .....	196b	172
Procedures for requesting TAF Air Reconnaissance Missions .....	134	113
Processing:		
At higher echelons .....	52	31
Definition .....	11	8
Documents .....	21c	14
Sequence of operations .....	38	24
Production of combat intelligence:		
Collection .....	10	6
Direction .....	13	8
Processing .....	11	8
Use .....	12	8
Psychological Warfare .....	157c	131
Quartermaster Corps Units, as Collecting Agencies .....	30c(3)(c)4(g)	19

	Paragraph	Page
Recent and present significant activities of intelligence estimate.....	60e	39
Agencies.....	123	107
Air.....	127	110
Definition.....	119a	105
Missions.....	124	107
Principles.....	122	106
Targets.....	128	110
Types of missions.....	129b	111
Visual.....	129	110
Reconnaissance by fire.....	119b(1)(b)	105
Reconnaissance in force.....	125, 119b(1)(a)	108, 105
Reconnaissance mission, requests:		
Immediate.....	134e	115
Preplanned.....	134d	114
Procedures for obtaining.....	134	113
Recording:		
At Division.....	39	24
At higher echelons.....	53	31
As step in processing.....	11a(1)	7
Reinforcements.....	60d(3)(b)	38
Reliability, determination.....	45	28
Replenishment issue of maps.....	142d(2)	119
Reporting, place and time.....	104	96
Reports:		
Photo-interpretation.....	71l	58
Prisoner of war interrogation.....	71k	58
Translation.....	71m	58
Special.....	71s	59
Repetitive cover.....	130	112
Requests for air reconnaissance missions.....	134	113
Responsibilities:		
AWS officer.....	79a(5)	66
Commander.....	2a, 120a, 182a	3, 105, 165
Engineer.....	79b(1)	67
Enemy materiel.....	22b	15
For air photos.....	145	120
For counterintelligence.....	157	130
For maps.....	140b, 140c	118
For reconnaissance.....	120	105
G2.....	2b, 51, 79a(4)	3, 31, 66
Intelligence training.....	182	165
Ridge and stream lining.....	83b(2)(a)	69
Route reconnaissance.....	129b(3)	111
Secrecy discipline.....	158b(1)	131
Security:		
Civil.....	158	131
Intelligence.....	7b	57
Military.....	158b	131
Port, frontier, and travel.....	158d	132
Sequence of Intelligence Planning.....	194	171
Shelling report, as source of information.....	24	15
Signal communications, enemy, as source.....	23	15
Signal Corps units, as collecting agencies.....	30c(3)(c)4(h)	19

Situation map and overlay:	Paragraph	Page
As means of dissemination .....	71f	58
Description .....	41	25
Source(s), intelligence:		
Definition .....	15a, b	9
Enemy signal communications .....	23	15
Shelling reports .....	24	15
Terrain information .....	79b	67
Weather information .....	27, 79a	16, 65
Special cover .....	149a(3)	
Special information service:		
Defined .....	30c	16
Types .....	30c(3)	17
Special staff sections, as collecting agencies .....	30c(3)(c)	17
Special:		
Cover .....	149a(3)	122
Operations .....	158f	133
Reports .....	71s, 152b(6)	59, 128
Specific search .....	129b(2)	111
Spot reports .....	70b	57
Standing Operating Procedure:		
Items in collection plan .....	115	101
Outline form for G2 section .....	App XV	235
Outline form for intelligence para of command SOP .....	App XVI	233
Stereoscopic paid .....	146d	121
Strategic intelligence:		
Comparison w/ combat intelligence .....	6	4
Definition .....	5	4
In special operations .....	201c	178
Strength subparagraph of intelligence estimate .....	60d	36
Strip mosaic .....	148c	124
Suitability of collection agencies .....	103c	95
Summary reports .....	152b(4)	128
Supporting services:		
Marine air reconnaissance support .....	139	117
Naval air reconnaissance support .....	138	117
Tactical air force .....	137	116
Surveillance, battlefield .....	10b	8
Tactical air force reconnaissance units, as collecting agencies .....	30c(3)(d)	19
Tactical effect of weather and terrain .....	85	78
Tactical study of weather and terrain:		
As means of dissemination .....	71h	58
Definition .....	78a	63
Example .....	App V	193
Technical intelligence:		
Bulletins and summaries .....	71g	58
Defined .....	8b	6
Group .....	178c(5)	155
Technical service intelligence detachments:		
As collecting agencies .....	30c(3)	17
Duties .....	30c(3)(a)1	17
Terrain:		
Compartments .....	84f(3)	76
Determination of critical terrain .....	84c	72

Terrain—Continued	Paragraph	Page
EEI pertaining.....	92	88
Effects.....	85c	80
Map or overlay.....	83b	69
Military aspects.....	84	71
Models, as source.....	26b	15
Theater Army:		
Collecting agencies available.....	37	22
Intelligence Division.....	179	157
Timeliness.....	56d, 68a, 68c, 192	33, 56, 57, 171
Training, intelligence:		
Categories.....	183	166
Creating intelligence consciousness.....	189	169
Intelligence section personnel.....	184	166
Maneuvers.....	190	169
Methods of instruction.....	188	168
MI specialists.....	186	167
Other personnel.....	187	167
Reconnaissance units and special information services.....	185	167
Responsibility.....	182	165
Translation reports.....	71m	58
Transportation Corps units as collecting agencies.....	30c(3)(c)4(i)	19
Troops:		
As collecting agencies.....	30b	16
Troop movements, enemy.....	66	52
Uncontrolled mosaic.....	148b	124
Use of intelligence.....	67	56
Uses of photo-intelligence reports.....	152c	128
Vertical photographs.....	146a, 147a(3)(c)	121, 122
Visual reconnaissance, types of missions.....	129b	111
Vulnerabilities, enemy:		
Discussion.....	62c	45
EEI Pertaining to.....	90	87
Weather:		
As source of information.....	79	65
Defined.....	78c	63
EEI pertaining.....	93	89
Effects.....	85b	78
Effects of atomic weapons.....	85d	81
Requirements.....	App IV	186
G2 responsibility.....	79a(4)	66
Weather forecasts:		
Accuracy.....	78g(2)	64
As source of information.....	27	16
Classification.....	78g(3)	64
Defined.....	78f(1)	64
Weather summary.....	78i	65
Worksheet:		
Counterintelligence.....	162 App XI	135, 229
G2, description.....	42	25
Sample counterintelligence.....	App XII	230

[AG 353 (29 Aug 56)]

By Order of *Wilber M. Brucker*, Secretary of the Army:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,  
*General, United States Army,*  
*Chief of Staff.*

Official:

JOHN A. KLEIN,  
*Major General, United States Army* DA FA 12-25  
*The Adjutant General.*

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Gen & Br Svc Sch (5) except	ARMA (2)
Armd Sch (175)	

NG: State AG (6); units—same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit.

USAR: Same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.